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INTRODUCION 
 
In 2060 the percentage of people aged 65 years and older will reach 30% in most European 
countries (Eurostat 2011), an increase of 13 percentage points over 2010 (see also Economic Policy 
Committee, 2001). This increase gives an idea of the needs connected with the LTC services in the 
near future. Lafortune et al. (2007) notes that, even if the disability rates are decreasing to a certain 
extent in some countries (Denmark, Finland, Italy, The Netherlands and USA) (Gruenberg, 1997, 
Fries, 1980, Manton, 1982) and the increase in the elderly population does not translate 
automatically into a corresponding increase in the number of individuals with more or less serious 
disability, it is necessary to pay attention to the increasing demand for long-term assistance. Such 
attention is, however, a recent phenomenon, in fact, as stated by Costa and Ranci (2010, 3) “care 
was for long time confined to the sphere of intimacy and of private solidarity, and only in the last 
two decades, with the explosive growth of the elderly population, has it moved into the public 
domain”. Due to these demographic changes the Long Term Care (LTC) policies are one of the 
welfare state fields which have experienced throughout western Europe, in the last ten-fifteen years 
and in countertendency with respect to the main sectors of social policies, an overall growth of 
public financing, an increase in beneficiaries, and a broadening of public responsibilities. 
Nonetheless all European countries,  to different degrees, are facing the problem of the 
sustainability of their LTC system, and consequently a reorganization and/or reduction of their 
costs. A central aspect of the reform processes that are affecting the LTC system concerns “the 
capacity of public spending to meet rising long term care expenditure […] and the issue of 
sustainability arises in relation to private as well as public expenditures (OECD, 2005; 82). As 
suggested by Pommer (et al., 2007), a possible outcome of these reform processes concerns the 
reduction of the public role in favor of an increase in the private dimension, concerning both care 
provision and financing.  
There is a relation linking the reforms of the LTC sector and the level of private resources that these 
systems demand from the beneficiaries of care and their families, which is governed by the 
characteristics of the system of care and assistance. The latter do not concern only the level of 
public services that a state ensures. We shall argue, in fact, that in answering the need of 
sustainability , the national LTC systems have pursued different reform trajectories encompassing: 
i) the structure and the role of the different actors of the market of care services; ii) the sharing of 
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resources among formal care services; iii) the financing modalities of the system; iv) the public 
responsibility of care in terms of services accessibility.  
For each one of these features, it is possible to identify specific aspects affecting the degree of 
private involvement in the care of elderly people. Our aim is, firstly, to single out those factors 
directly affecting the degree of reliance on private resources, and to investigate how the European  
countries are distributed in relation to this aspect. This analysis will be instrumental to our main 
goal, which is to investigate whether a relation exists between the level of private care resources 
and the risk of poverty of dependent elderly people and their families. 
More specifically, on the basis of selected indicators of LTC system characteristics, we present the 
results of a cluster analysis that considers the EU LTC systems from the standpoint of the resources 
- both financial  and in time - which frail elderly people and their families allocate to care. The 
cluster analysis provides two outcomes: 1. a map of the clustering of European countries with 
respect to the characteristics that we have singled out as directly affecting private care resources; 2 
the identification of six European countries, representative of the various clusters,  that will make 
up the case studies of the second part of this work. In this second phase, using the data of the 
Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE), we investigate how the reforms 
which have been implemented by these countries have affected the dependent population (and their 
adult children), in terms of: 1. support received, both services in-kind and cash benefits; and 2. 
involvement in the care process, informal care received (and provided) and private care 
expenditure. The last part of this work is devoted to the presentation of the main results of our 
research. Through the use of binary logistic regression models, we test the hypothesis that the 
dependent condition and the extent of private resources devoted to care increase the probability to 
be at risk of poverty for the dependent elderly persons’ and their adult children’s families. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
THEORETICAL MODEL 
 
 
This work starts from the premise that dependency represents a significant risk factor which 
considerably increases the probability to fall into the risk of poverty. Families with dependent 
members often experience a ‘compression’ of their living standards due to two main factors: the 
reduced capacity to work for both the dependent elderly and their family caregivers, and the fact 
that dependency entails increased expenditures for routine activities and especially for the health 
related costs. In this regard, research findings (OECD 2011) show that, in several countries, the cost 
associated to the care and assistance to the elderly with a high level of dependency exceeds the 
available income of (dependent) individuals including those comprised in the sixth income decile. 
As claimed  by Costa and Ranci (2010), the presence of dependent persons significantly affects both 
the organization of their families (the household members who assume care-giving responsibilities 
must reconcile paid work with care by accepting jobs with reduced hours or low wages), and the 
household’s overall income. While family caregivers often act as a social safety net for older care 
receivers (Lubben,1988), research findings consistently indicate the associated caregiving burden 
that family caregivers experience, and its financial cost (Lai, 2012). Based on these considerations, 
our intent is to understand how these dimension, care cost and informal care, are affected by the 
LTC characteristics and, in turn, how they affect the dependent elderly's family income and the risk 
of poverty. 
1.1 Hypothesis and conceptual framework 
Private care resources are the focus of our research: indeed, they represent the link between the 
LTC national systems characteristics and the probability to be at risk of poverty of the elderly 
people and their relatives. According to Fast et al.(1999), who propose a taxonomy of hidden costs 
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related to the elderly care1, private resources devoted to care include both direct monetary expenses 
(out of pocket) and time, unpaid labour and employment related costs (informal care).  
As diagram 1 shows, the level of private resources devoted to the care of the frail elderly is the 
result of the specific aspects of the LTC system, and, in turn, it plays a role as possible cause of the 
impoverishment of the elderly population and their relatives.  
As for the relation between private care resources and LTC system characteristics, following the 
literature on care regimes (Albert, 1995; Anttonen and Sipilä 1996; Bettio and Plantenga 2004; 
Daly and Lewis 2000; Lewis 1992; Jensen, 2008; Orloff 1993, Ranci and Pavolini, 2008), it is 
possible to identify three factors that are crucial for understanding the effects of the reforms of the 
national LTC systems: the structure of the services and of care provision; the structure of the care 
market; and public responsibility for care (OECD 1996, 2005; Jacobzone 1999). 
On the basis of these works, it is possible to identify specific aspects of the LTC national systems  
that may condition the private involvement in the care of elderly people. There are four aspects of 
LTC systems that are of interest for our research, and we briefly summarize  their characteristics: 
i) services provision (characteristics of the structure of LTC services): the level of private 
resources devoted to care is directly connected to the level of services provided in a given LTC 
system. The availability of formal services in kind (public and private) or in cash, providing support 
to the dependent elderly people, limits the burden of care falling upon the individual sphere. The 
care of dependent elderly people through the informal (and formal) sphere entails the need for 
private resources in terms of time and money; 
                                                             
1
 They identify two components of hidden costs in elderly care, economic costs and non economic costs. In turn the first 
aspect derives from three distinct factors: employment related costs; out- of-pocket expenses and unpaid labour; whilst 
the second aspect derives from: physical costs; social costs; and emotional costs.   
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Diagram 1 The risk of poverty for dependent elderly 
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ii) market structure (characteristics of care market structure): private resources for care depend 
on the care market structure. We do not deny that the presence of a plurality of providers entails, 
through competition mechanisms, a benefit for the dependent elderly people and their families, both 
in economic terms and in terms of time; but we maintain that the end result is influenced by the role 
played by the public actor in two ways: by ensuring a fair access to care of potential beneficiaries, 
with regard to their income and/or their level of disability; and by regulating and sustaining the 
development of private providers and private services, so that it does not entail a deterioration of the 
quality of the services provided and/or an increase of the economic burden required from the 
families. 
iii) entitlement to care (access to  care); the regulation of the access to care affects private care 
resources. The criteria regulating access to care that a public LTC system applies, both for services in 
kind and for cash benefits, define the extent and the characteristics of beneficiaries of the public services 
and ultimately affect the amount of private care resources falling upon the family;   
iv) public expenditure (public expenditure for LTC services): the public expenditure allocated to 
the LTC sector directly affects the private care resources. It is assumed that the generosity of a LTC 
system is directly proportional to the share of public expenditure that is allocated to it; thus, greater 
levels of coverage of the services - and smaller need for private resources - correspond to greater 
levels of expenditure. However, since public expenditure is financed through general fiscality, the  
issue of the re-distribution of private resources must be considered. 
Regarding the aspect of services provision, at European level new trends are observable: a new 
“discovery" (and use) of informal care-giving (Kröger and Sipilä, 2005, Wiener 2003), an 
increasing use of home based solutions instead of institutionalization (Lundsgaard, 2005; OECD, 
1996, 2005; Marin et al., 2009; Bettio and Verashchagina, 2010), and a growing importance of cash 
transfers in substitution or integration of services (Da Riot et al. 2007; Ungerson and Yeandle, 
2007). Nevertheless, meaningful differences still exist across countries in the levels of the provision 
of services and in the degree of coverage of social needs. These differences affect the effort, both in 
terms of time and money, which the elderly and their families have to sustain for care: we can 
assume that countries with a higher degree of formal services in kind (public and private), or a more 
7 
 
developed system of cash benefits, the burden of care reserved to the individual sphere can be more 
limited. 
In response to the issue of sustainability, and as a consequence of the reorganization of services 
provision, an increasing number of countries are shifting to market principles (Anxo and Fagan 
2005; Pavolini and Ranci, 2008,). Although the entry of for-profit actors in the provision of welfare 
state services dates back to the last century - specifically in the last two decades (Everse and 
Laville, 2004) -, as claimed by Shutes et al. (2011) different market-oriented reforms have 
characterized the recent restructuring of welfare states. In relation to the LTC system, this change is 
detectable in: i) the increasing outsourcing (contracting-out) of home care services and the 
consequent shift in the balance of provision in favor of private or not-for-profit providers (Daly and 
Lewis, 2000); ii) a shift towards the direct purchasing of care by individuals and their families 
through the public transfer of cash payments (Ungerson, 2007, Simonazzi 2009) or vouchers (Bode 
and Chartrand, 2010; Beltrametti et al., 2011); iii) and greater reliance on private funding of care by 
individuals and their families (Shutes and Chiatti, 2011). As the OECD (2011) claims,  the presence 
of a plurality of providers may entail - through competition mechanisms - a benefit for the 
dependent elderly people and their families, though this benefit is bound to the presence of 
monetary subsidies and to the recipient’s freedom of choice between different providers (ibidem). 
However, the relation between the process of marketization of the care sector and the private care 
resources is more complex, since it is affected by other aspects, such as –at the institutional level -  
the existence and the quality of instruments favouring the promotion and affordability of the private 
services, and – at the micro level – families’ characteristics, such as the capacity to pay for the 
services. We assume that the process of marketization generates a negative impact on the private 
care resources in countries with a less developed system of support of access to services: as 
Szebehely and Trydega°rd (2011) have noted, this process can limit the availability of formal 
services for the low-income families. 
Another aspect affected by the process of reform for the sustainability of the LTC system is the 
dimension of the entitlement to care
2
. The main form of targeting of care (financial accessibility, 
for Pommer et al., 2007) regards the provision of benefits and it concerns, on one hand, targeting of 
a services package and, on the other, eligibility for the cash benefit schemes. In the EU countries the 
                                                             
2
 We consider this dimension as the possibility to take advantage of a service through public subsidies or facilities (total 
or partial). This definition differs from that used by WHO (2003), which concerns the possibility (entitlement 
programmes) or impossibility (Non entitlement programmes-Budget constraint) to receive a public service.   
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definition of a services package is individualized as much as possible. (MISSOC 2006): it is 
affected by the level of incapacity, the place of residence, the living conditions, the environment, 
the availability of informal care, and by the income of the recipients of care. Similarly, eligibility 
for cash benefit schemes can vary according to age, need and income, and it may relate  only to the 
frail elderly person or also to his/her family (OECD 2011). Another aspect related to the regulation 
of access to care and to the sustainability of LTC systems is the mechanism for sharing the costs of 
care by the beneficiaries. All public LTC systems involve a degree of cost sharing, albeit at 
significantly different levels; and usually, the copayment is related to the income or assets of the 
beneficiary. The criteria for access to care that a public LTC system applies, define the extent and 
the characteristics of beneficiaries of the public services thus affecting the amount of private care 
resources falling on the subjects. Specifically, we assume that countries lacking an effective balance 
between the eligibility criterion based on the dependent elderly income (or, in some cases, 
household income) and those based on the level of disability and family characteristics, a higher 
level of private care resources is required. Another interesting aspect related to the targeting of care 
is the role played by the family legal tie: it is possible to assume that the degree or presence of this 
tie affects the allocation of the care cost between the dependent elderly, their relatives and the state. 
A final aspect connected to the sustainability of the system and closely related to the amount of 
private resources involved in elderly care is the public expenditure devoted to the LTC sector. As 
Kraus  (2010) notes, public expenditure is the most important source of financing for LTC services 
in almost all countries and it can be seen as a measure of the generosity of an LTC system. As 
remarked by the European Commission (2009), it might be thought obvious that differences in 
public expenditure allocated to the LTC sector are directly related to the level of development of the 
services in that sector, but this assumption it not always true since the relation between the public 
expenditure and the effective level of benefits received by the dependent elderly can vary because 
of different factors. Firstly, the definition of the amount of public expenditure is complex because, 
in almost all the EU countries, the functioning of the LTC system involves different levels of 
government, and the services are often provided and funded at the regional/local level, with 
differences both  in terms of type/intensity of and access to the services. Moreover, although a high 
level of public expenditure can be associated to a developed LTC system, the relation between  
public financing and generosity of an LTC system is affected by the aspects presented above.       
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The interaction between the characteristics of the four aspects  presented defines the capacity of the 
system to meet the demand of care of the dependent population, and indirectly, determines the 
amount of private care resources that the families have to integrate in order to compensate the 
unmet demand of care. To fill the gap between supply and demand, the families can be involved 
indirectly, by purchasing services and assistance through the market, or directly, by providing 
themselves care to their relatives. The former solution, presented in figure 1 as "the economic 
dimension of private care resources", generates a loss of family income proportional to the elder 
person’s disability level, and inversely proportional to the public support received; the latter, 
defined as "the non-economic dimension of private care resources", reduces the work capacity of 
the members of the family that take care of the elderly, generally the partner or the adult children, 
and as the economic dimension, is affected both by the disability level and by the public support, 
but also by the family capacity and possibility to share the burden of care. Whereas these two 
dimensions are not mutually exclusive, but rather coexist, it is possible to maintain that the double 
reduction of income caused, on the one hand by the care expenditure, and on other hand by the drop 
of income from work, can lead the dependent person’s family below the poverty threshold. 
In order to understand if the need for private care resources can increase the risk of poverty, we 
must consider two dimensions: institutional factors  and individual and social factors. The 
institutional factors represent the support that the elderly receives from the formal LTC system, and 
can be divided in two broad category: services in kind, such as home care and domestic help 
services,  semi-residential and residential facilities; and cash benefits, such as disability allowances, 
tax credits and vouchers. Both types reduce the family economic burden, by taking care of the 
elderly or by subsidizing care. The second dimension considers the individual characteristics that 
can affect the family risk of poverty, such as age, gender, disability level or health status of the 
dependent person, and the social factors that, at the household level, act both on the care process 
and on the household’s income, such as the family dimension, the number of siblings of the 
informal caregiver, the household’ employment situation, the economic transfers between 
generations, and the presence of a legal tie that recognizes the duty of care within families, 
generally between parents and children. 
On the basis  of these considerations we have defined two consequential hypotheses, which are 
related to the macro (H1) and micro (H2) assumptions respectively. These hypotheses are: 
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 H1= the LTC reform processes aimed at increasing sustainability through: 
 i) public spending reorganization/reduction;  
ii) a growing individualization of care, through both the process of marketization of care, and  
greater reliance on the family ;  
iii) the narrowing of the accessibility to services  through the process of targetization of care;  
determine a shift of the responsibility of care from the public to the private sphere, generating a 
growing involvement of the family in the care process; 
H2= due to this shift of responsibility, the families became the main actor in the care of the elderly, 
both directly, providing care, and indirectly, financing services; this reduction of the public role can 
have an economic impact on the dependent elderly and their relatives, increasing their probability to 
be at risk of poverty. 
1.2 Relevance 
This research attempts to bring together two levels of analysis that have been usually considered 
separately in social policy studies. In diagram 1 we presents the relationships linking together the 
processes of reform that have interested the LTC systems at the macro level with the economic 
impact that they generate at the micro/individual level. Additionally, this analysis tries to consider 
simultaneously both the risk factors and the prevention factors related to the dependent condition, in 
order to assess the extent to which greater reliance on the private care resources can affect the 
household’s risk of poverty. The macro analysis highlights the existence of a trade-off between the 
two dimensions of private care resources, showing that the LTC systems are distributed on a 
continuum, from countries in which the families are scarcely involved in the care process, to 
countries in which the elderly care is almost exclusively a private matter. On the basis of these 
results it is possible to identify four typologies of elderly care systems. The micro analysis has 
allowed to better understand the consequences of the reform processes on services perception in the 
Swedish case, highlighting, counter-trend with macro data, how the LTC system of this countries is 
moving away from the Scandinavian model. This research is the first study (to the author’s  
knowledge) that tries to link together, in a causal relationship, two of the main social risk at EU 
level: the ageing population and the risk of poverty of dependent persons and their families.  
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CHAPTER 2 
 
 
MACRO ANALYSIS  
 
 
This chapter is dedicated to the macro analysis of the functioning of LTC systems. The aim of this 
phase is twofold: to identify typologies of national LTC systems based on the characteristics related 
to the four aspects defined in the theoretical model; and to understand if and how these typologies 
differ in relation to the dimensions of private care resources. The first paragraph provides a  
definition of the variables used, the second section, applies an univariate and bivariate analysis to 
the structure and the characteristics of LTC systems, and the third part presents the results of the 
cluster analysis. In the last paragraph we identify four typologies of LTC systems on the basis of the 
need for private care resources. 
 
 
2.1 DATA, SAMPLE AND VARIABLES USED 
The analysis covers 14 EU countries, and we collected 12 variables, 3 for each aspect of the LTC 
system being examined. In the following, we present a synthetic description of the variables and the 
source of data used. 
Services delivery  
Home Care recipients (label: Home_ rec)  
This variable defines  the share of dependent elderly persons receiving formal care at home in total 
population aged over 65.  
Institutional Care recipients (label:  Instut_ rec)  
This variable measures the level of residential care available in a country, and is defined as the e 
ratio of dependent elderly people receiving institutional care services in total population over 65. 
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Cash Benefit recipients (label: Cash_rec) 
This variable defines the share of elderly people  receiving monetary transfers related to their 
condition of non-self-sufficiency. Like the other variables, it compares the population over 65 
receiving cash benefits with the entire over-65 population. 
Market structure
3
 
Public providers (label: Public_prov) 
In constructing this variable two aspects were taken into account: i) the different role of the public 
actor in providing home care services or institutional care services respectively; ii) and the level of 
coverage of these two services. In other words, this variable is constructed by means of a weighted 
average: 
 
( 
Market share of  
public providers 
for Home care  
* 
home 
care 
recipients 
) + ( 
Market share of  
public providers 
for residential care  
* 
Institutional 
care 
recipients 
) 
  
 
                        ( home care recipients    +    Institutional care recipients ) 
 
This variable tries to synthesize in a single value the role played by the public actor on the care 
market, taking into account the different role that it plays in the provision of the two different 
services and the level of coverage, and therefore the capacity, of those services. 
Not-for-profit providers (label: Notprofit_prov)  
This variable makes it possible to understand the role of the not-for-profit actor in the care market. 
The mechanism used for constructing the variable is the same as that used for the preceding one. 
For-profit provider (label: Forprofit_prov)  
This variable aims at estimating, on the basis of the mechanism used for the two preceding 
variables, the share of the care market held by private for-profit actors. 
                                                             
3
 The three variables used to define the market composition  consider only the professional operators, omitting the role 
of  private individual caregivers and informal care . According to the literature, especially in Southern European 
countries, but not only there, a good part of private provision of services comes from non-professional caregivers 
employed in the grey market,  usually immigrant women directly hired by the families. We had to omit  this aspect 
because- due to the non-professional nature of these workers, there are no reliable data that allow a comparison between 
countries in relation to this aspect. Nevertheless, in the micro level analysis, we take account of this aspect  through the 
variable of family care expenditure. This variable represents all kind of expenditure that the families sustain for care, 
included the cost of individual caregiver. In relation to the informal care, these variables consider only the formal 
services and operators, while for detect the role played by this kind of care a specific variable is dedicated (infocare). 
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Entitlement for care  
Share of means-tested expenditure (label: MT_exp)  
the share of means-tested evaluation procedures in the total public expenditure allocated to services 
in- kind. 
Formal Care of Dependent population (label: Formal_dep)  
The share of persons that receive formal care (Home and Institutional care) in the total number of 
elders with problems related to the condition of non-self-sufficiency. We use this variable as an 
indicator, at the aggregate level, of the possibility of accessing formal care. 
Cash benefits on dependent population (label: Cash_dep)  
The share of dependent persons that receive monetary transfers. 
Public expenditure 
Gross Domestic product for LTC (label: GDP_LTC) 
The share of public expenditure for LTC in GDP, not corrected by the share of the older population. 
Public expenditure on LTC per capita(label: Per_cap)  
This variable measures  the level of public expenditure used by a country for the care of dependent 
elderly people
4
. The variable is constructed as follows:              
 
                                              
                                                            public expenditure on LTC/GDP               
                                                          share of persons aged 65 and older               
 
In other words, this variable compares the LTC expenditure per inhabitant over 65 with the national 
per capita income. By standardizing the  public expenditure on LTC per elderly person with the 
national per capita income we obtain a variable which is comparable across European countries 
with different levels of GDP). 
This variable and the previous one provide a complete information of the public effort in financing 
the elderly care, per head and in the aggregate. 
 
                                                             
4
 This variable is a variation of the “Income and needs-corrected spending” indicator used by Kraus et al. (2010) 
14 
 
Cash and In-kind expenditure rate (label: cash_kind) 
This variable gives the ratio of the expenditure allocated to cash benefits in relation to the amount 
of expenditure allocated to services in-kind. Values equal to 1 indicate an identical amount of 
expenditure for the two kind of service; values equal to 2 indicate that the expenditure for cash 
benefits is  twice the expenditure for services in kind. 
Private care resources 
Out-of-pocket expenditure (label: priv_exp)  
This variable measures the share of expenditure by private parties for the purpose of care, in the 
total expenditure of the LTC sector. In other words, the variable defines how much of the total cost 
of care falls upon dependent elderly people and their families. 
Informal care (label: infocare) 
This variable reports the share of population aged over 65 that receives care and assistance from 
relatives, friends or their partner on a voluntary basis. 
Table 1 presents the main sources of the data for each variable and the reference years. The selected 
countries are: Spain, United Kingdom, Germany, France, Austria, Poland, Estonia, Belgium, Italy, 
Czech Republic, Slovenia, Finland, Sweden and Denmark. The selection criterion is the availability 
of comparable data for all the variables considered. In order to ensure comparability between 
countries we decided to rely on international databases, that guarantee a standardized procedure of 
data processing. So as to obtain the national public expenditure of LTC systems, we have used the 
same methodology applied by the European Commission for the Ageing Report (2012), based on 
two international data sources: System of Health account (SHA) and ESSPROS. The European 
System of Integrated Social Protection Statistics, abbreviated as ESSPROS, is a common 
framework developed in the late 1970's by Eurostat and the European Union Member States 
providing a coherent dataset  of social benefits to households and their financing, thus making 
international comparison of the administrative national data on social protection possible. The 
System of Health Account, is the result of a collaboration between EUROSTAT, OECD and WHO, 
started in 2000, and provides a standard framework for producing a set of comprehensive, 
consistent and internationally comparable accounts to meet the needs of public and private-sector 
health analysts and policy-makers. 
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Table 1. Sources and reference years of the variables used in the cluster analysis 
Variables Sources  
Reference 
years 
Home_rec OECD 2011, ESSPROSS and EUROSTAT mid-2000s 
Institut_rec OECD 2011, ESSPROSS and EUROSTAT mid-2000s 
Cash_rec ESSPROS, EUROSTAT 2010 
Public_prov Allen et al. (2011), Barnett et al. (2010) and Sowa (2010) [Rodrigues et al., 2012] mid-2000s 
Notprofit_prov Allen et al. (2011), Barnett et al. (2010) and Sowa (2010) [Rodrigues et al., 2012] mid-2000s 
Forprofit_prov Allen et al. (2011), Barnett et al. (2010) and Sowa (2010) [Rodrigues et al., 2012] mid-2000s 
Formal_dep ESSPROS, EUROSTAT mid-2000s 
Cash_dep ESSPROS, EUROSTAT 2010 
MT_exp System of Health Account (SHA); ESSPROS 2010 
Per_cap System of Health Account (SHA); ESSPROS 2010 
GDP_LTC System of Health Account (SHA); ESSPROS 2010 
Cash_Kind System of Health Account (SHA); ESSPROS 2010 
Infocare OECD 2011 mid-2000s 
Priv_exp System of Health Account (SHA); ESSPROS 2010 
 
 As table 1 shows, these two database together with the EUROSTAT data, represent the main data 
sources for the definition of the LTC system characteristics,  relating to provision, accessibility and 
financing of services. The market composition has been defined on the basis of information 
provided by Rodriguez et al. (2012), in "Fact and Figures on Healthy Ageing and Long-Term Care". 
In this work the authors dedicated a chapter on the care market composition under a double 
perspective: public or private nature of providers, and type of services (home care or residential 
care), putting together information provided by international researches. 
The results of the operation of data collecting are reported in table 2. The comment of the figures 
reported in the table is provided in the next paragraph, which focuses on the analysis of the LTC 
systems characteristics based on the data provided in table 2. 
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Table 2 Countries values of the variables used in the macro analysis  
Countries 
ES UK  DE FR AT PL EE BL IT CZ SI FI SE DK mean 
LTC 
aspects Variables 
Service 
delivery  
Home_rec 4,2 12,6 6,7 4,9 14,8 1,2 1,6 8 2,8 7,3 2,2 9 9,7 14 7,1 
Institut_rec 4 3,8 4,1 3 3,5 0,5 1,8 4 2 3,8 4,1 5,5 6 4,8 3,6 
Cash_rec 3,9 15 4,6 10,6 18,2 10 5 0 12,5 16 9,2 13 1 18 9,8 
Market 
structure  
Public_prov 23 12,2 3,1 18,6 30,6 64,4 51,9 38 30 65 100 79 75 73,9 47,1 
Notprofit_prov 24 11,5 43,5 50,5 55,5 30 21,7 36 50 32 0 0 10 0 26,1 
Forprofit_prov 53 75,6 54 30,9 13,9 5,6 12,3 26 20 3 0 21 15 26 25,45 
Entitlement 
for care  
Formal_dep 20 43 49 66 69 6 8 54 18 48 56 48 62 79 44,71 
Cash_dep 12 11 23 48 70 65 15 1,5 58 62 55 44 5 57 37,6 
MT_exp 0,86 0,644 0,376 0,305 0,348 0,009 0,037 0,007 0,219 0,043 0,064 0 0,009 0 0,209 
Public 
expenditure  
Per_cap 0,086 0,087 0,089 0,133 0,134 0,056 0,037 0,127 0,054 0,054 0,111 0,124 0,046 0,211 0,096 
GDP_LTC 0,014 0,014 0,018 0,022 0,024 0,008 0,006 0,022 0,011 0,008 0,018 0,028 0,008 0,035 0,017 
Cash_Kind 0,296 0,154 0,333 0,315 0,553 0,879 1,24 0,017 2,861 1,976 0,703 0,205 0,197 0,323 0,718 
Private 
care 
resources 
Infocare 15,3 15,2 11,5 10,2 9,8 10,3 24 12,1 16,2 12 10,5 8 8 9,3 12,31 
Priv_exp 28 20 25 25 17 1 22 16 35 35 2 15 4 9 18 
Source: Author’s elaboration 
 
As noted by various authors (Pavolini, Ranci et al, 2013), in spite of the great number of studies on 
elderly care and LTC system and the increasing attention on this topic, due to the recent definition 
of the LTC system as a distinct sector within the welfare system, the first step of an analysis must 
be the definition of a coherent set of data. That’s why, in this paragraph, we have taken care to use, 
as far as possible, data that are comparable and provide a detailed description of the variables on 
which the macro analysis is based, specifying the information that each variable brings to the 
analysis. 
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2.2 CHARACTERISTICS OF LTC SYSTEMS  
Over the past fifteen years the Long Term Care (LTC) sector has experienced an overall growth in 
public financing, an increase in beneficiaries, and a broadening of public responsibilities throughout 
Western Europe. This has taken place in counter-tendency with respect to the main sectors of social 
policies. However, all European countries, in different degrees, are facing the problem of LTC 
system sustainability and, consequently, a reorganization and/or reduction of their costs. A central 
element of the reform processes that are affecting the LTC system concerns “the capacity of public 
spending to meet rising long term care expenditure […] and the issue of sustainability arises in 
relation to private as well as public expenditures (OECD, 2005; 82). As suggested by Pommer (et 
al., 2007), a possible outcome of these reform processes consists in the reduction of the public role 
in favour of an increase in the private dimension, care provision and financing.  
Therefore, it is possible to assume the existence of a relation between the reforms in LTC sectors 
and the required level of family involvement in elderly care. This relation is governed by the 
characteristics of care and assistance systems. The latter are not limited to the level of public 
services ensured by the state. In fact, an answer to the need of LTC sustainability has been provided 
by the different reform trajectories that have concerned - and are concerning - the national LTC 
systems, whose main scopes are to re-define: i) the structure and role of the different actors of the 
care service market; ii) the sharing of resources among formal care services; iii) the types of 
financing; iv) and the public responsibility of care in terms of service accessibility. 
The care regime literature (Albert, 1995; Anttonen and Sipilä 1996; Bettio and Plantenga 2004; 
Daly and Lewis 2000; Lewis 1992; Jensen, 2008; Orloff 1993, Ranci and Pavolini, 2008) has  
identified three main lines of change of the national LTC systems: i) the structure of the services 
and the provision of care; ii) the structure of the care market; iii) public responsibility for care 
(OECD 1996, 2005; Jacobzone 1999). Our aim is to analyze the impact of these changes on the 
private involvement in the care of elderly people, by focusing on four aspects of LTC national 
systems: service delivery, market structure, entitlement for care and public expenditure. These 
aspects and their characteristics at the national level are analyzed in the following paragraph. 
Services delivery (characteristics of the structure of LTC services) 
The configuration of LTC systems varies considerably depending on whether in-kind services or 
cash benefits are provided. In-kind services are provided directly to recipients by way of residential 
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or home care, while cash benefits have the effect of passing the responsibility to individuals and 
families for the organization of their own care services. As far as in-kind services are concerned, we 
note an increasing use of home-based solutions compared to institutionalization  (Lundsgaard, 
2005; OECD, 1996, 2005; Marin et al., 2009; Bettio and Verashchagina, 2010). At the same time, 
there has been a growing importance of cash benefits in replacement or integration of services (Da 
Riot et al. 2007; Ungerson and Yeandle, 2007).  
 
The macro data
5
 partly confirm this reconfiguration between these different types of public 
involvement. In 2010, all European countries present a higher coverage of home care services 
compared with residential services. This means that the European Commission’s target of "ageing 
in place" has been partly acknowledged by the EU countries. It is interesting to note, however, that 
there is a positive correlation (0.598) (figure 1) between the rate of coverage of residential services 
and the share of home care services, which indicates that, in each country, the extent of home care 
services is proportional to the degree of residential care. Assuming the coverage level as a proxy of 
                                                             
5
 For an overview of the data and variables used for the macro analysis refer to the Appendix (A1 and A2). 
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the level of development of in-kind services, the correlation between home and residential care 
indicates that European countries tend to range from countries with an undeveloped sector, to 
countries with a high rate of coverage for both home and residential care services. 
 
Data also suggest that cash benefits play a key role in the functioning of the LTC system, even in 
those countries with a strong tradition of in-kind services, like the Scandinavian countries. At the 
EU level, the share of cash benefit recipients in the total population over 65  is around 10%. This is 
a significant share, especially when compared with the average percentage of institutional users, 
that is only around 4%. However, European countries differ widely in their reliance on cash 
benefits. In countries where the services are provided by private operators, the cash-for-care is an 
instrument for subsidizing the provision of care, in line with the idea of free choice. This means that 
the (old) disabled people and/or their families may choose among different kinds of care and care 
providers (Da Roit, Le Bihan, 2010b). The European countries differ widely in terms of regulation 
of access and use of cash transfers. For example, in Italy the main cash benefit (Indennità di 
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Accompagnamento) is not means-tested, and its amount is not related to the level of disability, 
while in France the amount of the benefit is related to the disability level and it is paid to finance a 
specific care package established by a team of professionals. We can thus conclude that the 
mechanism of regulation of access to cash benefits generates two opposite effects. In countries 
where there is a limited supply of in-kind services and the cash benefits are not strictly regulated, 
they can be a form of family support, a payoff for the family caregiver. Viceversa, where the public 
transfers are designed for the support of the care process the cash benefit schemes work as a 
mechanism that favours the development of the system of in-kind services. It is therefore not 
surprising that there is a positive correlation (0.443) (figure 2) between the percentage of users of 
home care services and the share of beneficiaries of cash transfers. 
It seems safe to assume that the differences in the mix of services and their degree of development 
affect the effort, in terms of time and money, that the elderly and their families have to make for 
care. However, in our analysis based on macro data, the only clear relationship between private care 
resources and services provision that we could find is a negative relation between the percentage of 
recipients of services in-kind and the level of coverage of informal care (home care -0.429; 
institutional care -0.516). No significant correlation could be found between the out-of-pocket care 
expenditure and the degree of development of cash transfers. Nor we could find a correlation 
between cash transfers and reliance on informal care, while there is weak evidence that in those 
countries with a high degree of formal (public and private) services the economic burden of the care 
reserved to the individuals can be limited (respectively home services; -0.084, and residential care, -
0.152). 
 Market structure (characteristics of care market structure)  
In response to the issue of sustainability, a second trajectory of reform that has involved a large 
number of European countries concerns the reconfiguration of the care market, and specifically, the 
shift to market principles (Anxo and Fagan 2005; Pavolini and Ranci, 2008). Although it is since the last 
century that for-profit actors were involved in the provision of welfare state services, in the last two 
decades (Everse and Laville, 2004) - as claimed by Shutes et al. (2011) - different market-oriented 
reforms characterized the recent restructuring of welfare states. In relation to the LTC system this 
change is detectable in: i) the increasing outsourcing of home care services and the consequent shift 
in the balance of provision in favour of private or not-for-profit providers (Daly and Lewis, 2000); 
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ii) a shift towards the direct purchasing of care by individuals and their families through the public 
transfer of cash payment (Ungerson, 2007, Simonazzi 2009) or vouchers (Bode and Chartrand, 
2010; Beltrametti et al., 2011); and iii) the greater reliance on private care funding by individuals 
and their families (Shutes and Chiatti, 2011). As noted by Riedel and Kraus (2010), EU countries 
have responded quite differently to an optimal (or at least feasible) public-private mix in the 
provision of long-term care services. Simonazzi et al (2012) highlighted that in those countries 
where services used to be provided by the state, contracting out has increased, and reforms might 
concern - or affect - the “terms of trade” between public authorities and providers, and between 
providers and final users. As a result, profit providers are allowed to enter the market. On the 
contrary, in countries where public involvement has been more limited and/or there is a substantial 
reliance on cash transfers, it is possible to observe a shift from family to market (Simonazzi, 2009) 
and/or the transition from supply-side subsidies to demand-side subsidies through cash for care or 
vouchers.  
The result of the interaction between the marketization processes and the national LTC system 
characteristics is the creation of different care markets. The latest available data on market 
composition (Rodriguez et al., 2012) show that, with the exception of the Eastern European 
countries, private operators hold a significant share of the care market in Europe (at least 10% of  
total operators). It is therefore possible to identify a common trend. The Scandinavian countries (FI, 
DK, SE) are characterized by a predominance of the public operator, supported by an increasing 
role of private providers (Sjørup, 2010; Sutela, 2010; Nyberg, 2010). Likewise, in the Eastern 
European countries, the public provider is still the main actor on the market, but private operators 
are replaced by not-for-profit providers (Karu, 2010; Plomien, 2010; Křížková, 2010). In those 
countries, characterized by a strong tradition of not-for-profit operators, combined (for Italy) with a 
weak presence of the public operator, the process of marketization has generated different 
outcomes. In Italy and Austria the not-for-profit operator has increased its importance, becoming a 
fundamental actor on the market (in combination with the role played by the public operator). The 
expansion of the private providers is limited to the provision of specific services: home care 
services in Italy (Fondazione Istud, 2010) and residential care in Austria (Rodriguez et al., 2012). 
An important issue affecting both countries is the importance of immigrant workers employed in the 
grey care market and/or directly hired by the families. It is difficult to estimate the number of these 
workers, but they play a fundamental role for the functioning of the LTC system, filling the gap left 
by the formal sector (Mairhuber, 2010; Bettio and Verashchagina 2010). In France and Belgium the 
reform processes have generated a deeper reorganization of the care market, and the public and not-
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for-profit operators remain the main actors in residential and institutional care. On the contrary, 
especially in France, in home care and domestic help the for-profit firms and the private carers have 
substantially increased their role (Silvera, 2010; Meulders 2010). In the United Kingdom, Spain and 
Germany more than half of the operators of LTC services belong to the private sector, and the not-
for-profit providers hold an equal (Spain) or greater (UK and Germany) share of the market than the 
public provider (Gago, 2010; Maier 2010; Fagan 2010). In the UK the home care and institutional 
services are provided almost exclusively by private operators, while in Germany the not-for-profit 
sector is still the major operator for residential services (Rodriguez et al., 2012). In Spain nursing 
homes and residential homes are mainly managed by private operators, and an important share of 
home care services and domestic services are also provided by immigrant (and irregular) workers 
(IMERSO, 2005, 2009). 
 
The relationship between the marketization process of the care sector and private care resources is 
complex. In fact, it is affected by institutional factors, such as the presence and quality of 
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instruments that allow the promotion and affordability of private services, and by individual 
characteristics, e.g., the capacity to pay for the services. As highlighted by the OECD (2011), the 
presence of a plurality of providers may entail a benefit for dependent elderly people and their 
families through a competition mechanism. However, it is also true that this benefit depends on the 
monetary subsidies and the instruments that support the recipient’s freedom of choice between the 
different providers (ibidem). The analysis of macro data does not provide a clear understanding of 
this relationship. The use of informal care is not related to the different mix of operators, even if it 
seems that in those countries where there is a prevalence of the public operator the recourse to this 
kind of care tends to be limited. While in some countries, like the Scandinavian ones, the public 
supply of services seems to keep the level of private expenditure low (-0.611) (Figure 3), when the 
not-for-profit operators hold a significant market share the family economic involvement tends to 
grow (0.555). It is interesting to note that, even if the market share held by private operators is 
slightly positively related to the increase in informal care (0.138) and to out-of-pocket expenditure 
(0.310), it does not seem to be a main factor for the increase of private care resources.  
Finally, there is evidence that the process of marketization can generate a negative impact on 
private care resources in those countries with an inadequate support to access services, and, as 
Szebehely and Trydega°rd (2011) have noted, this process can limit the availability of formal 
services for the low-income families. 
Entitlement to care (factors favouring access to care )  
Another element that has been affected by the process of reform of LTC systems is  the entitlement 
to care. The targeting of care can potentially help in reaching a reasonable balance between two 
competing priorities: “fair” protection and fiscal sustainability (OECD 2011, 266). Therefore, if on 
the one hand, the entitlement to care determines the amount of resources that each society is willing 
to bestow on the dependent elderly (Simonazzi, 2009), on the other hand there has been increased 
targeting of eligibility for public provision, with a shift in the direction of public funding to older 
people with higher needs (Shutes and Chiatti, 2011). 
The main form of targeting of care (financial accessibility for Pommer et al., 2007) regards the 
provision of benefits and it may concern either the targeting of a service package or the eligibility 
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for the cash benefit schemes. In the EU countries the definition of the service package is extremely 
individualized (MISSOC 2006): it is affected by the level of incapacity of the person concerned, but 
also by the place of residence, the living conditions, the environment, the availability of informal 
care, and the income of the care recipients. Similarly, eligibility for cash benefits can vary 
according to age, need and income; the latter may relate only to the frail elderly or also to their 
families (OECD 2011). Another element related to the regulation of access to care and to the 
sustainability of LTC systems is represented by the mechanism regulating the sharing of the costs of 
care with the beneficiaries. All public LTC coverage systems involve an element of private cost 
sharing, albeit at significantly different levels, with the co-payment usually related to the income or 
the assets of the beneficiary. 
It is difficult to define the national level of accessibility of the LTC services in the European 
countries. Normally, the regulation of the access criteria is set at the regional or local level, and the 
accessibility level is directly related to the availability of public funding, that similarly, varies 
across regions (MISSOC, 2006). Moreover, the lack of comparable LTC data across countries 
affects the availability of information on this aspect. We use the share of dependent elderly that 
actually receive LTC services (in-kind and cash ) as a proxy of the system capacity to respond to 
care needs
6
. It is not surprising that in the Nordic countries, where there is a very high coverage of 
in-kind services, the rate of accessibility to these services is high (around or more than 60% of the 
dependent population). The same level of access to home and residential services is present in some 
continental countries like France, Belgium, Austria and Slovenia. On the other hand, in those 
countries where the development of the services sector has been more limited - like in Italy, Spain, 
or in the Eastern countries - the share of people with access to care  services is restricted: around or 
below 20% of the dependent population. 
Another option to analyse how the various countries differ in terms of accessibility is to look at the 
share of public expenditure devoted to means-tested services in-kind in relation to the total public 
expenditure for in-kind services. There is a strong linear correlation between the share of means-
tested expenditure and the market share held by private operators (0.763) (Figure 4), which suggests 
that if the government decides to prioritize the prevention of the social risk of poverty over the 
needs related to disability (means versus needs testing), the middle and upper income classes may 
                                                             
6
 These variables have to be considered as a rough indicator of the accessibility level of a LTC system, as they do not 
take into account the kind of services providers and completely or partly exclude the services purchased by the 
recipients. 
25 
 
have to decide how to finance and organize the care of their dependent elderly on the market. If the 
access criteria are too restrictive, however, the low-income families that do not fulfil these criteria, 
and do not have enough resources to face the care cost, must share the care burden among family 
members.  
 
As highlighted before, UK, Germany and Spain are the most “privatized” countries, allocating a 
higher share of expenditure in services, subject to means testing. This rate is high also in countries 
with a different care market composition. In fact, in Italy, Austria and France between 20% and 
35% of public expenditure is allocated to means-tested services. It should be noted that there is a 
negative correlation between the share of in-kind services that are means-tested and the dimension 
of the public operator: in the Nordic countries and in the group of Eastern countries only a small 
percentage (less than 6%) of in-kind services provision is allocated through the mechanism of 
income assessment. 
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It is obvious that the access criteria , by defining the extent and the characteristics of public services 
beneficiaries, affect the amount of private care resources demanded from families. The data suggest 
that in those countries where there is a high rate of accessibility to the services, especially services 
in-kind, the recourse to the use of informal care is more limited. Conversely, a high share of 
expenditure devoted to means-tested services is related to a greater amount of private expenditure. 
It can be assumed that in those countries where there is a lack of balance between the eligibility 
criteria based on means-testing (of the elderly person or of the household) and those based on the 
level of disability and family characteristics, a higher level of private care resources is required 
Public expenditure (public expenditure in LTC services) 
LTC is defined differently in the various EU countries, the delivery of care is often shared between 
various government departments and state agencies, and countries use different methods for the 
financing of LTC (OECD 2005, 2011). This helps explain why current available statistics on public 
LTC programmes are somewhat patchy (Oliveira Martins 2006; Fernandez 2009). For this reason 
our analysis is limited to the data provided by international sources (ESPROSS and SHA) that 
ensure a reasonable comparability, since the same methodology has been used to identify the 
various items of expenditure. This is the methodology adopted by the European Commission for the 
Ageing Report (2009, 2012). As we have observed earlier, the main goal of the reform processes 
that have interested the LTC sector is the sustainability of the system, that is, a reduction of the 
public financial burden. As a consequence, the level of spending that a government allocated to the 
LTC system directly influences the characteristics of the variables described above, and determines 
the level of private care resources required from the families. Based on the information provided by 
the System of Health Account (SHA) (OECD, 2011), it emerges that in all European countries the 
public share represents the most important source of financing for LTC services (covering at least 
three-quarters of the total expenditure)
7
. This, in spite of the fact that, compared with other sectors 
of the welfare state (e.g. pension or health), public intervention in LTC is still relatively 
underdeveloped even in the most advanced countries (Pavolini et al., 2013). Total public spending 
on LTC in OECD countries is on average 1.2 % of GDP. The analysis at country level confirms the 
well-known differentiation in terms of generosity of welfare systems: the Scandinavian countries 
plus France and Belgium devote more than 2% of their GDP to the LTC system; Slovenia, 
Germany, Spain, UK and Italy spend between 1 and 2% of their Gross Domestic Product; finally, 
                                                             
7
 These figures do not take into consideration the role played by informal care. 
27 
 
the block of Eastern countries spends less than one point of GDP (SHA, 2010; ESPROSS 2010). 
The same picture emerges if we analyze the countries from the point of view of per capita spending 
corrected for the population aged over 65.  
Public expenditure in LTC can be considered as a measure of LTC system generosity (Kraus, 
2010). This is confirmed by the clear correlation between the share of GDP devoted to LTC and the 
degree of accessibility to the formal in-kind services (0.712) (Figure 5). 
 
Although, we could not find a similar correlation with the degree of accessibility to cash benefits 
(0.211): a high public expenditure in LTC tends to correspond to a limited use of cash benefits. As 
highlighted before, a greater use of in-kind services, relative to monetary subsidies, tends to be 
linked with a more limited family involvement in the care process, both in economic terms and in 
time. Thus, the ratio between spending devoted to in-kind services and cash benefits can be of 
relevance for the private cost of care. Italy and the Eastern countries are the only countries that 
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spend more on cash benefits than on services, (twice as much on cash than on services). On the 
contrary, Belgium, UK and Sweden are the most services-oriented countries. In Belgium the 
expenditure for monetary subsidies is less than 2% of the expenditure on services. 
We can conclude that, although it is obviously true that differences in public expenditure allocated 
to LTC are directly related to the level of development of the care services, which in turn implies a 
lower level of private expenditure (European Commission 2009), the relation is a complex one. This 
has not only to do with the difficulties encountered in defining the amount of public expenditure 
which we mentioned above (cross-countries differences in the levels of government, in terms of 
kind/intensity and access to the services), since the relation between public financing and the level 
of generosity of the LTC system is affected by all the factors that we have examined above. Thus, 
an understanding of the relation between the characteristics of the LTC system and the family 
involvement in care can be achieved only by taking into account all the different aspects of the 
system. 
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2.3 CLUSTER ANALYSIS 
As the different features impact private expenditure, the objective of this section is to present how 
the selected EU countries are grouped on the basis of the indicators related to the LTC system 
characteristics presented above. The purpose of this exercise is to define groups of countries based 
on the features of their LTC systems, in order to understand if similar characteristics of elderly care 
sectors require a similar level of family's private resources for the care of the dependent elderly. In 
other words, we want to investigate whether the selected LTC system characteristics can define the 
degree of involvement of families in the care process.  
In the next sections we present: i) the outcome of the Principal Component Analysis, used in order 
to obtain a proper grouping of countries; ii) and the outcome of  the cluster analysis. 
 
2.3.1 Principal component analysis 
In view of the quantity of variables used (12) and the number of European countries for which it 
was possible to obtain data (14
8
), we decided to construct indicators that would make it possible to 
summarise the characteristics of the LTC systems, without involving a reduction of the information 
provided by the data collected. The Principal component analysis (PCA) technique was used for 
this purpose. The PCA is a statistical procedure that uses orthogonal transformation to convert a set 
of observations of possibly correlated variables into a set of values of linearly uncorrelated variables 
called principal components. The number of principal components is less than or equal to the 
number of original variables. Based on the research design this technique is applied to the 12 
variables that represent the four aspects affecting the level of family's involvement in the care 
process
9
, leaving aside the two variables that directly indicate the two dimensions of private care 
resources required by each LTC system, namely, informal care (label: infocare) and out-of pocket 
expenditure (label: priv_exp). 
                                                             
8
 These countries are Spain, United Kingdom, Germany, France, Austria, Poland, Estonia, Belgium, Italy, Czech 
Republic, Slovenia, Finland, Sweden and Denmark. The selection criterion is the availability of comparable data for all 
the variables considered. 
9
 The explanation of the variables is provided in appendix A2. 
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As Table 3 shows, 3 indicators were identified with an explained variability of about 79%. The 
outcome presented in the table is coherent with the analysis presented in the previous section. In the 
following, we briefly explain the relation between factors and variables. 
Table 3 Pattern matrix of Principal Component Analysis, Oblimin rotation, variability 
explained 78,98, KMO test=0.556. 
variables factor 1 factor 2 factor 3 
GDP_LTC ,907 -,011 ,132 
Per_cap ,903 -,009 ,177 
Formal_dep ,871 ,104 ,017 
Home_rec ,832 -,169 ,029 
Institut_rec ,634 ,184 -,512 
Public_prov ,030 ,974 -,056 
MT_exp ,041 -,840 -,091 
Forprofit_prov ,237 -,810 -,358 
Notprofit_prov -,220 -,588 ,509 
Cash_dep ,166 ,279 ,899 
Cash_rec ,468 ,007 ,778 
Cash_Kind -,554 ,124 ,591 
 
Sources: Author’s elaboration. 
 
The first factor represents the variables related to the public expenditure, accessibility and coverage 
level of services in-kind, and it confirms the existence of a positive relation between these aspects. 
The second factor is a summary index of the care market dimension variables and of the rate of 
means-tested expenditure for services in-kind, and it attests that the public operator is inversely 
correlated not only with the private fro-profit and not-for-profit actors but also with means-tested 
expenditure. In other words, the share of means-tested services tends to be higher in countries in 
which the public operator is not the main actor in the market. The last factor is the index of the three 
variables that reconstruct the features of the LTC system's cash benefits schemes, and it is not 
surprising that these variables are related together in a positive manner: the more the public 
expenditure is allocated to cash benefit schemes, the more the latter will be accessible.  
The Principal Component Analysis selects those factors that enable a feasible and proper cluster 
analysis. However, in order to clarify the results of the cluster process, in the next paragraph we 
explain its results through the (original) variables used in the previous section. 
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2.3.2 Results 
Table 4 summarizes the characteristics of the identified clusters10. Attention should be paid in 
interpreting this clustering exercise: it is not an attempt to update taxonomies of care regimes if 
anything, because we are referring to only one category of population, the dependent elderly, and 
not to the overall care sector. It rather offers an opportunity to summarize the findings on the 
availability and accessibility of care services and complementarity among providers, while also 
capturing some of the changes that care regimes are undergoing.  
As indicated in Table 4, we obtained four clusters
11
 that differ little from other works on different 
types of LTC systems (Kraus et al, 2010; Poomer et al., 2007 Bettio and Verashchagina, 2010).  
Table 4. Cluster identified 
LTC system 
dimensions 
CLUSTER 
                                 
VARIABLES  
CLUSTER 1 CLUSTER 2 CLUSTER 3 CLUSTER 4 
 SE, FI, DK, SI  
IT, PL, EE, 
CZ 
  FR,  AT 
ES, BL, UK, DE 
Service 
delivery  
home care +65 + -- ++ = 
istitut. Care + 65 ++ -- = = 
cash ben. + 65 = + ++ -- 
Market 
structure  
Public prov. ++ + - - 
not for profit prov. -- + ++ = 
private prov. - - = ++ 
Entitlement for 
care  
Formal in kind on dep. pop. + -- ++ = 
Cash ben. on dep. Pop. + + ++ -- 
% of exp.  in kind mean tested -- - + ++ 
Public 
expenditure  
per capita pub. exp. Pop +65 + -- ++ = 
LTC/GDP + -- ++ = 
Cash in kind exp. Rate - ++ - -- 
Source: Author's compilation;  Note: + or -  indicate cluster average value including between the mean of all countries 
and 1 standard deviation of the variable: ++ or - - indicate a value higher or lower than 1 standard deviation.   
 
It is not surprising that the Nordic countries cluster together with Slovenia. This cluster is 
characterized by a high level of provision, accessibility and funding, and the delivery of LTC 
                                                             
10
 Some countries (e.g. The Netherlands)  have been left out due to the difficulty in collecting data that would allow an 
acceptable level of comparability. 
11
 In order to have a proper subdivision into groups we decided to repeat the clustering operation using the different 
methods and compare the results. The methods used were: Complete linkage method, Average linkage method, Ward’s 
method and Centroid method. The results of the cluster analysis were tested through R² ,Semi Partial R² and pseudo t². 
The methods used produced similar results. In any case, the best distribution that we found was the subdivision into 4 
groups. See the dendrogram in the Appendix. 
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services is almost exclusively of public relevance. Somewhat more unexpected is that Sweden still 
belongs to this cluster. As a consequence of the reduction of service provision and budget cutbacks 
that have interested this country in the past years, research findings (Meagher and Szebehely, 2013; 
Szebehely and Trydega°rd, 2011) show that the Swedish LTC system is no longer so close to the 
Scandinavian characteristics. This is also confirmed by our data: Sweden shows a public spending, 
both as percent of GDP and per capita, which is lower not only than the Nordic countries' average, 
but also with respect to the mean of our selected countries. 
The novelty with respect to the past clustering is the position of Italy and Spain, which do not 
belong to the same cluster. Italy is placed in the same cluster as the Eastern countries, (even if it 
shows a higher level of generosity and accessibility than Poland and Estonia). Spain appears to have 
moved towards more performing countries, like Belgium, UK and Germany. The common feature 
between these four countries is the composition of the care market, namely the common high share 
of private operators with respect to public and not-for- profit providers12. Another incongruity in 
relation to our expectations is the position of Belgium in this cluster, which, based on the literature, 
does not fully represent the characteristics of its LTC system. As we have seen - and as we shall see 
in the next paragraph - the Belgian LTC system presents several features similar to the French LTC 
model, such as a high level of public expenditure and a high coverage level of home care services. 
Therefore, we would have expected that these countries clustered together. Instead, France forms a 
group with Austria, generating a cluster that seems to be formed by two of the top performing 
countries. In fact, the latter are characterized by a generous funding of the LTC system, and, 
consequently, they show a high coverage of home care, as well as cash benefits. Moreover, even if 
they tend to allocate a substantial share of their expenditure to means-tested services, the degree of 
accessibility to services is high. Finally, in both of them the not-for-profit operators provide more 
than half of the LTC services. 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
12
 It should be considered that our data mainly refer to 2010 and do not reflect the budget cuts and 2011 and 2012 
government reforms that reduced the capacity of the Spanish LTC system (Observatorio Estatal De La Dependencia 
2012)(refer to thesis). 
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2.4 A TYPOLOGY OF LTC SYSTEMS BASED ON THE RELIANCE ON PRIVATE CARE 
RESOURCES 
This section focuses on the analysis of the relation between the characteristics of the national LTC 
systems and the level of private resources that the families devote to care, in order to understand the 
role of the factors described above in determining the involvement of the family in care. In other 
words, we want investigate whether countries with similar characteristics of national LTC systems 
tend to present similar distributions of the cost of care, with specific reference to private care 
resources. To this end, we analyze the outcome of the cluster analysis under the two dimensions of 
private care resources: reliance on informal care and out-of pocket expenditure. The result is shown 
in Figure 6.  
 
= cluster 1;             = cluster 2;              = cluster 3;               = cluster 4;                = mean value 
Source: Author's calculations based on: informal care, OECD 2011;  out-of-pocket expenditure, SHA and 
ESPROSS, 2010 reference year. 
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There is positive correlation (0.643) between the two dimensions of private care resources, which 
means that there is not a trade-off between the them. Countries are distributed along a line going 
from those with a limited family involvement in care, to countries that depended heavily on family 
resources for the care of the elderly. A possible explanation for this positive correlation could be 
offered by a third variable: the level of public spending. In fact, with the only exception of Sweden 
and Poland, the level of private care resources increases with the decrease in public expenditure 
(figure 2, appendix A.3). Moreover, Figure 6 shows another important element - with the exception 
of cluster 2 -: the distribution of countries reflects the outcome of the cluster analysis based on LTC 
system characteristics. This pattern suggests that even if public expenditure tends to determine the 
private care resource level, the elements described above contribute to determine the degree of 
family’s involvement in care. 
Considering the fit line as a proxy of the level of development of national LTC system, we can say 
that the need for private resources decreases with the increase in LTC “quality”. It is not surprising 
that the first cluster is placed in the lower left quadrant, where family involvement in care is lowest.  
Italy and the Eastern countries (with the exception of Poland) are placed in the opposite quadrant, 
which is characterized by a high level of both dimensions of private care resources. The fourth 
cluster is placed in an intermediate position, but slightly toward the top right quadrant. It presents an 
average value of informal care and a substantial level of private spending. The cluster of France and 
Austria is characterized by a similar level of out-of-pocket expenditure, but by a lower share of 
elderly receiving care from relatives or friends. 
On the basis of the cluster outcome and the countries’ distribution in relation to the level of private 
care resources, it is possible to identify four types of LTC system. 
“Self-sufficiency model” 
This model represents the LTC systems able to ensure a suitable level of formal services and 
adequate financial support to the dependent elderly: they do not depend heavily for they 
sustainability, on the recourse of the family of the frail elderly. This model identifies the 
characteristics of Cluster 1. In fact, on average, less than 9% of the older population receives care 
from relatives, partners or friends. This may be a consequence of the fact that in these countries the 
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care of the dependent elderly is a direct responsibility of the State. The public operator is the main 
actor, providing more than 80% of the services, ensuring the highest level of coverage and 
accessibility. Moreover, this cluster combines a high public spending and an extremely low share of 
means-tested services expenditure, integrated by a fair level of coverage and expenditure for cash 
benefits. The result is that the cluster average percentage of private expenditure on total LTC 
spending is about 8%, less than half the average value of all countries. 
 “Family-centred model” 
The second cluster (cluster 2) identifies the polar model, in that it indicates countries in which the 
care of the dependent elderly is tightly dependent on family involvement. The characteristic feature 
of this model is the subsidization of care. About 70% of total LTC expenditure is devoted to cash 
benefits, with in-kind services that covering only a small part of the dependent elderly. As a 
consequence, more than 15% of the older population has to rely on their family’s assistance. 
Moreover, although the public operator is the main provider of services and there is a fair share of 
means-tested services expenditure, the insufficient public resources devoted to the LTC imply that 
about a quarter of total LTC expenditure derives from cost-sharing or private expenses. 
 “Cash for care / economic involvement model”  
The third cluster identifies a model of LTC that requires a limited involvement of the family in 
terms of informal care, and moderate reliance on private financing. This model presents some of the 
characteristics of the Scandinavian countries. In France and Austria the LTC system receives a 
generous public funding (more than 2 points of GDP) and is characterized by a virtuous sector of 
home care services, and a broad coverage level of cash benefits. So it is not surprising that in this 
model there is a limited recourse to the use of informal care. At the same time, despite the high 
public spending, more than 30% of the expenditure for in-kind services is subject to means-testing, 
and the public operator provides only a quarter of services, leaving to not-for-profit actors more 
than half of the delivery of LTC benefits. With respect to the self-sufficient model, these differences 
involve a heavier economic burden for the families of the dependent elderly,  reaching about 22% 
of the entire LTC expenditure. 
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“Family integration model” 
In this model the formal care sector is able to take care of the dependent elderly, but needs the 
integration of the family, both in terms of direct support to care (informal care) and cost-sharing 
(private expenditure). Figure 6 shows that the fourth cluster is placed between the two identified 
extreme models. In fact, this cluster is characterized by average level of coverage and public 
expenditure in services, which results in a slightly above average use of informal care (13.5% of the 
older population). Moreover, this model combines a limited financing and use of cash benefits, with 
a strict income assessment for the access to in-kind services that are mainly provided by private 
operators. Although expenditure on services is twice the amount spent on cash benefits, the broad 
use of mean-testing, together with the limited role played by public providers, seem to generate a 
negative effect for the dependent elderly and their families, namely, a significant level of cost-
sharing and private expenditure: more than 22% of LTC funding derives from household incomes. 
These types of models should be considered as ideal-typical models of the relation between LTC 
system characteristics and the needs for private care resources. Unfortunately, macro data can 
provide only a general view of these relations, and cannot provide information on how the different 
models affect the economic condition of the dependent elderly and their families. Since our research 
is aimed at understanding whether the LTC reforms affect the risk of poverty for the dependent 
elderly and their families, we extend the analysis to the micro level. To this end, we shall consider 
only a limited number of countries, selected on the basis of the results obtained in the cluster 
analysis. The countries we are going to analyse are the following: 
Sweden: we decided to choose this country from the "Self-sufficient" model, because, as already 
mentioned, following an intense process of reform, the country is now moving away from the 
characteristics of the Scandinavian LTC system; Italy and Poland: were selected from the "Family-
centred model”, since though presenting similar characteristics of their LTC systems, they are 
placed at the opposite ends of the diagonal of figure 6; Belgium and Spain too: are interesting case: 
they belong to the “Family integration model” bur they are placed in the two opposite quadrants in 
figure 6, and they belong to the same cluster, but present substantial differences as regards the 
characteristics of LTC systems; France: this country was selected from the “Cash for care model” 
because it requires a higher level of private care resources than Austria, and, compared to the 
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average characteristics of the model, it is more oriented to a LTC system based on services provided 
by non-public providers. 
Before presenting the results of the analysis on the relation between risk of poverty and elderly care, 
in the next section we provide a brief overview on how the LTC reforms have influenced the 
(family) care for the dependent elderly in the last ten years. In particularly, we analyze, from the 
point of view of dependent elderly, how the provision of LTC services and cash benefits have 
changed over this period, and what consequences that these changes have caused on the families of 
frail elderly, in terms of both financial costs and time-to-care. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
38 
 
CHAPTER 3 
THE IMPACT OF REFORM PROCESSES IN SIX NATIONAL LTC SYSTEMS
13
 
 
 
As mentioned earlier, all EU countries were tackling the problem of sustainability of their LTC 
systems in different ways: the recent economic crisis has directly affected the reform guidelines that 
have interested this sector. As argued by Pavolini and Ranci (2013), since the beginning of the early 
1990s up to 2008, the spending dynamics in various countries have highlighted a growing public 
expenditure in care sector. However, positive trends can hide important variations in the spending 
programs aimed at the older population. In general, in spite of a growing demand for LTC services, 
overall public spending did not rise at the same pace. Institutional reforms in this sector have been 
addressed at trying to meet the growing demand for services, while simultaneously containing 
public spending. This section is aimed at understanding the consequences of these policies on the 
dependent population.  
In the following paragraphs the research will focus on schemes that provide home care services or 
cash to support dependent older people aged 65 and over, living in their homes, leaving aside the 
schemes of residential and semi-residential services. This decision derives from data constraints: the 
only survey that provides information on income, health status, LTC services, and health 
expenditure, for both dependent elderly and their adult children is the "Survey of Health, Ageing 
and Retirement in Europe" (SHARE), and its samples represent the non-institutionalized population 
aged 50 and older of each country.  In this research we use three waves of this survey: the first 
refers to the years 2004 and 2005, the second to 2006 and 2007, and the fourth wave 2011 and 
2012. Due to the different purpose of the third wave, the data of this wave cannot be used in our 
research. In fact, SHARELIFE - the third wave of SHARE- focuses on people's life histories. Its 
questionnaire links individual micro data over the respondents’ entire life with institutional macro 
data on the welfare state; and does not provide information of elderly disability level, families care 
expenditure or informal care provided or received. 
                                                             
13
 This chapter and the next one are based on the use of SHARE data, a multidisciplinary and cross-national panel 
database of micro data on health, socio-economic status and social and family networks, with a sample representing the 
non-institutionalized population aged 50 and older. 
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3.1 SERVICES PROVISION 
3.1.1 Cash benefit 
In last 15 years there has been a considerable increase in the use of cash-based schemes to support 
to disable people (Ungerson, Yeandle et al., 2007), and this paragraph starts by looking how the 
reforms and accessibility characteristics have influenced the provision of cash benefits for the over 
65 population. We use a broad definition of "cash transfers", one which encompasses both LTC 
benefits and disability allowances. This decision was suggested by the scarce homogeneity across 
countries both, in the definition of services packages for the dependent population, and in the 
identification of beneficiaries. Figure 7 reports the percentage of dependent elderly that have 
received cash benefits in the survey’s years, and their average annual amount (green triangles). 
Although the trends over the 3 years are largely negative, in terms of both coverage level and 
average amount, in 2012 in five out of the six selected countries, at least 8% of the dependent 
population had received this benefit 
In Belgium the two major cash benefits are targeted at supporting financial costs of nonmedical 
care-related expenses, and they are means-and needs-tested. The financial evaluation is related to 
the family income, including every relative living with the dependent elderly (Meulders, 2010). 
They are strictly targeted on the neediest old people living at home, but they do not require the 
agreement of a particular care plan and recipients are free to spend the money as they want
14
. Figure 
7 shows that one of the consequences of the 2004 home care reform, in particular the reallocation of 
public resources towards the services in-kind and resort to different financial instruments - such as 
the tax deduction - has been the reduction of the average annual amount of cash benefit, from 
around 7,000 € in 2004 to about 5,000 € in 2012. In 2012 the effect of the increase in public 
expenditure in the LTC sector was detectable, leading the number of users close to 10% of the 
dependent population.  
The economic compensation for dependent elderly and/or for family carers is not particularly 
common in Sweden (Socialstyrelsen & Linköpings universitet 2007). The main forms of 
                                                             
14
 Moreover, Flemish older people receive a flat cash allowance of €30 (2009) from the Flemish Long –Term Care 
Insurance (Vlaamse zorgverkering). This entitlement program is not means-tested and is targeted on people from above 
a certain level of dependency living in residential facilities or at home (CROME 2012). 
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compensation are a home nursing grant (hemsjukvårds¬bidrag) and a family carer grant 
(anhörigbidrag). The former is a compensation from the local authority or the county to a person 
close to the dependent person for nursing work in the home. A family carer grant is a cash 
compensation to help a person in ordinary house working, i.e. elderly people who can use the grant 
to pay a relative for help in the home (Nyberg, 2010). The amount of these benefits is rather small 
in relation to the cost of living (ibidem): the care grant is comparable to a nurse’s aide, while the 
latter is equivalent to sickness allowance. In 2012 the annual base amount of the family care grant 
was 48,000 SEK, around € 5,500 (Försäkringskassan, 2012). Between 2004 and 2012 the number of 
recipients of cash benefits decreased from around 15% to 7.3% (but also annual amounts decreased 
on average by around 2,000 € from 2007 to 2012)(figure 7). This can be explained with the reforms 
undertaken by the Swedish government, in order to reduce public spending on LTC: between 2000 
and 2009 the latter decreased not only in relation to the ageing population, but also in absolute 
terms (by 6%) (Szebehely 2011). In addition to a deep process of market reorganization in favour of 
non-public operators, budged reductions have led to the narrowing of the definition of public 
responsibility (Nyberg, 2010), translated into the decision of concentrating available resources on 
the population with a high level of disability (Szebehely 2011). 
On 1 January 2007 a new law regulating the services provided to dependent people became 
effective in Spain: “Ley de Promoción de la Autonomía Personal y Atención a las Personas en 
Situación de Dependencia - LAPAD” (Dependency Act). This law has radically changed the 
characteristics of the Spanish LTC system, creating a new citizenship right that tries to meet the 
dependent people’s care needs (Gutiérrez, 2010). The reform has a service-oriented philosophy and 
establishes that the use of cash benefits is allowed only when the equivalent services in-kind are 
lacking, or is bound to purchase specific services. In fact, after 2007, the two main benefits 
introduced by the law are granted only when it is not possible to access a public service (Prestación 
económica vinculada al servicio) or, exceptionally, if beneficiaries are being cared for by their 
families in their own homes (Prestación económica para cuidados en el entorno familiar y apoyo a 
cuidadores no profesionales). Moreover, like all the services and benefits established by LAPAD, 
access to the cash benefits is regulated on the basis of a disability evaluation and on the 
beneficiary’s economic status. In spite of its brief history, the Dependency Act is already 
experiencing severe difficulties for its full implementation, and as claimed by Gutiérrez, in 2010 
more than 45% of the benefits were of a financial nature. As a consequence, despite the significant 
reduction of recipients of cash benefits which occurred after the introduction of the LAPAD,  - by 
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around a quarter during the eight years considered (figure 7) - there is still a high use of cash 
benefits, the second highest coverage level of financial benefits among our 6 countries in 2012.  
Figure 7. % of dependent elderly that receive public cash transfer for LTC or disability, on 
total dependent population aged over 65 (left axis), annual average amount of cash benefits, at 
family level (right axis) 
 
Source: Author's compilation on the basis of SHARE data, waves 1-2-4. 
 
Italy is the country that presents the highest level of cash benefit recipients. As highlighted by Gori 
(2012), the main instrument at the core of the Italian LTC system, together with the role played by 
the families and by the private caregiver, is the disability allowance - “indennità di 
accompagnamento” -. This cash benefit, unlike in other OECD countries, is a fixed lump-sum and is 
not means-tested (Colombo et al. 2010). It is subject to certification of a (severe) disability issued 
by the Health authorities and can be freely spent (Bettio and Verashchagina 2010). The second 
major cash transfer, is the care allowance that plays a minor role in terms of public financing and 
share of users, and is financed by municipalities or National Health Service Units. It is paid either in 
cash or tax credit, it is means and needs tested, and unconstrained in its use. According to SHARE 
data, between 2004 and 2012, more than 20% of dependent elderly people received cash benefits 
The observed reduction in share of users is mainly explained by the increase in the population with 
LTC disabilities, unmatched by a proportional increase of public expenditure (Gori, 2012). The 
average monthly amount is stable over the years, with a slight increase,  from € 436,7, in 2004, to € 
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492,9 in 2012
15
. Figure 7 allows us to understand the effects of the Italian (lack of) reforms that 
have maintained a cash-oriented system: in 2012 the Italian share of recipients of cash benefits is 
almost double the Spanish one. Specifically, in Italy, the shift towards untied cash transfers, 
together with the family's legal obligation to provide care to its relatives in need, result in a increase 
in care responsibility of the family. In particular, cash transfers are often used by Italian elderly to 
buy services from private providers or to compensate the care provided within family. 
The aim of the 2002 French reform was clear: to move away from the previous cash scheme 
(Prestation spécifique dépendance), based on a cost containment objective, and to increase the 
number of recipients. The Personalised autonomy allowance (“Allocation personnalisée à 
l‟autonomie”) (APA), was therefore created, based on a universal principle, (Martin, 2003). 
According to Campéeon et al. (2008), the French long-term care policy is based on a specific 
scheme – the APA – which is organized around three main elements. Firstly, the APA is a benefit 
given to the elderly people who live at home and in institutions, according to their level of 
dependency. As the French scheme is a national scheme implemented at the local level, and in order 
to guarantee access to the same services across the country, care packages are defined according to 
the level of dependency, and give rights to a certain amount of benefit. Secondly, a main 
characteristic of the French scheme is that the benefit is paid to finance a precise care package, 
determined by professional teams, according to the needs of the recipient. The use of the benefit is 
therefore controlled, and can only finance the services identified as necessary by the professionals. 
Finally, France has adopted a mixed system for the funding of the care packages. At the lower end 
of the income scale care is provided on an assistance principle: under a fixed income threshold - 
€669.89 in 2010 -, recipients do not contribute at all to the funding of the care package. Above the 
threshold, a user fee or co-payment system is introduced: the recipient contributes to the cost of the 
care package, according to his/her level of income. According to data of the Ministry of Social 
Affairs and Health (Ministère des affaires sociales et de la Santé)
16
, between 2002 and 2010 public 
resources devoted to APA increased at an annual rate of 5.9%, while users increased at a rate of 
8.8%. Although figure 7 captures only the non institutionalized users, this positive trend is clearly 
visible. The share of user increases over the period considered from about 5% of the dependent 
population to 8% in 2012. The higher increase of users compared to resources leads to a constant 
reduction in the average amount, passing from 6,200 € in 2004 to around 5,000 € in 2012. 
                                                             
15
This figure could be a further confirmation of the predominance of  the disability allowance among disability cash 
schemes: the average annual amount detectable by SHARE data is very close to the annual amount of the disability 
allowance, respectively 492,9 €  and  495€( http://www.inps.it/portale/default.aspx). 
16
 http://www.social-sante.gouv.fr/ 
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The limited presence of in-kind services (figure 10) and cash benefits in the Polish LTC system can 
be explained by the fact that the development of a formal, non-family based LTC system is in its 
initial stage (Golinowska, 2010). At present, there is no specific regulation that comprehensively 
covers the issues of care services for the elderly, the institutions providing these services, the rules 
of access or the ways of financing . The majority of LTC services is provided by the Health sector, 
under a chronic shortage of public fund (ibidem). As reported by Szwałkiewicz (2007), the 
financing of elderly care and LTC services remains a major policy concern in Poland, which 
involves all kinds of provisions and providers. According to the national consultant on nursing and 
care of chronically ill and disabled, LTC facilities in the health sector are increasingly indebted due 
to insufficient funding from the health fund (NFZ). As a result, the recent system reforms, further 
reduced the availability and affordability of the LTC services and benefit provisions (Golinowska, 
2010). Figures 7 and 8 confirm this picture: the percentage of dependent elderly that receive cash 
benefits is around 5% of the dependent population, and the annual average amount of these benefits 
decreased by one-third between 2006 and 2012. Moreover, although there is a limited system of 
formal in-kind LTC services, in the first wave of the survey covering Poland (the 2
nd 
wave) no one 
aged over 65 declared to receive this kind of services (figure 10).  
In order to understand how the characteristics of the cash schemes (and the related reforms) have 
affected the care conditions of the dependent elderly it can be useful to analyze, in a diachronic 
perspective, the average amount that the elderly receive, on the basis of their disability level. 
Excluding Spain, in 2004 the annual amount of cash benefits received by elderly people with a 
moderate level of disability does not vary significantly across countries, and it ranges between4000 
€ to 5200 €. Conversely, table 5 shows that the compensation to severely dependent elderly people 
varies considerably. In 2004 in Italy, Spain and France this category of population received, on 
average, around 6500 € per year, in Sweden  4700 €, and only  3500 €  in Poland; completely 
different is the Belgian scenario, where the public economic support is close to 9000 € per year.  
The change in the absolute values of cash benefits between 2004 and 2012 demonstrate the impact 
of the reforms on the dependent elderly. One of the consequences of the economic crisis on the 
welfare policies is the narrowing or reduction of public services; in the LTC sector, this mechanism 
has affected primarily the elderly with a low level of disability: all countries show a negative 
differential for this category of population. As for the elderly with severe disabilities, the figures 
suggest that in Italy, France and Poland the amount has remained more or less stable during the 
years, while in Spain, thanks to the reform introduced in 2007 which linked the amount of benefit to 
the level of disability, the situation has changed completely, leading to an increase of 2000 €. 
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Table 5. Average annual amount of LTC cash benefits in 2004-05 and absolute change in 
2011-12, by disability level 
  
average annual amount €* differential between years €* 
2004-05 2004-05 / 2011-12  
  moderate 
medium or severe 
(difference) 
moderate medium or severe 
Italy 5203 6123 (920) -37 + 359 
Spain 7246 6620 (-636) -604 + 2003 
France 3980 6887 (2907) -753 -68 
Belgium 4201 8858 (4657) -678 -2269 
Sweden 4665 4705  (90) -499 + 1227 
Poland (06-07) 4165 3512 (-653) -5 -271 
  Source: Author's compilation on the basis of SHARE data, waves 1-2-4.; *= adjusted by purchasing 
power standard 
Another country in which the process of focusing on the neediest is more evident, is Sweden. The 
category of population with moderate disability receives 500 € less, while the benefit for the more 
severely dependent has increased by 1200 €. In Belgium the decision to reallocate the expenditure 
towards different care services has affected both categories , with the neediest suffering the larger 
reduction. 
The main goal of cash benefits is to support, through a public transfer, the income of the family of 
disabled people, so that they can face the related care expenditure. Cash benefits perform a dual 
role: care and assistance , and  income support . If viewed as an income support instruments, their 
amount should be adjusted to the recipients' economic resources. Since the main goal of this 
research is to understand the relation between poverty and the condition of dependency, it is 
important to asses the degree of redistribution achieved by these services in the selected countries. 
Figure 9 shows the share of low-income recipients of cash benefits, in total beneficiaries; low-
income refers to a family equivalised income included in the first two quintiles of the income 
distribution. In those countries where access to cash benefits is based on disability and family’s 
economic resources - Belgium, Spain and Sweden - more than half (and more than 60% in 2012), of 
cash benefits receivers live in a low-income family. In Italy and Poland, where the public transfers 
do not require a means-tested assessment, this percentage presents lower values. 
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Figure 9. Percent of low-income recipients of cash benefits in total recipients  
 
     Source: Author's compilation on the basis of SHARE data, waves 1-2-4. 
Note: Low-income recipients: first two quintile of the income distribution.  
In France, the means-tested evaluation does not limit the access to the services, but reduces or 
excludes the user's co-payment for in-kind services. This can explain the low share of benefits 
bestowed to the poorest elderly in 2004 and 2006. All in all, these figures give an idea of the impact 
of the current economic crisis on the families of the dependent elderly: regardless of the evaluation 
criteria, in all countries the share of low-income beneficiaries of public transfers  reaches a peak in 
2012. 
3.1.2 Services in-kind 
Figure 10 reports the percentage of the dependent population aged over 65 that receives formal LTC 
services, where for formal services it is intended all LTC services provided by professional workers 
through private, public or not-for-profit operators, in 2004-05 and in 2006-07. Due to changes in the 
questions in the fourth wave, it was impossible to obtain information on type, coverage level and 
number of hours of formal LTC services received by the elderly for 2011/12.  
The first important element is the difference between the macro and micro data in relation to the 
Swedish case. In the previous paragraph Sweden was grouped together with countries with a 
medium-low level of use and accessibility to cash benefit schemes, but with a very high level of 
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coverage, accessibility and expenditure for formal in-kind services. However, the micro data 
provide a different indication. According to the SHARE data, for the period between 2004 and 
2007, only about 25% of the dependent population aged over 65 received formal LTC services, and 
the monthly average number of hours was reduced by half, from 31 to 15. The Swedish decline in 
home care coverage is also noted by Szebehely (2012) who stated that the share of elderly 
population that received home care in 1980 was above 16%, while it was 8% in 2008 . This 
situation derives from the processes of reform and from the demographics changing which occurred 
in the last 20 years. During the 1990s economic crisis the resources allocated to elderly care by the 
municipalities decreased. Also the resources in the counties to health and medical care were cut and 
the number of places in emergency health care was almost halved between 1992 and 2003 
(Socialstyrelsen, 2005). During the same period the number of persons 80 years and older increased 
by 22 percent. The declining number of places of care in combination with the increased number of 
elderly in the population resulted in more elderly people being checked out to go home, though 
stilling need of nursing and rehabilitation. As a consequence, the municipalities choose to 
concentrate resources on those persons with the greatest needs, so that elderly people with less 
severe care needs are often not taken care for by the municipalities. This development has generated 
a more narrowly defined concept of public responsibility and more responsibility has been shifted 
on persons in need of care. (Larsson & Szebehely, 2006). Additionally, regarding the intent to 
reduce or redirect the public responsibility of care, the government, during the last two decades, has 
implemented a packet of reforms with the goal of broadening  recipients’ freedom of choice through 
the increase of privatisation in the elderly care sector. From the new Local Government Act of 1992 
the municipalities are able to out-source provision of tax-financed care services to non-government 
actors, both for-profit and non-profit. Since then, there has been a growth in the proportion of 
services provided by for-profit organisations, and, in 2007, nearly 11% of people over the age of 65, 
who were granted home help service, had these benefits provided privately (Socialdepartementet, 
2008). A consequence of this policy of austerity is that more elderly today than 10-15 years ago 
receive help from family members: between 1994 and 2003 the percentages of female relatives that 
provide help to dependent elderly (over 75 years) grew of 10 points, and specifically the percentage 
of adult daughter caregivers pass from 22% in 1994 to 35% in 2003 (Socialstyrelsen, 2004). 
France and Belgium have moved in a different direction, developing a variety of instrument to 
support elderly care. Since 1990 various measures have been taken in France to facilitate home care 
(Le Bihan, 2012): tax deduction, introduced to encourage home employment; ‘service employment 
vouchers’, to simplify the procedure for paying people working in the home; and in 2005 the 
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‘Cheque emploi service universel’ (universal service voucher), created with the purpose to simplify 
and extend the access to private/public formal services. A similar reform process has interested the 
Belgian LTC system, with the introduction of voucher schemes as Titre-Service, and tax reduction 
to support home care services. The main goal of this process has been to strengthen the already high 
degree of development of the public in-kind services (Willemé, 2010). As a consequence of these 
interventions on home care, in France and Belgium these services meet the needs of a large share of 
dependent elderly, reaching, in both countries in the period under examination, around half of the 
dependent population (Figure 10). As mentioned earlier, in these countries the intensity of cash and 
in-kind services is based on the disability level of the recipient. Here too, however the increase in 
the share of recipients was not matched by an increase in the average number of hours. Between 
2005 and 2007, in both countries, this indicator decreased, respectively, by 4 hours in France and 8 
hours in Belgium. Yet, in 2006 a French or Belgian dependent elderly person receives, on average, 
around 20 hours of service per month, that, compared with the other countries, seems to be an 
acceptable intensity of care. 
Figure 10. % of dependent elderly that receive professional nursing care at home, on total 
dependent population aged over 65,(*=monthly average number of hours received)  
 
Source: Author's compilation on the basis of SHARE data, waves 1-2. 
SHARE data allow to analyse only the initials effect of the introduction of the Spanish 
constitutional reform implemented on 1 January 2007. On the basis of the information provided by 
figure 10, it seems that this reform has significantly affected the intensity of services but not the 
level of coverage. This partial increase may be considered a consequence of the implementation of 
0 
13,6 
17,6 
25,1 24,6 25,9 25,4 
50 50,3 
47,4 
52,8 
0 
10 
20 
30 
40 
50 
60 
06-07 (50,40)* 
04-05 
(49,14)* 
06-07 
(21,86)* 
04-05 
(43,47)* 
06-07 
(31,62)* 
04-05 
(15,60)* 
06-07 
(24,24)* 
04-05 
(20,84)* 
06-07 
(28,68)* 
04-05 
(20,69)* 
06-07 
PL IT ES SE BE FR 
%
 o
f 
d
ep
en
d
en
t 
el
d
er
ly
 
% of dependent  population that receives home care services 
48 
 
the first phase of the reform, whereby, in compliance with the law, the right to care is progressively 
based on the users’ level of dependency (Gutiérrez, 2010). In 2007 the implementation schedule 
planned the introduction of services for persons with high/very high disability, that required a high 
number of hours of professional care. Thus the doubling of the monthly number of hours between 
2004 and 2007 (from 21 to 43 hours), might derive from an increase of the share of dependent 
elderly with high or very high disability among recipients of services. 
Since the ‘90s the Italian LTC sector has been characterized by an institutional inertia and, in spite 
of several attempts at institutional reforms
17
, no change has been introduced in the national Italian 
LTC system over the last 10-15 years. All attempts stumbled against two main difficulties. The first 
is financial: the country’s public debt is high and the level of taxation on wage income is also high 
(Bettio and Verashchagina, 2010). The second has to do whit the low priority assigned to care, 
given the widespread feeling that ‘the family can fix it’, which tends to hinder any major social 
policy reform until the status quo turns into a state of emergency (ibidem). This inertia has 
generated a situation in which regional and municipal authorities are proceeding in a random 
fashion, accentuating the existing fragmentation across regions and municipalities (Gori, 2008). In 
this scenario the Italian home care sector is doubly penalized. Historically this sector has suffered 
from a subordinate position with respect to the cash benefits. Between 2005 and 2011 more than 
half of the increase in public financing (amounting to 0.21percente of GDP) is devoted to cash 
scheme (58%), and only around 35% is intended to services in-kind provided at home (ibidem). 
Additionally in Italy, unlike France, Sweden and Belgium, there is no legal obligation on the part of 
public authorities to deliver care to old people in need, and the responsibility falls on the families 
(Bettio and Verashchagina, 2010). Therefore, the insufficient public resources devoted to formal in-
kind services, the limited involvement of the national government in the management of this sector, 
and the absence of a public commitment to service provision can explain why the home care 
services sector is undersized (Gori, 2012). With the exception of Poland, Italy has the lowest home-
care services coverage ratio among the selected countries (Figure 10). Despite the increase in 
                                                             
17
 In 1997 the Commissione Onofri proposed to institute a national fund for the disabled financed with a dedicated tax. 
In 2002 the then Health Minister Sirchia advocated a mandatory fund partly financed out of workers’ contributions. In 
2003 the Commissione Affari Sociali put forward a draft legislation instituting a fund for the care of disabled persons 
that would pay for residential care and home care services; the idea was to finance the fund mainly out of general 
taxation and to leave to families the option between existing cash transfers and fruition of services. Since its existence 
this fund has suffered several cutbacks, and the second-last Italian government had almost canceled the financial 
resources from the expenditure budget. In 2006 the Prodi government begun to draft a bill purporting to enact perhaps 
the most complete reform envisaged to date. The main pillar of the reform was the individual right to so-called ‘basic 
levels of care’ (livelli essenziali di assistenza). The expansion and reorganization of publicly financed services, as well 
as the setting up of a machinery to monitor outcomes and quality, would be geared to implement this right. The 
government fell before any such bill was passed. 
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recipients by of 4% in the two years under examination, more than 80% of the potential 
beneficiaries of these services do not receive professional care at home. 
According to the results of the Eurobarometer survey conducted in 2007, almost a half of Italian 
interviewees (43% of the answers including the ‘Don’t know’) declared that home care (but also 
residential care, 49%) is not affordable. The average European citizen held slightly more positive 
views, with a 32%, but, excluding Poland (47%), this figure significantly decreases if we look at the 
other examined countries, respectively France 20%, Spain 23%, Sweden 9%, and Belgium 33%. 
The results of this survey are in accordance with the graphs presented in figure 11. The only country 
in which both the percentage of beneficiaries and the average number of hours are proportional to 
the family income is Italy: only about 10% poor elderly (first quintile of income distribution) 
receives professional care at home, with an intensity, that despite the increase of 2007, was under 
15 hours per month; while for better-off population, these figures reach respectively around 30% 
and more than 50 monthly hours. In Italy a scarce presence of public home services and a broad 
supply of private carers, together with cash benefit amount usually lower than the cost of care, mean 
that the possibility to access to the home care services is strictly related to the possibility to pay for 
them. In Spain the reception of services is proportional to family income, but with a less intensity 
compared to the Italian case. In 2007, the gap in the share of beneficiaries between the first and the 
fourth income quintile in is limited to 5%. Additionally in Spain, between 2004 and 2007, the 
intensity of services significantly increases for the extreme groups of the population: the dependent 
elderly included in the two first quintile of income distribution, on average, receive the same 
intensity of care of the wealthy population. In France, the strong correlation between income and 
share of beneficiaries in 2007, suggests that the financial incentives introduced in the early 2000 
have generated a broadening of the home care sector driven by the middle-income households
18
. 
However, in this country a high public spending for the home services sector together with the 
"subsidization" of private operators, ensure a fairly access to the care: around a half of the 
dependent elderly that live in a low-income family has access to the home care services and receive 
an intensity of care equal or higher than the rest of the population. 
 
 
                                                             
18
 In 2005, the tax deduction for employing help at home is more affordable for middle-income family; considering the 
most dependent people this instrument involves a cost reduction equal to 77% for those on high pay (€ 43200 annual), 
while this discount reaches the 23% for those on low pay (€ 7756 annual) (Cour des comptes, 2005). 
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Figure 11, monthly average number of hours (line, right axis) and percentage of recipients of 
formal services in-kind (bar, left axis), by quintile of household equivalised income. 
 
                                                  
 
 
 
 
Source: Author's compilation on the basis of SHARE data, waves 1-2. 
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The most appropriate LTC system in relation to accessibility level seems to be the Belgian one. The 
share of recipients of home services is higher than the half of the dependent population, and the 
2007 the low-income family benefited of an increase of services provision, reaching a level of 
coverage close to 60%. Additionally, the reduction of number of hours occurred between 2004 and 
2007 affected especially the middle-income families, leaving almost unaltered the benefits' intensity 
of the low-income households. The capacity of the Swedish home care sector to meet the dependent 
elderly needs is fairly limited, and is similar to the Spanish one. Unlike the latter, however, the 
figure shows that the perception of services is evenly shared across income groups, and the poorest 
elderly receive the highest share of services as well as the greater intensity of care compared to the 
entire population.  
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3.2 PRIVATE CARE RESOURCES 
The last part of this chapter is dedicated to the analysis of how the LTC characteristics affect, at the 
individual level, the two dimensions of private care resources: informal care, both received and 
provided; and the incidence of care costs on the family’s equivalized income.  
3.2.1 Private expenditure 
Figure 12 shows the average annual values (first and second wave of SHARE) of the incidence of 
families out-of-pocket expenditure for care and health on the household’s equivalised available 
income
19
. In the micro analysis phase of this research we consider both the expenditure devoted to 
LTC services, and health expenditure. In fact in all countries the basket of LTC services includes 
both medical and social treatments, that are managed by different sectors, and elderly care requires 
a wide variety of treatments, ranging from domestic help to specific medical and physiotherapy 
treatments. Thus, the basket of services which, includes expenditure for health, hospitalization and 
drugs, in addition to the LTC services, provides a more correct definition of the "economic 
dimension" of private care resources. Indeed, the use of this indicator gives a completely different 
picture of Poland and, to some extent, Belgium, compared with the distribution obtained through 
aggregate data. In Poland, where, due to the lack of private supply of formal services, private 
expenditure for LTC services is necessary low, the inclusion of health expenditure completely 
changes the scenario. This country shows the highest incidence of health expenditure on household 
income for the two groups of population examined in figure 12 (dependent elderly and older 
population not affected by disabilities). Similarly, in Belgium where the private LTC expenditure is 
slightly below average (figure 6), when health expenditure is included we find that on average a 
dependent elderly person has to devote a quarter of his/her household’s income to care and health 
expenditure.  
The level of public spending devoted to the LTC system helps understand the countries’ 
distribution. Excluding Belgium, in the countries with the highest public expenditure, France 
(where the elderly care sector receives approximately 2% of GDP), and Sweden (in which the 
                                                             
19 The equivalised disposable income is the total income of a household, after tax and other deductions that is available 
for spending or saving, divided by the number of household members converted into equalized adults. A detailed 
description of this indicator is presented  in the next section. 
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overall social protection expenditure is one of the highest among EU countries, reaching more than 
30% of GDP), the incidence of care and health expenditure does not exceed 8% of household’s 
income. On the contrary, in countries where the public intervention is more limited, like Italy and 
Poland, the dependent elderly devote on average a quarter or a fifth of their household’s income to 
care and health expenditure. 
Figure 12 Incidence of care expenditure on equivalised disposable household income by 
country, average annual values (mean between 1° and 2° wave)   
 
Source: Author's compilation on the basis of SHARE data, waves 1-2. 
In analysing the relation between risk of poverty and private care resources it is important to note 
that a common element is represented by the greater incidence of care and health expenditure of the 
dependent elderly, compared with the older population not affected by disabilities. This is 
particularly true for Spain that presents the broader gap between these two categories of population. 
A crucial issue affecting the incidence of care costs is given by the criteria for the definition of the 
degree of co-payment which are adopted by each country. These criteria vary from country to 
country, but also at sub-national level. Moreover, as already pointed out, they can consider only the 
dependent elderly, his/her family income, or the families’ availability in terms of financing and 
support to care.  
The introduction of the family co-payments for care home services was seen as a ‘revolution’ in the 
Polish social system. Before 2002 the evaluation criterion that regulated the access to care was 
based only on the recipient income, while after the introduction of this reform the co-payment level 
is determined taking into account the income of partner and/or children. Additionally, recently the 
Polish government reduced the income threshold for the services' accessibility evaluation, 
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establishing a ceiling rather low, equal to 316 PLN (which amounts to about 10% of the average 
earnings in the economy). This lowering of ceiling implies that also less well-off families have to 
face necessary payments (several hundred PLN) for the care of their family members in social 
services (Golinowska, 2010). These changes can in part explain why, in 2007, none dependent 
elderly interviewed by SHARE survey declared to receive home care services (figure 10-11). 
According to Kotowska and Woycicka (2008) the changes in the responsibility for payment, and the 
lowering of income threshold may have been associated with a falling demand for services
20
. 
Indeed, the cost and quality of formal care for the elderly is seen as a substantial barrier to a wider 
use.  
In Italy the co-payment, based on family income, instead of the recipient's wealth, and the direct 
expenditures for the care of the dependent elderly represent a significant cost for the family. The 
Centro Studi Investimenti Sociali CENSIS (2013), estimates that an Italian family spend annually 
on average € 8488 for services, € 1297 for drugs not reimbursed by the health system, and € 3178 
for other related activities to care (i.e. specific visits or rehabilitation). Despite this, in Italy the co-
payment level represents only a minor part of the private home care sector expenditure, as the 
majority of services is provided outside the public domain. An estimation of the cost to the user for 
home basic home care
21
, states that, including the social security contributions and of the meal 
allowance, this cost amount to 987 € per month22 (N.N.A, 2009). Considering that the average net 
wage earnings for 2003 were € 1228 per month, and the average pension for ex-employees is € 612 
per month (average for men and women) and € 464 per month for women only, the home care (an 
in-living assistant) would prove unaffordable for the average holder of a pension with no other 
source of income, and even more so for women pensioners.  
In Spain the dependent person's income level and also that of their relatives and the cost and nature 
of the care services provided are considered to determine the private level of contribution. Criteria 
determining the amount of co-payments to be paid have recently been defined, and for the public 
services an estimation of the average co-payment level amounts to around 17% of total SAAD 
                                                             
20
 Referring to the residential sector in 2003 about 19 800 persons were awaiting placement, while in 2008 the number 
was much lower at 9 600 persons (GUS 2009). 
21
 Where by basic home care we mean the combination of home help and of personal care delivered by family assistants 
(considering the minimum contractual rates for a low-skilled assistant, € 5,13). The estimation uses data provided by 
National Institute for Statistic INPS and Bank of Italy, and is based on 2003. 
22 The figure refer to a services provided an in-living assistance (around the clock), while for a regularly employed 
assistant on a part-time basis (4 hours, 30 days per month) the price is € 616 , and for the same assistant employed on a 
full-time, but daily schedule (8 hours, 30 days per month) the cost is € 1231. 
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expenditure in 2009 (Asociación Estatal de Directores y Gerentes en Servicios Sociales, 2009). This 
figure does not consider the private expenditure that the families sustain for the services out of the 
public domain. This expenditure might explains the difference between this data and the figure used 
in the macro analysis (28% of total LTC expenditure, see Table 2, cap. 2.1). This differential allows 
to define the cost of the private services sustained by the families, which can be estimated around 
11% of total LTC spending
23
. Despite the fact that at current stage of implementation of reform 
define the private care cost sustained by the families is really difficult (Gutierrez, 2010), Gonzales 
Gago (2010) suggests that main concern regarding elderly home care is not the type of provisions, 
but the availability and affordability of the existing ones. In fact, from the second question of 
Eurobarometer survey related to the affordability of home care services, emerges that in Spain only 
18% of citizens - the lowest percentage of the whole European Union - thinks that professional care 
at home is available at an affordable cost.  
In France, for health home and home care, in 2007, families paid € 650 million in co-payments. For 
a very dependent person the private cost for home services ranges from € 1500, for around 60 hours 
of care per month, to € 4000, per 250 hours per month (Gisserot, 2007; Cour des comptes, 2005); 
and on average, cost-sharing for home services amount to € 88 per month (Joël et al, 2010), equal to 
the 18% of the average value of APA (Prevot, 2009). As mentioned earlier the APA benefit is not 
means-tested but the amount is reduced progressively (from 0% to 80%) for recipients who have 
resources in excess of € 677.25 a month (in 2008). Moreover the amount of this benefits is related 
to the level of disability of the elderly and in 2008, the maximum monthly amount of APA for a 
very dependent elderly person living at home was about € 1,209, while for a less dependent person, 
it was about € 518 (Joël et al, 2010). From these figures it can be assumed that the care cost for an 
elderly with moderate or medium disability it equal or slightly higher than the benefits that he/she 
receives, while for very dependent elderly people the maximum amount of APA does not cover the 
total cost, and the difference fall back on the families. 
In Sweden taxes and general allowances finance the majority of total costs for care of the elderly, 
and the share of out-of-pocket expenditure is the lowest among the examined countries, reaching, in 
2006, only the 4% of LTC spending (SKL, 2007). In 2002, a new fee system was introduced for 
elderly and disabled care, establishing that the highest fee the municipal authorities may charge for 
                                                             
23
 In the interpretation of this figure it have to consider that the estimation is based on different sources of data and 
different reference years (respectively 2009 and 2010 for macro analysis); additionally the data reported in this 
paragraph refers both to residential services and home care services. 
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home care services was around € 170 per month in 2010 (Socialstyrelsen 2010). The purpose of the 
new system was to protect the individual from excessively high costs for municipal care (maximum 
rate or high cost insurance), and to ensure that all individuals have a minimum sum for living 
expenses once all fees are paid, known as a reserve sum (förbehållsbelopp) (Socialstyrelsen 2002). 
In 2010, the reserve sum is around € 475 per month for single people and around € 400 per person 
for married or common-law spouses living together (Socialstyrelsen 2010). It follows that in 
Sweden the majority of expenditure are sustained by public resources and the families face only a 
very small part of the general cost. Nevertheless, the National Board of Health and Welfare 
(Socialstyrelsen) has in reports from 2004 and 2005 shown that elderly with home help services 
have lower incomes and less often private means than people at the same age without home help. 
The income of more than a fourth of the care receivers is so low that they do not cover the average 
living costs in spite of the fact that they do not pay any home care fee. Additionally, in 2005 slightly 
less than half of the care receivers who do not pay any fee do not have capital above around € 9900 
(Socialstyrelsen 2007). 
Given the organisation of the Belgian LTC system, with its division of responsibilities between the 
federal and the regional levels, it follows that the financial flows are rather diverse and complex. 
Total LTC expenditures were approximately € 5.7 billion in 2006, of which almost 98% was 
financed by a combination of social security contributions (59%) and taxes (39%). This figure does 
not include out-of-pocket payments for accommodation in residential care (approximately €2.3 
billion), while the co-payment expenditure for home care services was around € 1 million. It should 
be noted that not all out-of-pocket expenditures for LTC are known, since elderly persons who are 
not eligible for subsidised home care can and do buy these services privately, mainly by using 
‘service cheques’. These are vouchers that can be purchased to pay for domestic services provided 
by public bodies or private firms who employ - usually low-skilled - personnel. The services 
provided under this scheme are paid in large part by government subsidies - around €13 per hour -, 
with the balance paid by the user (€7.5 per hour). This amount covers the hourly wage of the 
employee, including social security contributions, and a profit for the employer. The money spent 
on service cheques is tax-deductible by users up to a certain limit - implying that the government 
intervention is even greater than the subsidy - . In 2008 the system cost around €1.3 billion 
(Willemé, 2010). The amount spent on LTC is unknown, unfortunately, because the vouchers are 
used rather extensively to pay for domestic help other than help for elderly persons with IADL 
limitations. Nevertheless for define the cost borne by families it can be useful utilize the estimate 
provided by the Flemish Agency for Care and Health. Considering the overall provision of services, 
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in 2006, the private services offered close to 12 million hours of help and the 80.52% was 
consumed by population aged over 65, that has contributed with an amount of user fee of about € 38 
million; while the public services offered 2 million hours of help in 2006 and 83.15%  was used by 
users aged 65 or over, and the co-payment level was close to € 7 millions24.  
Figure 13, average annual values of Incidence of care expenditure on equivalised 
disposable household income, by year and  quintile of income distribution; differential 
between years (table), population aged 65 or over; (left axis: expenditure incidence,%) 
                                                               2004-05 
 
 
2006-07 
 
Bl -3,59 -4,45 -3,82 -3,2 -1,4 
IT 1 0,6 -0,3 -0,7 0,13 
ES 2,14 -1,04 -1,96 -1,26 -0,48 
SE -1 -1,53 0,11 0,03 -0,21 
FR -0,87 -0,29 0,1 -0,31 -1,46 
PL - - - - - 
Source: Author's compilation on the basis of SHARE data, waves 1-2. 
The analysis by income groups tends to reflect the results presented in figure 12: the Italian, Belgian 
and Polish families bear, on average, a greater incidence of care costs compared to the other three 
countries. Additionally, in all countries the incidence of expenditures is inversely proportional to 
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 http://www.zorg-en-gezondheid.be/topPage.aspx?id=11418 
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household income: with the exception of France, the incidence of care costs for the families 
included in the first income quintile is about five or six times that of the richest population (families 
with a disposable income included in the last quintile of the distribution). When considering all the 
income groups we find that in Spain the incidence of the care costs for the low- and middle-income 
families is closer to the Italian and Belgian case than to the more egalitarian countries, namely 
Sweden and France. Moreover the differential between 2004 and 2007, shows that the Belgian 
reforms seem to generate a beneficial effect on the "care cost", producing an evenly reduction of the 
families economic burden close to 4 percentages points. 
Notwithstanding the SHARE data do not allow to monitor all the indirect economic effects of the 
dependent condition, it must be observed that the reforms and characteristics of LTC systems affect 
the care process not only in terms of informal care provided by the family (analyzed in the next 
section), but also in financial terms. Moreover the Eurobarometer survey (2007) confirms that the 
economic care burden can exceed the dependent elderly family income and falls back on the 
financial resources of their relatives, namely their adult children: the majority of Europeans who 
pay for their parents’ care spend less than 30% of their income on the service (68%), but one 
respondent in twenty who paid in the past or who is paying for his or her parents’ care spends more 
than half of the household income, and close to one respondent in ten spends between 31% and 50% 
of the household income. To this end the dependent elderly as well as their adult children can be 
considered categories exposed to financial impairment, and the last chapter is dedicated to figure 
out if the dependent condition can lead to an increase of the risk of poverty for both these 
population groups. 
3.2.2 Informal care 
As argued by OECD (2011), informal carers are the backbone of long-term care systems in all 
OECD countries. On average, in 2007 in the OECD area, one-in-nine people aged 50 and over gives 
care and ADL assistance to a dependent relative (ibidem). Form this it seems evident that the EU 
countries, alongside the development of formal services sector, have to recognize the importance of 
the informal carers and provide them the necessary support in order to ensure a fair balancing 
between care, work and private life. The six selected countries, even if with significant differences, 
guarantee a financial sustain for the informal carers, in form of allowance (for the not active 
workers) or in terms of parent leave. Although In Italy no leave scheme is explicitly and solely 
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devoted to elderly care, use can be made of two schemes motivated by ‘serious and specific family 
reasons’. The first (Permesso retribuito) is modest as it entitles employees to a maximum of 3 days 
per year, or an equivalent reduction in working hours. It is fully paid in case of medically certified 
severe disability or death of a family member and unpaid for other family reasons. The second 
scheme is the ‘Congedo per gravi e documentati motivi personali’ or leave for serious and certified 
personal reasons. Under this scheme employees of private and public concerns are entitled to leave 
that can be taken up in whole or in parts for a maximum of 2 years in a lifetime. The leave is unpaid 
except in the specific cases
25
 (the amount is proportional to the carer wage). There are some 
restrictions as to whom the applicant may care for, but they are not too severe when the leave is 
unpaid. Unfortunately, there are no publicly available figures on the take up rate of these leaves and 
this suggests that currently the use of these time off is somewhat limited. Additionally, Italy is the 
only country that does not provide allowance or a direct economic support to the family carer
26
.  
In Belgium the family of frail elderly can benefit of two leave schemes. The first (Leave for medical 
assistance) may be taken to take care of a household (each person living under the same roof) or 
family (to the second degree) member with a serious illness. The length of this leave is minimum 1 
month and maximum 3 months. It can be extended to 12 months when leave is taken full-time (full 
career interruption) and to 24 months when it is taken half-time or at a rate of 1/5. The leave for 
palliative care, instead, regards who is approaching the end of his/her life. Any form of assistance 
(medical, social, administrative and psychological) and caring for a person with an incurable 
disease in the terminal phase, is considered palliative care. There does not necessarily need to be a 
family tie with the person cared for. The length of this leave amounts to 1 month and it can be 
extended with another month. This leave can be taken full-time, half-time or at a rate of 1/5. During 
each of these leaves a lump-sum allowance is granted to compensate for foregone earnings. The 
amount of these allowances vary according to the type of leave taken, the sector of economic 
activity and, in a number of cases, the age or seniority of the worker (the amount is higher for 
workers above 50 years of age). Additionally, the Flemish region's citizen can benefit from a 
informal care allowance aimed to reduce the burden of care, that in 2008 was about € 115 per 
month.  
                                                             
25
 According to Law 104/92 revised in light of the judgment recently made by the Constitutional Court (Sentenza 
19/2009), some beneficiaries of the 2 years leave are also entitled to full pay provided they are: i) the co-residing spouse 
of the disabled elderly; ii) the brother or sister of the disabled elderly, subject to both parents having died or being 
seriously disabled themselves; iii) and  a child co-residing with the disabled elderly subject to the fairly restrictive 
condition that there are no suitable carers to replace her or him. 
26
 An additional allowance aimed to sustain the dependent elderly and to compensate the caregiver effort has been 
introducted in the last year in some Italian Regions,mainly in the North Italy. The availability and amount of this 
allowance ("Assegno di cura") significantly vary across regions and even among local community. 
60 
 
In France, as claims Joël (et al., 2010), the issue of reconciling life times regards primarily the child 
care, while, at current stage, the support for informal caregivers seems to be underdeveloped. As 
mentioned earlier, the APA beneficiaries can employ their relatives to care for them, and use the 
amount of the cash benefit for pay the assistance received. The restriction in its use, the elderly - 
cannot use this benefit to hire the partner or a cohabitants to care for them - implies that only the 8% 
of the APA receivers employ their relatives, mostly their daughter or daughter-in-law. The only 
leave measure intended for the care of an needy elderly is the Family Solidarity Leave (Congé 
d'accompagnement de fin de vie) available for all employees, whose ascendant, descendant or 
someone sharing their home suffers from a life-endangering pathology. This leave lasts for a 
maximum of 3 months, which is renewable once, and does not recognize any compensation to the 
applicant
27
.  
The Spanish elderly care sector recognizes two different measures of reconciling life times. A 
targeted leave is available for all workers in order to take care of a dependent relative. Under this 
scheme employees of private and public concerns are entitled to an unpaid leave for a maximum of 
2 years, and the social security contributions are recognized during the first year. Additionally, the 
carers can take advantage of a flexible time arrangements, that allows the family members to reduce 
their working hours by 1/3 and up to 1/2 to take care of a dependent relative, with the proportional 
reduction of their pay (Gonzales Gago, 2010). The compensation for the family carers, that derives 
from the care allowances received by severely disabled elderly, is granted if there are no public 
alternatives. The elderly are entitled to use the amount for pay the related care expenses; and this 
benefit usually goes to family carers and implies the inclusion of the carer in the social security 
system
28
.  
As we have seen before (¶ 3.1.1)  in Sweden, the economic compensation for family members 
providing help and care to elderly is not especially common (Nyberg, 2010). Nevertheless, each 
Swedish cash benefit examined previously is directly targeted to sustain the family carers. The 
family carer grant and the home nursing grant are compensations to a person closely related for 
nursing work in the home or for help in ordinary housing. Additionally, two further measures are 
recognized by the Swedish LTC system: family members can be employed to care 
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 http://www.e-sante.fr/ (last access November 2013) 
28
 Also in Italy the care allowance (Indenntà di accompagnamento) is usually used to compensate both  the family 
caregiver or the private carers directly employed by the family. The feature that differs Italy from Spain and France is 
that, in this case, the mechanism of subsidization of care is not regulated by any national, regional or local law. 
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(anhöriganställnig), and an allowance for care of close relatives (närståendepenning) (Nyberg, 
2010). The latter is a benefit from Försäkringskassan (the Swedish Social Insurance Agency), which 
can be used for a maximum of 100 days as of 1 January 2010 (earlier it was 60 days) if a person 
stays home from work in order to nurse a closely related person who is seriously ill, and the 
beneficiaries receive approximately 80 per cent of their salary
29.
 
Somewhat contrasting with the characteristics of Polish LTC system previously presented is the 
nursing benefit (świadczenie pielęgnacyjne) available since 2003. This measure is a payment to a 
person - parent or child - who resigned from paid employment to care for a disabled person (child or 
adult) certified as in need of permanent or long term care or assistance based on severely limited 
ability to function independently. Since January 2010 the benefit is independent of family income 
(previously means tested) and the current level is € 133 per month. Carers who are entitled to any 
pension or to social assistance benefits are not eligible to receive the nursing benefit. Also, benefit 
is not paid if the cared-for person is married or is a resident in a facility providing round the clock 
care. The Polish system does not provide a targeted leave scheme for long-term care, but recognizes 
the right to leave from work to care for a family member, whatever his/her age. This leave is 
accompanied by care allowance (zasiłek opiekuńczy) funded by the Social Insurance, that is granted 
for the duration of the leave, but no longer than 14 days in a calendar year at the level of 80% of 
pay.  
To sum up, all countries provide a form of sustain for the informal caregivers, but the majority of 
these measures do not concern the non-working population, and generally have a limited length. 
Additionally, where the caregivers are entitled to receive a economic compensation for the 
assistance provided, generally, the compensation derives from a redirection of the cash benefit 
received by the elderly. 
Figure 14 shows the degree of importance of informal care in all countries according to SHARE 
data: from 25% to 35% of the elderly population receives informal care from relatives or friends, 
and with the exception of Sweden and Poland, the recourse to this kind of help increases over the 
period between 2004 and 2012.  
                                                             
29 https://www.forsakringskassan.se/ (last access January 2014). 
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Figure 14. % of population over 65 that receive informal care on total population of over 65 
(left axis); and % of population aged 50-65 that provide informal care to parents/in law on 
total population aged 50-65 (right axis), 
 
Source: Author's compilation on the basis of SHARE data, waves 1-2-4. 
 
Although there is little difference in terms of share of older population receiving informal care, 
Spain, Italy and Belgium show the highest degree of reliance on this help. Moreover, in the two 
Mediterranean countries roughly half of the help that a dependent elderly person receives is 
provided by a cohabitant, in most cases his/her partner or adult child. The green triangles report the 
share of population aged between 50 and 65 not living with parents but providing informal care to 
them or in-laws (we have identified this type of population as the "adult children") with respect to 
the total population of the same age. In all countries a significant share – about 15% - of this 
population category is involved in the care of parents or in-laws.  
The income groups analysis suggests that the degree of informal care received by the elderly is 
related with the household’s economic resources. Focusing on the dependent population that 
receives assistance from relatives or friends on a daily basis, figure 15 shows that the share of 
elderly that relies or needs this help decreases with the increasing of household income. In 2006, in 
France, Belgium and Sweden the relation between informal care and family income is clear and 
almost linear: in the first two countries the ratio between the share of the first income quintile and 
the percentage of the last income quintile is equal to 3,1; while in Sweden this form of help regards 
almost exclusively the poorest dependent population. 
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Figure 15. Share of dependent population aged 65 or over that receive informal care almost 
daily or daily on total dependent population aged over 65 by quintile of household income, in 
2006-07; differential between years 2006-07/2011-12. 
 
1° Q 13,5 5 4,5 -4,1 1,2 -2,1 
2° Q 1 1,6 5,1 1,4 4,1 1,2 
3° Q 9,5 3,4 4,4 1,7 -0,2 4 
4° Q -1,8 4,4 -5,4 1,5 2,4 -0,3 
5° Q -0,6 2,7 2,2 2,4 2,9 0,6 
 
Source: Author's compilation on the basis of SHARE data, waves 2-4. 
In the other three countries the situation is slightly different. First of all, on average, each income 
groups, present the highest percentages of elderly that receive assistance every day among the 
examined countries. Additionally, in Spain and Italy the second income quintile shows a significant 
trend reversal, and respectively 25.3% and 26.3% of dependent population of this income group, 
rely on daily informal care. After controlling for the socio-demographic variables
30
, this aspect 
suggests that for the low-income families that have the possibility to chose to reduce or leave work 
in order to take care of a relative, the care opportunity cost boost the caregiver toward this 
alternative. In Poland, instead, the absence of a developed system of formal services implies that 
informal care tend to be slightly correlated to the family income, and an important share of 
population receives this kind of help regardless their wealth. Another difference between the latter 
countries and France Belgium and Sweden is the impact of the economic crisis on the recourse to 
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 Value of the socio-demographic characteristics considered respectively, % of female; % of elderly that live in a 
family with 2 or more members; average age: Spain first quintile: 80%; 75%; 78.02; Spain second quintile=65%; 68.8; 
78.1; Italy first quintile: 84%; 69.2%; 77.07; Italy second quintile: 65; 55,2%, 78.3. 
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informal care. Although all countries, after 2007, show a general increase in the share of dependent 
elderly population that receives help on a daily basis (figure 15), in the two Mediterranean countries 
and in Poland this rise is more evident and affects especially the lower income groups. In Italy the 
first income quintile presents a differential of 13,5%, and in 2011-12 around one in three dependent 
elderly of this income group receives informal care every day. Although in Poland and Spain the 
increase is milder, in 2012 about a quarter of the low-income elderly family relies on daily 
assistance of friends and relatives. 
Nevertheless, the interpretation of the population share providing informal care requires a careful 
analysis. Even if this indicator confirms that providing and receiving care within families is a 
common aspect in all countries, it does not give a direct information on the intensity of this practice. 
The number of monthly hours of received and provided care
31
 also allows us to understand the 
reliance of the LTC systems for this kind of help. The intensity of informal care received by 
dependent elderly for Italy, Spain and Poland, on average, exceeds 70 monthly hours (respectively 
80.6, 87.5 and 69.9); and proportionally the care intensity provided by adult children is extremely 
high. Respectively on average, an adult children dedicates in Italy 63.1, in Spain 73.6, and in Poland 
41.8 monthly hours in providing help and assistance to their parent or in-law. In the other three 
countries, both the categories analyzed show values of intensity considerably lower. The Swedish 
elderly population receives on average 13,9 hours of informal care per month, and the France and 
Belgium values are respectively 31 and 22,8. In these countries the intensity of care provided by 
adult children does not exceed the 27 monthly hours - France 21,8; Belgium 27; and Swedish 8,2 -. 
In light of the results shown in the first paragraph, this indicator confirms that the need for informal 
care is directly related to the degree of LTC system development, and to the public expenditure 
allocated to elderly care. In fact, figure 10 suggests a clear division of the LTC systems. On the one 
hand, we find countries in which the informal care plays a fundamental role in the care of the 
elderly, Italy, Poland, and also Spain. On the other hand, we find countries like France, Belgium 
and Sweden where families provide help and assistance to the elderly for 5-6 hours a week on 
average, instead of 20 hours or more 
The intensity and share of informal care provided by adult children in all countries suggest that a 
large part of elderly care is provided by this category of population. If we exclude the care provided 
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 Due to the changes occurred in the structure of the SHARE's questionnaire, in the fourth wave, the intensity of 
informal care is collected only through a categorical variable, and no data is available of the monthly numbers of hours 
for this wave. 
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by cohabitants, according to SHARE data, in all countries more than 75% of informal care, both in 
terms of intensity and quantity, regards the adult children. 
Figure 16, number of monthly hours of informal care provided by adult children to their 
parents or in-law, by income quintile, in 2006-07.  
  
          Source: Author's compilation on the basis of SHARE data, waves 2 
The figure 16 help to understand the impact of the informal care on the adult children's working 
life. Not surprising that the countries respect differentiation presented above, and that the burden of 
care is considerably heavier in Spain, Italy and Poland. In these countries, for those in the bottom 
half of the income distribution provide informal care to a dependent parents or in-laws severely 
limits the possibility of a full-time regular job. In Italy and Spain this population offers on average, 
between 15 and 20 hours of care per week. While in the other three countries the care burden of the 
low-income population is at most, on average, 1 hours for day. Currently, the caregiving impact is 
already straining the (women) carers' employment situation. According to Eurofamcare survey, in 
Italy, 13.5% of the family carers of disabled elderly in employment reduced hours of work in order 
to care, an additional 5.5% worked only occasionally and a slightly higher share (6.5%) experienced 
career problems. Additionally, about 8% of the non employed carers had to give up work altogether 
(Lamura 2008). Without adequate support, informal care giving might exacerbate employment and 
health inequalities (Colombo et al., 2011). For this reason, in the next chapter, the relation between 
private care resources and risk of poverty has been analysed for two specific categories: people 
aged over 65 affected by LTC disability and the adult children of parents with a fair or poor health 
status.  
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CHAPTER 4 
 
DEPENDENCY, PRIVATE CARE RESOURCES AND RISK OF POVERTY 
 
4.1 POPULATION AT RISK OF POVERTY 
Figure 17 shows the distribution of the population at risk of poverty for the two age groups under 
examination (non-self-sufficient elderly people and their adult children). The indicator used to 
define the population at risk of poverty is the at-risk-of-poverty variable, that indicates the share of 
people with an equivalised disposable income below the at-risk-of-poverty threshold, which is set at 
60% of the national average equivalised disposable income after social transfers. The poverty 
threshold used in this research is estimated on the basis of the Eurostat data (EU-Silc data), while 
the equivalised disposable income is calculated in the following three steps: 
- all monetary incomes received by any source by each member of the household are added up; 
these include income from work, investment and social benefits, plus any other household’s 
income, excluding income from rents; taxes and social contributions are also deducted; 
- in order to adjust for differences in households’ size and composition, the total (net) household 
income (adjusted to the standard purchasing power) is divided by the number of 'equivalent adults’, 
using the modified OECD scale
32
; 
-  the resulting figure is called equivalised disposable income, and is equally attributed to each 
household member. 
During the period covered by SHARE data, in all countries, with the only exception of France (and 
Poland in the 2006-7 wave),  the elderly population shows a higher percentage of individuals living 
in a family with a disposable income below the poverty line, compared with the population aged 
between 50 and 65 (figure 11). Italy, Spain and Poland are the countries more exposed to the risk of 
poverty. In these countries, at least 20% of the population of both age groups can be considered at 
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 This scale gives a weight to all members of the household (and then adds these up to arrive at the equivalised 
household size): 1.0 to the first adult; 0.5 to the second one and each subsequent person aged 14 and over; 0.3 to each 
child aged under 14. 
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risk of poverty. On the other hand, in France, Belgium and especially Sweden, the risk of poverty 
affects only a reduced share of the population. Furthermore, France and Belgium are characterized 
by a positive trend in the reduction of the risk of poverty concerning both age groups 
Figure 11. % of population at risk of poverty by age groups. 
 
Source: Author's compilation on the basis of SHARE data, waves 1-2-4. 
Sweden and Spain show a significant difference in the risk of poverty of the two groups: in the three 
periods, the elderly population has a higher probability (at least five percentage points) to be 
exposed to the risk of poverty than the other group. This disparity is only partly explained by 
differences in welfare policies across countries and in relation to the different age groups. In fact, it 
may simply result from the features of the indicator. First of all, the at-risk-of-poverty defines 
poverty as the economic inequality within the place or society where people live (World Bank, 
2011). Furthermore, in a context of economic growth, characterized by an average increase of 
wages, this indicator tends to emphasize the risk of poverty of the population with a more stable 
revenue, such as pension income. This last factor can partly explain the large gap between the two 
age groups presented in the second wave in Spain, the most dynamic economy in the Euro zone in 
the decade 1998-2008.  
All in all, figure 11 shows a picture in line with the studies on the poverty risk for older people 
(Zaidi 2008, 2010). Although no single explanation can fully account for the differentiation across 
countries, differences in welfare states can provide a part of the story. In general, the risk of poverty 
of both age groups tends to increase across countries: starting from Sweden, characterized by a 
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Nordic welfare state, through those countries featuring a continental welfare state - France and 
Belgium- , reaching the highest share in the Mediterranean countries or in countries with a less 
developed welfare state (the Eastern countries). In the next sections we investigate whether the 
condition of dependency and the private care resources can play a role in the explanation of the risk 
of poverty for the two groups of population under consideration: the dependent elderly and their 
adult children. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
69 
 
4.2 SAMPLE, MODELS AND VARIABLES 
The datasets of the first, second and fourth wave of SHARE have been divided in two subsamples 
on the basis of the age of the interviewed people: persons aged between 50 and 65 and persons aged 
over 65. For the definition of the level of disability of people aged 65 or more, the SHARE survey 
uses two common indicators: Activities of Daily Living (ADL) and Instrumental Activities of Daily 
Living (IADL). The population aged between 50 and 65 has been characterized on the basis of the 
parent’s health status, using the variable “health of parent (mother/father)”. Although this variable 
is not based on a specific scale of LTC problems, it can be considered a good proxy for the health 
status of the parent
33
. 
In order to assess whether the condition of dependency and the amount of private care resources 
affect the probability to be at risk of poverty for the two population categories, a logistic regression 
analysis has been used. The data has then been analyzed using SPSS. The “recoding into different 
variables” function and the creation of new variables have been necessary procedures in order to 
test the research hypothesis in a more adequate way.  
We use two models, one for the population aged over 65 and one for that aged between 50 and 65. 
The dependent variable is a binary variable created on the basis of the at-risk-of-poverty indicator. 
The value is equal to 1 when a person lives in a family with a disposable equivalized income below 
the poverty threshold, and 0 otherwise. In terms of our predictor (independent) variables we provide 
some transformations to the original ones in order to meet the requirements of a logistic regression 
analysis and offer a more comprehensive inferential analysis of their statistical effect over the 
outcome (dependent) variable. All variables used in the models and their categories are shown in 
table B1.2 of the Appendix. The models that are used in this study consist of a dependent variable 
(E) as a function of several variables, respectively: 
Dependent Elderly= nine independent variables. Where P is poverty risk, I is the intensity of 
informal care received, C is the incidence of the care costs, D is the level of disability, F is the 
                                                             
33
 Appendix B1 reports a summary table of the samples by countries, age groups, disability level and parent health 
status and table B1.2 reports an explanation of the indexes used. 
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family dimension, A is age, G is sex, B is the amount of cash benefits, S is the intensity of home 
care services, E is the employment situation at family level. 
                Pᵢ = f (Iᵢ, Cᵢ, Dᵢ, Fᵢ, Aᵢ, Gᵢ, Bᵢ, Sᵢ, Eᵢ) 
Statistically, where a and b (b1…b9) are parameters to be estimated and ɛᵢ is the error term, for 
agent I it has been estimated: 
Pᵢ= a + Iᵢb1 + Cᵢb2 + Dᵢb3 + Fᵢb4 + Aᵢb5 + Gᵢb6 + Bᵢb7 + Sᵢb8 + Eᵢb9 + ɛᵢ 
Adult children of dependent elderly= eight independent variables. Where P is poverty risk, H is the 
parent's health status, I is the intensity of informal care provided,  F is the family size, A is age, G is 
sex, B is the number of siblings, T are the financial transfers within family, E is the employment 
situation at family level. 
               Pᵢ = f (Hᵢ, Iᵢ, Fᵢ, Aᵢ, Gᵢ, Bᵢ, Tᵢ, Eᵢ) 
Statistically, where a and b (b1…b8) are parameters to be estimated and ɛᵢ is the error term, for 
agent I it has been  estimated: 
Pᵢ= a + Hᵢb1 + Iᵢb2 + Fᵢb3 + Aᵢb4 + Gᵢb5 + Bᵢb6 + Tᵢb7 + Eᵢb8 + ɛᵢ 
These models allow to reject or accept our hypothesis:  
-in relation to the dependent elderly’ model, if bi, b2, b3, are greater than 0, then there is a 
positive relationship between the private care resources, the elderly disability level and their 
risk of poverty; 
-in relation to adult children of dependent elderly’ model, if bi, b2, are greater than 0, then 
there is a positive relation between the parent’s health status and the care provided to them 
with the risk of poverty of adult children. 
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4.3 RESULTS 
The risk of poverty related to the condition of dependency is a concern which is widely shared by 
the majority of European citizens. According to the Eurobarometer survey (2007), about seven in 
ten respondents think that dependent elderly people are exposed to a high risk or some risk to live in 
poverty. This section aims at investigating whether this general concern has an empirical 
confirmation, and to understand if this risk can be partly explained by the amount of private care 
resources demanded from the family. 
 
In the previous chapter, the descriptive analysis of the main predictor variables explained how the 
characteristics of each LTC system affected the provision of services and the need for private care 
resources. In the following we analyse how these aspects can influence the risk of poverty for the 
two groups, focusing in particular on the predictor variables concerning the disability level , parent's 
health status and private care resources. 
Table 3. Values of Nagelkerke R Square and Hosmer-Lemeshow test of each logistic 
regression model used  
  
SWEDEN SPAIN ITALY FRANCE BELGIUM POLAND 
R Square HL test R Square HL test R Square HL test R Square HL test R Square HL test R Square HL test 
Population over 65 years 
Wave 1 0,225 0,895 0,154 0,445 0,269 0,541 0,133 0,825 0,197 0,226 - - 
Wave 2 0,285 0,211 0,222 0,092 0,184 0,066 0,216 0,225 0,225 0,766 0,593 0,328 
Wave 4 0,214 0,061 0,094 0,231 0,149 0,375 0,139 0,671 0,286 0,278 0,124 0,499 
Population aged between 50-65 years 
Wave 1 0,224 0,903 0,179 0,589 0,313 0,151 0,381 0,991 0,231 0,666 - - 
Wave 2 0,155 0,963 0,207 0,206 0,241 0,08 0,339 0,314 0,207 0,708 0,343 0,709 
Wave 4 0,37 0,985 0,221 0,097 0,311 0,06 0,216 0,23 0,309 0,137 0,272 0,502 
Source: Author’s elaboration 
To account for the effects of the characteristics of the national LTC systems on the probability to be 
at risk of poverty we run the models at the national level  for each wave of the SHARE survey. 
Thus we obtained 34 models: three for each country, (only 2 for Poland since it  did not participate 
in the 2004-05 wave). Table 3 reports the values of each model for Nagelkerke R Square, and for 
Hosmer-Lemeshow test. Due to the size of the samples, the models can be used in a descriptive 
way. Regarding the H.-L. Test, the models present statistical significance showing p values over (in 
some case slightly over) the confidence interval used (95% i.e. p value < .005). Tables B1.3-B1.8 in 
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appendix report the statistical significance and the Exp(B) values of the main predictor variables 
presented, while due to excessive size we cannot report the overall analysis outcomes
34
. 
The main outcomes are reported in the following figures, which are created in the same way: on the 
vertical axis are reported the odds ratio values for the wave or category which is presented in the 
horizontal axis. Odds ratio values higher than 1 (dotted red line) indicate a greater probability to be 
at risk of poverty in relation to the reference category. 
4.3.1 DEPENDENT ELDERLY PEOPLE 
i)Disability level 
Figure 18 presents the odds ratio to be at risk of poverty in relation to the disability level of the 
elderly compared to the older population with no disabilities. In Belgium, France, Poland and Spain 
it seems that a moderate level of disability does not increases the probability to be at risk of poverty 
for the dependent elderly. In fact Spain and France present a negative trend of the odds ratio 
between 2004-2012, while all countries show values close or below one. Conversely, the graph on 
the right suggests that, even in those countries with the most developed LTC systems, a severe 
disability level can affect the old person’s probability to be at risk of poverty.  
In France and Belgium the elderly people with medium or severe disability are more exposed to the 
risk of poverty compared to the dependent elderly population with a lesser degree of disability. 
Nevertheless it seems that the quality of these LTC systems is able to limit the economic incidence 
of the condition of dependency: in the last wave,  the increment of the risk of poverty generated by 
the condition of medium or severe disability is limited to an increase in the probability between 
20% and 30%, with respect to the older population without any disabilities. Conversely, it is a bit 
surprising to see that Spain and Poland are the only countries in which, a medium or severe level of 
disability has a minor impact on the probability to be at risk of poverty for the dependent 
population. This result contrasts with the limited capacity of their LTC systems and their path of 
reform. In the case of Spain, the result could be partly explained by the fact that the introduction of 
                                                             
34
 For the detailed outcomes of the regression refer to appendix B3. 
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the LAPAD targeted the neediest among the dependent population, so that this category might have 
benefited from the huge increase in the amount of cash benefits (€ 2000) between 2004 and 2012. 
Figure 18. Odds ratio to be at risk of poverty by disability level , population over 65, reference 
category= population over 65 without LTC disability.   
 
 
Source: Author's compilation on the basis of SHARE data, waves 1-2-4.  
In Sweden and Italy the condition of dependency seems to affect the elderly population’s risk of 
poverty. In Sweden both categories of dependent elderly have odds ratio values greater than 1,5 in 
all three waves, with a peak in 2006. This seems to indicate that the Swedish system has difficulty 
to offset the effects of the reduction of the (high) level of social protection which was provided to 
the dependent people, who seem to pay a higher cost for the government’s strategies compared with 
the self-sufficient older population. In Italy the odds ratio of elderly with moderate disability 
increases from a value close to 1 in 2004, to a value of 2,316 in 2012; and we observe the same 
trend as regards the population with medium or severe disability which, in 2012, presents a odds 
ratio equal to 1,489. These outcomes seem to be in line with the findings of the previous phases of 
our research. As we have seen, the Italian LTC system requires a substantial level of private care 
resources, and, at the same time, provides only a limited support in terms of home care services. 
Moreover, the greater exposure to the risk of poverty of the elderly with moderate disabilities 
compared with those more severely impaired can derive from the characteristics of the main cash 
benefit (indennità di accompagnamento). In fact, the absence of a relation between the value of the 
benefit and the level of disability seems to generate a lose-lose situation: the elderly people with 
severe disabilities tend to receive a monthly amount that does not fully compensate for the cost of  
care, while those with moderate disabilities have to rely wholly on their financial resources until 
they satisfy the standard of access to the allowance . 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
2004-05 2006-07 2011-12 
                    MODERATE DISABLITY                   
odds ratio 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
2004-05 2006-07 2011-12 
         MEDIUM OR SEVER DISABILITY          
odds ratio  
         Sweden         Spain          Italy         France         Belgium         Poland
74 
 
In general, even if the countries differ for the risk of poverty in relation to the disability level, it is 
possible to maintain that the condition of dependency can be considered a factor affecting the risk 
of poverty, which is increasing with the degree of disability. In fact, in all countries in 2012, the 
elderly with a medium or severe level of disability have a greater probability to be at risk of poverty 
compared to the total population aged 65 or over (see tables in appendix B2). 
ii)Informal care 
Figure 19 presents the odds ratio to be at risk of poverty in relation to the type and intensity of 
informal care received compared to the overall older population. We present the outcomes for the 
two categories of the variable that represent the highest level of informal care received: only from 
outside the household; and from inside and outside the household, for a monthly number of hours 
higher than the national average.  
Figure 19. Odds ratio to be at risk of poverty by type and intensity of informal care received, 
population over 65,  reference category= population that does not receive informal care. 
 
Source: Author's compilation on the basis of SHARE data. *= Monthly average number of hours at national level   
From the graph on the left we can see that, until 2006, in Italy, Spain, Poland, but also France 
receiving informal care only from outside the household increases the risk of poverty of elderly 
compared to older population that does not receive informal care; and, with the exception of Poland, 
their odds ratio values grow between the first and second wave, and are steadily higher than 1. 
Conversely, during the same period of time, Belgium and Sweden present stable values of 
probability to be at risk of poverty slightly below the poverty line. In 2012 the odds ratio of all 
countries converge to value close to 1, indicating a small probability to be at risk of poverty 
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compared to the reference category. This can suggest that, in a period of economic crisis, the 
dependent elderly may limit the burden of care through the help of relatives (and in a small 
percentage from the help of friends), that, compared to the previous years, allows the probability of 
risk of poverty to decrease for some countries (IT, FR, ES and PL), or to slightly increase in other 
countries (BL and SE). Those who receives informal care only from outside the family are usually 
elderly women living alone, that is, a group already highly exposed to the risk of poverty regardless 
its health status or the intensity of help and/or assistance received.  
In France (with the exception of the first wave) and in Belgium receiving informal care at the higher 
intensity level ( graph on the right), does not increase the probability of risk of poverty for the 
elderly. In fact in these countries the intensity of informal care received by the elderly population 
(on average, around 6 hours per week) indicates that this kind of help plays only a small role in the 
overall care of the dependent elderly, and from this we can suppose that their risk of poverty is 
primarily affected (or prevented) by the characteristics of the formal services, and by the private 
expenditure that the family has to sustain. Similarly in Sweden, in the first two waves of SHARE, it 
is not possible to identify an increment of the risk of poverty in relation to either receiving informal 
care or its intensity, but the outcomes of the last wave seem to suggest a different interpretation. 
Almost all the categories of the variable used to define the provision and the intensity of informal 
care received by the elderly, have odds ratio values higher than 1 (see table 3 in appendix B2). This 
seems to confirm the aspects emerged in the previous figure (18): the reform processes of the LTC 
system undertaken by this country seem to affect directly the economic situation of the dependent 
elderly. The reduction of public responsibility and financing in LTC sector, which occurred in the 
last decades, together with the impact of the economic crisis have generated a situation in which the 
low-income family of a dependent elderly person do not receive enough support and do not have 
enough resources to deal with the dependent condition. This aspect is also confirmed by the analysis 
for income groups. In Sweden the family support and assistance is almost exclusively a practice that 
concerns the poorest elderly population. 
In Italy, Poland and Spain to receive informal care, especially only from outside household, rises 
the probability to live in a family with an income below to the poverty threshold. However, it seems 
that in Spain the elderly that receive informal care are more exposed to the risk of poverty. If we 
look at the overall outcomes of this variable (tables B2 in appendix) it emerges that the receiving 
informal care increases the risk of poverty of the elderly also in Italy and Poland; but, in 2012, in 
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Spain, all the categories of this variables have odds ratios values higher than 1. In Spain, Italy and 
Poland, informal care is a widespread practice that involves not only the low-income families, but 
in the latter two countries the economic crisis has generated a significant increase in the share of the 
middle-income families that receive this kind of help, while in Spain this rise was milder. Despite 
these differences, a common feature can be identified. In these three countries the elderly that do 
not benefit of a direct support from their family network, namely those that receive informal care 
only from outside the household, are seriously exposed to the risk of poverty. 
iii)Private care expenditure 
Figure 20 presents the odds ratio to be at risk of poverty in relation to the incidence of care and 
health expenditure in the household’s income by quartiles. The risk of poverty increases steadily 
with the increase in the incidence of care expenditure. Except for Sweden, in all countries the 
incidence of these expenditure on household income is directly related to the risk of poverty, and in 
France, Italy and especially Belgium this risk is particularly relevant. In these countries, in 2006-07, 
even an incidence of the care cost included in the third quartile of the distribution increases the 
probability to be at risk of poverty. Moreover, if we exclude Poland (that did not participate to the 
first wave) in 2006, each category of the variable presented in figure 20 (namely, each quartile of 
the distribution of the variable) has a greater value of odds ratio than to 2004 (Table B1.3-4 in 
appendix). 
Figure 20 Odds ratio to be at risk of poverty by incidence of care expenditure, population over 
65, reference category= no care and health expenditure. 
 
 
Source: Author's compilation on the basis of SHARE data, waves 1-2. 
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The result for France in 2012 is puzzling: in fact, as we have seen above, in this country the 
incidence of private expenditure is generally fairly low, and extremely low for the low-income 
families. In fact, in 2004, even the fourth quartile of the distribution had an odds ratio value slightly 
above 1. Special care should be paid in interpreting the results at the light of the role played by co-
payment in the private cost of care. In some countries - France and Belgium - the elderly people 
with moderate disability receive a benefit equal to or slightly lower than the cost of care, in all 
countries a severe disability requires that families shoulder a significant share of the total cost, an 
amount that, in some cases, can be two or three times the cash benefit. Thus, in those countries 
where access criteria are not need and means-tested ( IT and PL); and/or where a scarce provision 
of public services shifts on the families the majority of the cost (IT, ES and PL), the severely 
dependent elderly people are likely to be particularly exposed to the risk of poverty, and this risk 
can involve directly their adult children. 
4.3.2 ADULT CHILDREN OF DEPENDENT ELDERLY 
The next step considers the population aged between 50 and 65 years, specifically, the adult 
children  who provide informal care to their parents or in-laws. We analyse the effects of the health 
status of the parents - fair (left) or poor (right) – on their adult children economic conditions when 
the parent lives alone (the most taxing conditions for the adult children).  
Figure 21 shows that in all countries a "fair" health status of the parent has a small effect on the risk 
of poverty of his/her adult children. With the exception of Sweden, fair health conditions increase 
the probability to be at risk of poverty for a maximum factor of 1,3 compared to the reference 
category, and the odds ratio values tend to decrease between 2006 and 2012. This result suggests 
that fair health conditions require only a limited involvement of the adult children in the care of the 
elderly, and it is not to be considered a primary cause of their risk of poverty. Likewise, a poor 
health condition of the parent seems to have an impact on the risk of poverty of the adult children 
which is similar to the previous case; except for Poland and Sweden, the odds ratio values are equal 
to or below 1.5. 
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Figure 21. Odds ratio to be at risk of poverty by parent’s health status, population 50-65 
years, reference category= population with no parents alive 
 
Source: Author's compilation on the basis of SHARE data, waves 1-2-4. 
However, it is possible to identify two different trends. In France and Belgium the odds ratio values 
are close or below the dotted line, and it seems that in these countries the health status of parents 
does not affect the economic condition of their adult children. In Italy, Spain and Poland the 
parent's poor health increases, year by year, the probability to be at risk of poverty of their adult 
children, peaking in 2012. In these countries care responsibility falls on the family, both in terms of 
assistance and in terms of legal obligations, so that a reduction in the public efforts is directly 
translated in an increase in the private burden for care. Adult children’s families facing economic 
difficulties are thus exposed to the risk of poverty. Sweden represents an anomaly compared with 
the other countries. In 2006 there is a peak of odds ratio, followed by a significant decrease of the 
probability of risk of poverty for the adult children of a single parent with a fair health; conversely, 
the children of a parent in poor health show a steady decrease in their risk of poverty. All in all, in 
this country the condition of dependency seems to affect directly the risk of poverty of the elderly 
population, as well as the economic situation of the adult children.  
The last figure (22) allows to see if the involvement of the adult children in the elderly care 
increases their probability to be at risk of poverty. We focus on the third and fourth quartiles of the 
distribution of hours of informal care provided, since we suppose that a substantial engagement in 
term of hours can reduce the working capacity and working possibility of the adult children, 
increasing their probability to be at risk of poverty. 
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From the figure (22) emerges that the only country in which providing assistance to their parents, 
regardless of the intensity, increases the probability to be at risk of poverty for the adult children, is 
Italy. In this country, in the last two waves and for both the categories presented, the odds ratios are 
higher than 1; and the risk of poverty increases steadily during the period under examination. 
Figure 22. Odds ratio to be at risk of poverty by intensity of informal care provided, 
population 50-65 years, reference category=adult children that do not provide informal care 
  
 
Source: Author's compilation on the basis of SHARE data, waves 1-2-4; ref. cat.= no informal care provided. 
Conversely, if we exclude the odds ratio value of 2012 of the fourth quartile for Poland (even if it is 
particularly high), for the other countries, providing care to parents does not seem to represent a 
cause of the risk of poverty. This result may reflect the absence of measures in support of the 
caregiver. In fact, Italy is the only country among those under study that does not provide any form 
of direct economic support allocated to the family carers: the beneficiaries of the main cash benefits 
(indennità di accompagnamento) are the dependent elderly, not the family caregivers. In Sweden 
allowances related to a condition of dependency are directed to the family caregiver; in Spain the 
law recognizes the possibility to redirect the cash benefit to the informal carers and provides them 
with social security; even in Poland, where the formal LTC system is almost non-existent, the 
family member taking care of the elderly can benefit from a monthly allowance. 
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4.3 CONCLUSION 
In this chapter we studied whether the condition of dependency and the private care resources can 
play a role in the explanation of the risk of poverty for two specific groups of the population: the 
dependent elderly and their adult children.  
For the first group of the population, we have analysed the risk of poverty in relation to the 
following variables: LTC disability level; type and intensity of informal care received; incidence of 
care expenditure on equivalised disposable household income; formal home care services received; 
public cash transfers for LTC or disability. Our results suggest that Italy and Poland are the two 
countries in which the risk of poverty for the old population with disabilities is more evident: for all 
the aspects analyzed, the probability, in general, is higher than 1. Although with minor intensity, 
also in Spain the condition of dependency entails a higher probability of risk of poverty for the 
elderly population, and receiving a high level of informal care is also correlated with an increase in 
the risk to fall into poverty. The amount of private resources committed to care seems to have 
different effects across countries. In Sweden the private cost of care does not seem to be a direct 
cause of family financial impairment, in spite of the high risk of poverty which affects the 
dependent population, regardless of the disability level. In France and Belgium, viceversa, the risk 
of poverty, even if with a limited probability, concerns the elderly with moderate or severe 
disability, and, with a greater intensity, the population with high care expenditure. In all countries 
receiving home care services lowers the probability to be at risk of poverty while this does not 
apply to cash benefits
35
. This can explain the results of France and Belgium. In fact, the features 
that can limit the private cost of care derive, on the one hand, from the degree of development of the 
formal home care sector, and on the other hand from the accessibility of care. In France and 
Belgium more than half of the dependent population receives formal services at home, and the 
accessibility of services (in-kind and cash) is related to both the level of disability and the individual 
income, and these aspects ensure a fair and high coverage from poverty risk. 
The analysis of the adult children population has highlighted the differences in the LTC systems 
under study. In fact while the French and Belgian population over 65 is only touched by the risk of 
                                                             
35
 For all countries the dependent elderly that receive formal home care services, in the first and second wave of 
SHARE, have odds ratio values almost lower that 1, regardless the intensity of the services. The same does not happen 
for the dependent population that receives cash benefits (see Table B1.3-4 in appendix). 
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poverty caused by the condition of dependency , this risk disappears altogether when the analysis 
focuses on their adult children. Conversely, in the other countries, in general the parent's dependent 
condition transcends generations and involves the adult children’s life. There is room for 
differentiation, of course. In Sweden the adult children’s risk of poverty seems to be smaller and 
decreases over the period; moreover the Swedish welfare state has the capacity to limit the effects. 
In Spain, even if the risk is concrete and it affects both the categories examined, the situation elicits 
lesser optimism: the Spanish government’s attempt to intervene in the LTC by introducing a 
constitutional reform, was blocked by the financial and fiscal crisis. What is surprising in Poland, is 
that the situation is not dramatic. In fact, even if this country shows the highest odds ratio values in 
several categories examined, the risk of poverty for both groups is almost in line with Italy and 
Spain. It must be considered that the Polish family structure can still help the elderly and their 
relatives to reduce the economic impact of dependency. Considering that on average the Polish 
families are formed by 3.2 members, it is possible to argue that the care burden can be more easily 
shared within the family. Finally, the analysis provides a disturbing scenario for Italy, where there 
hasn’t been a real reform of the LTC system in the last 20 years, and the fiscal crisis is diverting the 
scare public resources to other social needs.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
This work aimed at investigating the existence of a relation between the condition of dependence of 
elderly people and the risk of falling into poverty for them and their adult children. We started from 
the premise that the dependence –risk of poverty relation might have been strengthened by the re-
definition of public responsibility in the LTC, which affected the characteristics of the LTC systems 
and  the role of the family as care provider. For this purpose, we have brought together two levels of 
analysis that have been usually considered separately in social policy studies: we analyzed the 
relation between the process of reform of the LTC systems at the macro level with their economic 
impact at the micro/ individual level. We proceed in two logical steps: first, to investigate the 
relation linking the reforms of the LTC systems to the amount of private resources required from 
the dependent elderly people and their families; second, to assess the impact of the cost of care born 
by families on the risk of poverty. 
To this end, we have divided our research in two phases. In the first phase, we have identified four 
macro aspects of LTC national systems that may affect the private involvement in the care of 
elderly people. The result of the first phase, obtained through a cluster analysis, is a division of the 
European countries on the basis of those characteristics of their LTC systems that affect the level of 
private resources (time and money) that dependent elderly people and their family members devote 
to care. In particular, the results suggest the existence of a relation between the level of public 
spending on LTC and the private resources that must be devoted to care: increases in public 
financing correspond to reduction in family involvement, both in terms of money and  in  time. It is 
possible to identify four typologies of LTC systems in relation to their degree of family 
involvement in care. Moreover, the macro analysis highlights the existence of a complementarity 
between the two dimensions of private care resources (time and money), showing that the LTC 
systems are distributed on a continuum, from countries in which the families are scarcely involved 
in the care process, to countries in which the elderly care is almost exclusively a private matter. The 
micro analysis integrates and to some extent qualifies the macro analysis, allowing a deeper 
understanding of the consequences of the reform processes on the services provision in the various 
countries and on private cost of care. In the case of Sweden, for instance, the analysis on the basis 
of the micro data highlights how the LTC system of this country is moving away from the 
Scandinavian model, a result that was not so evident in the macro-analysis. 
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The purpose of the second phase was to ascertain a possible connection between the level of private 
care resources and the risk of poverty, at an individual level (dependent elderly people) and at the 
family level (spouse and adult children). On the basis of the results of the cluster analysis we 
selected a number of countries in order to estimate the impact of the private resources allocated to 
care on the elderly person and its family’s income. In this phase we used logistic regression models 
to estimate the relationship between the risk to fall in poverty, the private resources allocated to 
care, the individual and family characteristics and the benefits that the dependent elderly people 
receive from the LTC system. The analysis confirmed the existence of a relation between the level 
of private resources that the family of a dependent elderly devotes to care, and the probability to fall 
into poverty, and the probability increases in periods of economic crisis (2011-12). While a high 
share of care and health expenditure in the household’s income is generally associated with a risk of 
poverty, this risk is especially high in those countries where the elderly care sector has experienced 
a reduction of public funding –Sweden-, and where the public LTC system is under-developed - 
Italy and Poland. Although high levels of informal care help the older population to limit the burden 
of care, the recipients of this kind of assistance are exposed to the financial impairment, specially, 
in those countries where this practice is limited -Sweden - or mainly concerns – Spain and Italy - 
the low income families.  
The analysis of the risk of poverty of the adult children of a dependent old person supported the 
hypothesis that dependency has an intergenerational impact: in LTC systems with limited capacity, 
the parent's dependent condition affects the economic condition of his/her adult children. Narrowing 
public responsibility unsupported by an appropriate reorganization and funding of LTC translates in 
an increase in the risk of poverty also for the adult children of the dependent elderly person. 
However, the risk of poverty is affected by the different features that constitute the various LTC 
systems. A greater recourse to services in-kind as opposed to cash benefits, a fair access to services 
obtained through means and needs testing, a high share of beneficiaries of home services, are the 
main features that ensure a limited economic impairment for the dependent elderly people and their 
families. Also the process of marketization of care is not in itself a factor that increases the risk of 
poverty, as the comparison between Sweden and France shows. High public spending together with 
policies directly aimed to support the dependent person, allow the French LTC system to rely on a 
high share of private operators with a limited risk of poverty. On the other hand, the growing 
process of marketization of care, in combination with the reduction of public funding, has generated 
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a widespread increase of the risk of poverty in Sweden. Finally, the comparison between Italy and 
Poland suggests that the risk of poverty can increase substantially in the transitional phase from a 
familistic organization towards one based on a nuclear family, and from a male breadwinner 
towards a two-earners families, and the risk can be quite substantial if the state does not intervene 
with public provision to reduce the extent of private care resources demanded from families.  
The results on the risk of poverty of the adult children must be interpreted with a view to the future. 
Because of their aging population, the European economies will experience an increase in the 
dependency ratio (the ratio of  the old population over active population), with a consequent 
increase in the share of care that families will have to shoulder: an increasing financing of care, both 
private and public, will impinge on a shrinking active population. Moreover, family care falls still 
mostly upon women, who are penalized in the market, and suffer a gender wage and pension gap, 
thus running the greatest risk of poverty in old age. In those countries where old people’s 
dependence already threatens the economic situation of their adult children, the government might 
face a double responsibility: sustain and protect the elderly population from the disability risk; and 
prevent the risk of poverty of their adult children. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
Dendogram of cluster analysis  
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Correlation matrix of the variables used in macro analysis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Home_Care_rec 1 0,598 0,443 -0,100 -0,124 0,303 0,722 -0,011 0,094 0,556 0,570 -0,429 -0,429 -0,084
Institut_care_rec - 1 -0,09 0,232 -0,491 0,193 0,697 -0,324 -0,007 0,381 0,469 -0,512 -0,516 -0,152
Cash_rec - - 1 0,114 -0,001 -0,119 0,271 0,760 0,001 0,389 0,358 0,275 -0,198 0,125
Public_prov - - - 1 -0,684 -0,744 0,123 0,323 -0,703 0,060 0,045 0,066 -0,318 -0,611
Notprofit_prov - - - - 1 0,039 -0,116 0,200 0,241 -0,172 -0,177 0,340 0,138 0,555
Forprofit_prov - - - - - 1 0,017 -0,571 0,763 0,135 0,162 -0,428 0,167 0,310
Formal_Care_dep_pop- - - - - - 1 0,122 -0,150 0,718 0,700 -0,462 -0,673 -0,211
Cash_dep_pop - - - - - - - 1 -0,281 0,246 0,211 0,458 -0,335 -0,032
mean_t_in_k - - - - - - - - 1 -0,040 -0,049 -0,182 0,247 0,429
Pub_expen_corr - - - - - - - - - 1 0,846 -0,491 -0,485 -0,241
GDP_LTC - - - - - - - - - - 1 -0,493 -0,510 -0,183
CASH_KIND - - - - - - - - - - - 1 0,409 0,512
infocare_over65 - - - - - - - - - - - - 1 0,463
privexp_totexp - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1
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Appendix B1 
 
B1.Descriptive analysis of variables disability level and parent's health status . Distribution of 
frequencies, by waves of SHARE survey 
Table B1.1 
  
Population over 65 years Population 50-65 years 
  
% of persons affected by LTC 
disability 
  
% of adult children with parents 
that with health problems 
  
tot pop. moderate 
medium or 
severe 
tot pop. Fair Poor 
WAVE 1             
Sweden 1408 9,4 9,8 1761 8,3 19 
Spain 1275 11,7 17,5 1174 11,9 14,5 
Italy 1166 9,3 13,8 1497 7,6 15 
France  1425 11,7 15,5 1852 13,1 19,4 
Belgium 1752 12,7 12 2172 13,7 17,2 
WAVE 2             
Sweden 1413 8,3 8,4 1432 15,8 11,2 
Spain 1224 7,4 17,7 1077 14,8 7,8 
Italy 1562 8,3 12,9 1521 13,2 11 
France  1333 10,4 13,6 1702 16,1 13,9 
Belgium 1470 10,3 13,9 1786 16,4 6,6 
Poland 1074 12,8 30 1456 13,4 12,2 
WAVE 4             
Sweden 1422 10,1 12 708 12,8 12,8 
Spain 2159 10,9 22,5 1531 11,2 5,6 
Italy 2135 9,6 16,8 1602 9,5 6,9 
France  3023 11,9 15,8 3035 15,9 13,9 
Belgium 2541 13,9 21,4 2926 8,5 4,6 
Poland 1099 10,2 22,4 707 12,1 11,4 
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B1.2 Variables used in the logistic regression models 
VARIABLES USED  CATEGORIES 
Predictor variables used in the model for  the population aged 65 years or over 
LTC disability level at 
individual level  
- No LTC disability* 
- Moderate disability 
- Medium severe disability 
Type and intensity of informal 
care received aggregated at the 
household level 
- no informal care received* 
- only from outside family, < average national monthly number of hours 
(ANMNH) 
-only from outside family, > ANMNH 
-only from inside family 
-from inside family, and outside family < ANMNH 
-from inside family, and outside family > ANMNH 
Health and care expenditure 
aggregated at the household 
level 
- no care and health expenditure* 
- first quartile of distribution of the incidence of care and health 
expenditure at family level, on equivalised disposable household income  
- second quartile of distribution 
- third quartile of distribution 
- fourth quartile of distribution 
Public cash transfer for LTC or 
disability received aggregated 
at the household level 
- no public transfer received 
-amount of transfer below the national mean 
-amount of transfer above the national mean 
formal home care services 
received aggregated at the 
household level 
-no services received* 
- < ANMNH 
- > ANMNH 
Age - 65-69* 
  -70-74 
  -75-79 
  ->=80 
Predictor variables used in the model for  the population aged 50-65 years 
Parents health status - no parents alive or both parents with health status excellent/very 
good/good* 
-both parents alive, one parent fair 
-single parent fair 
-both parents alive one parent poor 
-single parent poor 
Intensity of informal care 
provided aggregated at the 
household level 
-no informal care provided* 
-first quartile of the distribution of number of hours of informal care 
provided at family level 
- second quartile of distribution 
-third quartile of distribution 
-fourth quartile of distribution 
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Economic transfers between 
parents and adult children 
aggregated at the household 
level 
-no financial transfer from parents to adult children* 
-family that receives financial  transfer from parents 
-no financial transfer from adult children to parents* 
-family that provides financial transfer to parents 
Age -30-50* 
-51-55 
-56-60 
-61-65 
Predicted variables used in both models 
Household dimension -single* 
-couple 
-3 members 
-4 or more members 
Gender -male* 
-female 
Employment condition at 
family level aggregated at the 
household level 
-at individual level the original variables used (EP005-EX103) provide 
six types of response: Retired / Employed or self-employed / 
Unemployed / Permanently sick or disabled / Homemaker / other. At 
household level this variables provides the combination between of the 
employment situations of each person who cohabits in the same 
dwelling. (over 65*=family with two pensioners/pop 50-65*= family 
with two workers). 
*=reference category 
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B2 Statistical, table 1: significance and the Exp(B) values of the main predictor variables 
used, population over 65, wave 1  
VARIABLES  
elderly with LTC 
disability,  (ref. Cat.= 
no LTC disability ) 
 type and degree of informal care received (ref. cat.=  pop over 
65 without LTC disability) 
gender 
(ref. cat.= 
male) 
  
 moderate 
disability   
 medium 
or severe 
deisability 
only from 
outside 
family,<  
MANH*** 
only from 
outside 
family,> 
MANH 
only from 
inside 
family  
from 
inside and 
outside 
family (< 
MANH) 
from 
inside and 
outside 
family (> 
MANH) Female 
SWEDEN  1,856** 1,453** 2,749** ,651** ,371** 1,348** 
SPAIN  1,268** 1,003** 1,354** 1,347** 1,294** 1,042** ,813** - 
ITALY  1,048** ,730** ,739** 1,728** ,993** 2,244** 1,272** ,155** 
FRANCE   1,429** 1,330** 1,491** 1,071** 1,576** ,835** ,971** ,964** 
BELGIUM   ,802** ,,825** ,501* 816** ,747** 676** 1,266** 
VARIABLES  
Total annual care expenditure on family 
equivalised income, quartiles of distribution (ref. 
cat.= no care expenditure) 
Public cash transfer 
received for disability 
allowance or LTC 
schemes (ref. cat.=no 
public transfer 
received)  
Formal professional 
care received (ref. 
cat.=no prof. care 
received)  
Categories  Q1  Q2  Q3  Q4  
< national 
mean  
> national 
mean  < MANH  >  MANH  
SWEDEN  0,071 0,167 ,537** ,515** ,582* ,247* 
SPAIN  0,34 0,482 ,847** 1,123** 1,665* ,108* 0,569* ,229* 
ITALY  0,258 ,728** ,807** 2,204 1,048** ,730** ,475* 
FRANCE   ,326* ,561** ,662** 1,133** ,817** ,565** 1,369** 1,191** 
BELGIUM   0,249* 0,741** 1,312** 4,583 0,450* 0,068* 0,564 0,307 
Pop. Over 65, wave 1*=sig between 0.001 and 0.05, **= sig. more than 0.05,   ***= Monthly average number of 
hours at national level   
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Table 2: Population over 65, wave 2 
VARIABLES  
elderly with LTC 
disability,  (ref. Cat.= 
no LTC disability ) 
 type and degree of informal care received (ref. cat.=  pop over 
65 without LTC disability) 
gender (ref. 
cat.= male) 
  
 moderate 
disability   
 medium 
or severe 
deisability 
only from 
outside 
family,<  
MANH*** 
only from 
outside 
family,> 
MANH 
only from 
inside 
family  
from inside 
and outside 
family (< 
MANH) 
from 
inside and 
outside 
family (> 
MANH) Female 
SWEDEN  3,614* 5,378 ,855** ,873** ,104* 1,526** 
SPAIN  1,046** ,960** 1,672** 2,970** ,968** 1,777** 1,142** ,758** 
ITALY  1,159** 1,182** ,874** 2,117** ,672** 2,057** 1,089** ,744** 
FRANCE   ,913** ,566** 2,012* 1,629** 1,683** ,789** ,788** 
BELGIUM   ,746** 1,110** 1,028** ,665** ,500* ,296* 2,633** 
POLAND ,817** 1,058** 2,059** 4,188* ,890** ,595** ,343** 
VARIABLES  
Total annual care expenditure on family 
equivalised income, quartiles of distribution 
(ref. cat.= no care expenditure) 
Public cash transfer 
received for disability 
allowance or LTC 
schemes (ref. cat.=no 
public transfer received)  
Formal professional 
care received (ref. 
cat.=no prof. care 
received)  
Categories  Q1  Q2  Q3  Q4  
< national 
mean  
> national 
mean  < MANH  >  MANH  
SWEDEN  0,031 0,083 0,2 ,715** 2,207** 1,172** ,301* ,476** 
SPAIN  0,297 ,515* ,623** 1,427** 1,280** 0,204 ,795** 1,044** 
ITALY  ,767** ,836** 1,420** 2,603 1,282** 0,06 ,608* ,670** 
FRANCE   0,195 0,268 1,130** 2,230** ,932** 1,563** ,889** ,809** 
BELGIUM   ,654** ,832** 1,772** 4,321 ,988** ,356** ,619* ,627** 
POLAND 0,078 
0,217 
0,32 2,384* 2,500** ,732** -  -  
*=sig between 0.001 and 0.05, **= sig. more than 0.05,   ***= Monthly average number of hours at national level   
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Table 3:Population over 65, wave 4 
VARIABLES   type and degree of informal care received (ref. cat.=  pop over 65 without LTC disability) 
  
only form 
outside 
family, 
almost every 
month/less 
often 
only form 
outside 
family, 
almost every 
week 
only form 
outside 
family, 
almost 
daily 
only from 
inside 
family 
from inside 
and outside 
family, 
almost 
every 
month/less 
often 
from inside 
and outside 
family, 
almost 
every week 
from inside 
and outside 
family, almost 
daily 
SWEDEN  ,990** ,923** 1,260** 1,247** 2,081** 5,728 1,403** 
SPAIN  1,040** 1,820* 1,269** 1,329** 2,030* 1,657** 2,497 
ITALY  ,965** 1,192** ,953** ,845** 1,406** ,879** ,788** 
FRANCE   ,599* 1,056** 1,295** 1,852 1,312** 1,055** 1,040** 
BELGIUM   ,556* ,611** 1,180** ,965** ,899** ,882** ,692** 
POLAND 1,836** ,826** ,864** 1,241** 1,348** 1,304** 1,124** 
VARIABLES  
Public cash transfer 
received for disability 
allowance or LTC schemes 
(ref. cat.=no public transfer 
received)  
gender 
(ref. cat.= 
male)  
elderly with LTC disability,  (ref. Cat.= no LTC 
disability ) 
Categories  
< national 
mean  
> national 
mean  Female  1 moderate disability   
1 medium or severe 
disability 
SWEDEN  1,663** 1,394* 1,488** 1,747* 
SPAIN  1,827* ,940** ,925** 0,89** 1,046** 
ITALY  ,661* 0,415 ,914** 2,316 1,489 
FRANCE   ,818** 2,019** 1,127** ,952** 1,277** 
BELGIUM   ,846** 1,532** 1,170** ,773** 1,320** 
POLAND ,815** 1,514** 1,223** 1,038** 1,086** 
*=sig between 0.001 and 0.05, **= sig. more than 0.05,   ***= Monthly average number of hours at national 
level   
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Table 4:population between 50-65 years, wave 1 
VARIABLES  
Parents health status (ref. cat.= no parent 
alive) 
gender (ref. cat.= 
male)  
Categories  
both 
parent 
alive, one 
parent 
fair 
single 
parent 
fair  
both 
parent 
alive, one 
parent 
poor 
single 
parent 
poor  
Female  
SWEDEN  5,440** 1,289** ,997** 1,815** 1,562** 
SPAIN  ,693** 1,128** ,812** ,793** ,980** 
ITALY  ,516** ,508** ,444** ,572** ,890** 
FRANCE   ,138** 1,211** 1,025** 1,095** 1,329** 
BELGIUM   1,174** ,797** ,550** ,815** 1,211** 
VARIABLES  
Quartile of distribution of monthly hours of 
informal care provided to parents/ in-laws (ref 
cat.: no informal care provided) 
Financial transfer 
(ref. cat.= no 
financial transfer)  
Categories  Q1  Q2  Q3  Q4  
give 
financial 
transfer to 
parent 
receive 
financial 
transfer 
from 
parent 
SWEDEN  - - ,539** ,976** 2,737** 2,225** 
SPAIN  ,239* ,640** ,165** ,563** ,953** 1,972** 
ITALY  ,796** 1,487** ,888** ,810** ,770** 1,046** 
FRANCE  1,255** ,601** ,531** ,847** 0,142 ,479** 
BELGIUM  1,033** 1,258** ,576** 1,288** ,870** 1,300** 
*=sig between 0.001 and 0.05, **= sig. more than 0.05.    
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Table 5:population between 50-65 years, wave 2 
VARIABLES  Parents health status (ref. cat.= no parent alive) gender (ref. cat.= male)  
Categories  
both 
parent 
alive, one 
parent 
fair 
single 
parent 
fair  
both 
parent 
alive, one 
parent 
poor 
single 
parent 
poor  
Female  
SWEDEN  ,292** 1,613** ,979** 1,330** 1,214** 
SPAIN  1,163** ,903** 1,096** 1,197** ,836** 
ITALY  ,693** 1,262** 1,485** 1,054** 1,051** 
FRANCE   ,801** 1,267** ,355* 1,016** 1,247** 
BELGIUM 1,004** ,902** ,454** ,877** 1,177** 
POLAND ,823** ,810** ,168* ,825** 1,121** 
VARIABLES  
Quartile of distribution of monthly hours of 
informal care provided to parents/ in-laws (ref 
cat.: no informal care provided) 
Financial transfer (ref. 
cat.= no financial 
transfer)  
Categories  Q1  Q2  Q3  Q4  
give 
financial 
transfer to 
parent 
receive 
financial 
transfer 
from 
parent 
SWEDEN  ,696** 1,274** ,637** ,493** ,886** ,532** 
SPAIN  1,351** ,317* ,514** ,617** 3,274* ,387** 
ITALY  ,827** 1,355** 1,193** 1,160** ,588** 1,263** 
FRANCE  ,924** 0,152 ,869** ,787** ,551** 1,841** 
BELGIUM ,697** 1,164** ,641** ,896** ,987** ,512** 
POLAND 0,096 ,577** ,626** ,267* ,733** 1,318** 
*=sig between 0.001 and 0.05, **= sig. more than 0.05.    
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Table 6: population between 50-65 years, wave 4   
VARIABLES  Parents health status (ref. cat.= no parent alive) gender (ref. cat.= male)  
Categories  
both parent 
alive, one 
parent fair 
single parent 
fair  
both 
parent 
alive, one 
parent 
poor 
single 
parent 
poor  
Female  
SWEDEN  1,568** ,452** 2,109** ,219** 1,849** 
SPAIN  ,685** ,888** ,290** 1,131** 1,064** 
ITALY  ,417** ,749** 1,715** 1,383** 1,242** 
FRANCE   ,909** ,872** ,712** ,950** 1,205** 
BELGIUM ,560** 1,157** 2,404** ,439** 1,566 
POLAND ,351** ,807** ,128* 2,062*   
VARIABLES  
Frequency informal care provided to the parents / in-
laws (ref cat.: no informal care provided) 
Financial transfer (ref. 
cat.= no financial transfer)  
Categories  
about once a 
month 
Almost 
every month 
Almost 
every 
week 
Almost 
daily 
give 
financial 
transfer to 
parent 
receive 
financial 
transfer 
from parent 
SWEDEN  - - ,451** ,668** 2,159** 1,62** 
SPAIN  ,730** ,895** ,213** ,779** ,940** ,527** 
ITALY  ,943** 0,405* 1,583** 1,386** 2,234** 1,368** 
FRANCE  ,825** ,470** ,191** ,777** 1,116** 1,453** 
BELGIUM ,675** ,578* ,322* ,799** 1,181** ,912** 
POLAND 1,134** ,222** ,258** 4,343** ,620** ,856** 
*=sig between 0.001 and 0.05, **= sig. more than 0.05.   
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B3. Outcomes of the regression analysis, for each countries examined and for both the 
categories under studies, wawe 1-2-4 
 
BELGIUM, WAVE 1, POPULATION OVER 65 YEARS 
 
      
Exp(B) 
95% CI per EXP(B) 
  B E.S. Wald df Sig. Inferiore Superiore 
condlav_ricod     34,596 6 0       
condlav_ricod(1) 1,109 0,3 14,128 1 0 3,031 1,7 5,403 
condlav_ricod(2) 1,076 0,73 2,148 1 0,14 2,933 0,696 12,37 
condlav_ricod(3) 0,995 0,19 26,68 1 0 2,704 1,854 3,944 
condlav_ricod(4) 1,188 0,93 1,63 1 0,2 3,281 0,53 20,329 
condlav_ricod(5) 3,024 1,1 7,595 1 0,01 20,57 2,395 176,736 
condlav_ricod(6) 1,036 0,41 6,319 1 0,01 2,819 1,256 6,325 
Qexpt_y_w1     103,52 4 0       
Qexpt_y_w1(1) -1,39 0,66 4,461 1 0,04 0,248 0,068 0,904 
Qexpt_y_w1(2) -0,3 0,58 0,275 1 0,6 0,738 0,238 2,296 
Qexpt_y_w1(3) 0,263 0,56 0,22 1 0,64 1,301 0,433 3,916 
Qexpt_y_w1(4) 1,511 0,56 7,294 1 0,01 4,532 1,514 13,569 
hh_infocare_ricod     7,177 4 0,13       
hh_infocare_ricod(1) -0,66 0,26 6,589 1 0,01 0,519 0,315 0,856 
hh_infocare_ricod(2) -0,15 0,39 0,152 1 0,7 0,86 0,401 1,841 
hh_infocare_ricod(3) -0,24 0,29 0,678 1 0,41 0,787 0,446 1,391 
hh_infocare_ricod(4) -0,33 0,43 0,584 1 0,45 0,721 0,311 1,67 
hhsize_cl     12,998 3 0,01       
hhsize_cl(1) 0,332 0,3 1,222 1 0,27 1,394 0,774 2,51 
hhsize_cl(2) 1,206 0,38 10,116 1 0 3,34 1,589 7,022 
hhsize_cl(3) 0,429 0,83 0,266 1 0,61 1,536 0,301 7,848 
ltc_prob_w1     1,87 2 0,39       
ltc_prob_w1(1) -0,29 0,25 1,386 1 0,24 0,745 0,457 1,216 
ltc_prob_w1(2) -0,26 0,27 0,899 1 0,34 0,775 0,457 1,313 
hh_M_pub_bft_w1     6,236 2 0,04       
hh_M_pub_bft_w1(1) -0,81 0,59 1,885 1 0,17 0,447 0,142 1,411 
hh_M_pub_bft_w1(2) -2,68 1,24 4,663 1 0,03 0,068 0,006 0,781 
hh_M_hpr_w1     16,805 2 0       
hh_M_hpr_w1(1) -0,57 0,21 7,172 1 0,01 0,564 0,371 0,858 
hh_M_hpr_w1(2) -1,19 0,33 13,108 1 0 0,306 0,161 0,581 
gender_w1(1) 0,276 0,16 2,96 1 0,09 1,317 0,962 1,803 
Costante -3,22 0,66 24,042 1 0 0,04     
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BELGIUM, WAVE 2, POPULATION OVER 65 YEARS 
 
      
Exp(B) 
95% CI per EXP(B) 
  B E.S. Wald df Sig. Inferiore Superiore 
age_classi_w2     4,293 3 0,23       
age_classi_w2(1) 0,263 0,22 1,407 1 0,24 1,301 0,842 2,011 
age_classi_w2(2) 0,31 0,23 1,817 1 0,18 1,363 0,869 2,139 
age_classi_w2(3) 0,484 0,24 4,204 1 0,04 1,623 1,022 2,579 
gender_w2(1) 0,358 0,17 4,598 1 0,03 1,43 1,031 1,984 
Mhh_pub_bft_ltc     1,162 2 0,56       
Mhh_pub_bft_ltc(1) -0,01 0,43 0,001 1 0,98 0,988 0,424 2,299 
Mhh_pub_bft_ltc(2) -1,03 0,96 1,16 1 0,28 0,356 0,054 2,332 
pr_careM_w2     4,626 2 0,1       
pr_careM_w2(1) -0,48 0,24 4,156 1 0,04 0,619 0,39 0,982 
pr_careM_w2(2) -0,47 0,35 1,811 1 0,18 0,627 0,317 1,238 
Qtotcarexp_y     72,57 4 0       
Qtotcarexp_y(1) -0,43 0,45 0,906 1 0,34 0,654 0,272 1,568 
Qtotcarexp_y(2) -0,18 0,44 0,172 1 0,68 0,832 0,349 1,981 
Qtotcarexp_y(3) 0,572 0,43 1,758 1 0,19 1,772 0,761 4,126 
Qtotcarexp_y(4) 1,463 0,43 11,35 1 0 4,321 1,844 10,123 
hh_size4cat     46,79 3 0       
hh_size4cat(1) 1,534 0,3 26,13 1 0 4,635 2,574 8,344 
hh_size4cat(2) 2,676 0,4 45,48 1 0 14,53 6,677 31,639 
hh_size4cat(3) 1,872 0,95 3,905 1 0,05 6,504 1,015 41,668 
hh_infocare4cat     9,84 5 0,08       
hh_infocare4cat(1) 0,027 0,26 0,011 1 0,92 1,028 0,621 1,7 
hh_infocare4cat(2) -0,41 0,43 0,913 1 0,34 0,665 0,288 1,535 
hh_infocare4cat(3) -0,69 0,34 4,062 1 0,04 0,5 0,254 0,981 
hh_infocare4cat(4) -1,22 0,47 6,596 1 0,01 0,296 0,117 0,749 
hh_infocare4cat(5) -0,38 0,3 1,646 1 0,2 0,685 0,384 1,221 
ricod_cond_lav_1     79,52 7 0       
ricod_cond_lav_1(1) 1,776 0,32 31,12 1 0 5,909 3,165 11,029 
ricod_cond_lav_1(2) 0,584 0,64 0,838 1 0,36 1,793 0,514 6,262 
ricod_cond_lav_1(3) 2,286 0,79 8,465 1 0 9,832 2,108 45,852 
ricod_cond_lav_1(4) 1,141 0,91 1,586 1 0,21 3,131 0,53 18,499 
ricod_cond_lav_1(5) 1,414 0,21 45,19 1 0 4,111 2,722 6,208 
ricod_cond_lav_1(6) 2,67 0,37 52,5 1 0 14,44 7,013 29,738 
ricod_cond_lav_1(7) 2,589 0,5 27,09 1 0 13,32 5,023 35,299 
ltc_prob_w2     1,935 2 0,38       
ltc_prob_w2(1) -0,29 0,31 0,879 1 0,35 0,746 0,404 1,377 
ltc_prob_w2(2) 0,105 0,29 0,128 1 0,72 1,11 0,625 1,972 
private_ltc_service_w2(1) 0,968 0,75 1,688 1 0,19 2,633 0,611 11,341 
Costante -4,62 0,59 61,87 1 0 0,01     
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BELGIUM, WAVE 4, POPULATION OVER 65 YEARS 
 
 
      
Exp(B) 
95% CI per EXP(B) 
  B E.S. Wald df Sig. Inferiore Superiore 
hhsize_cl_w4     100,42 3 0       
hhsize_cl_w4(1) 1,578 0,24 45,233 1 0 4,845 3,059 7,675 
hhsize_cl_w4(2) 2,608 0,31 73,202 1 0 13,569 7,466 24,66 
hhsize_cl_w4(3) 3,584 0,48 56,912 1 0 36,004 14,191 91,348 
age_clas_over65     18,076 3 0       
age_clas_over65(1) 0,379 0,2 3,788 1 0,05 1,46 0,997 2,139 
age_clas_over65(2) 0,697 0,19 12,917 1 0 2,007 1,373 2,934 
age_clas_over65(3) 0,739 0,19 14,665 1 0 2,094 1,434 3,056 
ltc_prob_w4     6,195 2 0,05       
ltc_prob_w4(1) -0,26 0,23 1,273 1 0,26 0,773 0,494 1,209 
ltc_prob_w4(2) 0,277 0,2 1,959 1 0,16 1,32 0,895 1,946 
hh_infocare_w4     7,723 7 0,36       
hh_infocare_w4(1) -0,59 0,32 3,443 1 0,06 0,556 0,299 1,034 
hh_infocare_w4(2) -0,49 0,29 2,975 1 0,09 0,611 0,349 1,069 
hh_infocare_w4(3) 0,166 0,31 0,291 1 0,59 1,18 0,647 2,154 
hh_infocare_w4(4) -0,04 0,23 0,025 1 0,88 0,965 0,621 1,5 
hh_infocare_w4(5) -0,11 0,66 0,026 1 0,87 0,899 0,245 3,299 
hh_infocare_w4(6) -0,13 0,42 0,092 1 0,76 0,882 0,391 1,987 
hh_infocare_w4(7) -0,37 0,44 0,698 1 0,4 0,692 0,291 1,643 
Mhh_pub_bft_ltc_w4     0,938 2 0,63       
Mhh_pub_bft_ltc_w4(1) -0,17 0,29 0,336 1 0,56 0,846 0,481 1,488 
Mhh_pub_bft_ltc_w4(2) 0,426 0,6 0,499 1 0,48 1,532 0,47 4,996 
condlav_ricod     226,12 9 0       
condlav_ricod(1) 0,896 0,22 17,417 1 0 2,45 1,608 3,731 
condlav_ricod(2) -1,21 0,75 2,568 1 0,11 0,299 0,068 1,309 
condlav_ricod(3) -0,21 0,82 0,065 1 0,8 0,812 0,164 4,025 
condlav_ricod(4) 1,339 0,57 5,458 1 0,02 3,815 1,241 11,731 
condlav_ricod(5) 1,304 0,16 70,624 1 0 3,683 2,718 4,992 
condlav_ricod(6) 1,226 0,86 2,049 1 0,15 3,407 0,636 18,246 
condlav_ricod(7) 1,037 0,33 9,844 1 0 2,821 1,476 5,393 
condlav_ricod(8) 1,748 1,2 2,117 1 0,15 5,741 0,545 60,44 
condlav_ricod(9) 4,895 0,39 158,84 1 0 133,66 62,428 286,164 
no_infocare(1) 0,374 0,21 3,275 1 0,07 1,453 0,969 2,177 
gender_w4(1) 0,157 0,13 1,524 1 0,22 1,17 0,912 1,502 
Costante -4,34 0,32 189,66 1 0 0,013     
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BELGIUM, WAVE 1, POPULATION AGED BETWEEN 50 AND 65 YEARS 
 
 
  
      
95% CI per EXP(B) 
  B E.S. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) Inferiore Superiore 
condlav_ricod 
    
194,148 15 0 
      
condlav_ricod(1) 1,702 0,467 13,3 1 0 5,487 2,198 13,7 
condlav_ricod(2) 0,834 0,509 2,68 1 0,102 2,302 0,848 6,244 
condlav_ricod(3) 2,819 0,482 34,148 1 0 16,759 6,511 43,137 
condlav_ricod(4) 2,216 0,6 13,641 1 0 9,175 2,83 29,744 
condlav_ricod(5) 2,851 0,39 53,478 1 0 17,303 8,059 37,15 
condlav_ricod(6) 0,547 0,455 1,443 1 0,23 1,727 0,708 4,215 
condlav_ricod(7) 1,762 0,456 14,963 1 0 5,827 2,386 14,232 
condlav_ricod(8) 0,433 0,792 0,299 1 0,585 1,542 0,327 7,273 
condlav_ricod(9) 0,959 0,659 2,118 1 0,146 2,609 0,717 9,493 
condlav_ricod(10) 0,921 0,462 3,97 1 0,046 2,512 1,015 6,218 
condlav_ricod(11) 3,406 0,615 30,618 1 0 30,133 9,019 100,675 
condlav_ricod(12) 3,724 0,448 69,173 1 0 41,435 17,228 99,659 
condlav_ricod(13) 3,483 0,403 74,893 1 0 32,57 14,798 71,686 
condlav_ricod(14) 1,833 0,504 13,255 1 0 6,254 2,331 16,778 
condlav_ricod(15) 2,738 0,463 35,002 1 0 15,45 6,238 38,265 
gender_w1(1) 0,192 0,156 1,507 1 0,22 1,211 0,892 1,646 
salute_gen_individ     2,849 4 0,583       
salute_gen_individ(1) 0,16 0,489 0,107 1 0,743 1,174 0,45 3,059 
salute_gen_individ(2) -0,227 0,271 0,703 1 0,402 0,797 0,469 1,355 
salute_gen_individ(3) -0,597 0,461 1,68 1 0,195 0,55 0,223 1,358 
salute_gen_individ(4) -0,205 0,264 0,603 1 0,437 0,815 0,486 1,367 
Q_infocare_dato_w1     4,026 4 0,402       
Q_infocare_dato_w1(1) 0,032 0,327 0,01 1 0,922 1,033 0,543 1,962 
Q_infocare_dato_w1(2) 0,23 0,342 0,451 1 0,502 1,258 0,643 2,463 
Q_infocare_dato_w1(3) -0,552 0,364 2,302 1 0,129 0,576 0,282 1,175 
Q_infocare_dato_w1(4) 0,253 0,269 0,885 1 0,347 1,288 0,761 2,18 
n_fratelli_cl     3,657 5 0,6       
n_fratelli_cl(1) 0,152 0,267 0,325 1 0,569 1,164 0,69 1,964 
n_fratelli_cl(2) 0,253 0,27 0,877 1 0,349 1,288 0,758 2,188 
n_fratelli_cl(3) 0,307 0,292 1,107 1 0,293 1,36 0,767 2,41 
n_fratelli_cl(4) 0,152 0,269 0,318 1 0,573 1,164 0,687 1,973 
n_fratelli_cl(5) 0,568 0,327 3,021 1 0,082 1,764 0,93 3,347 
hhsize_cl     19,08 4 0,001       
hhsize_cl(1) -0,34 0,266 1,636 1 0,201 0,712 0,423 1,198 
hhsize_cl(2) -0,23 0,294 0,612 1 0,434 0,794 0,446 1,414 
hhsize_cl(3) 0,513 0,326 2,483 1 0,115 1,671 0,882 3,163 
hhsize_cl(4) 2,748 1,121 6,004 1 0,014 15,604 1,733 140,503 
age_clas     2,344 3 0,504       
age_clas(1) 0,189 0,338 0,312 1 0,577 1,208 0,623 2,343 
age_clas(2) -0,113 0,346 0,106 1 0,745 0,894 0,454 1,759 
age_clas(3) -0,021 0,371 0,003 1 0,955 0,979 0,474 2,024 
ftgiv_w1(1) -0,139 0,577 0,058 1 0,809 0,87 0,281 2,695 
ftrec_w1(1) 0,262 0,49 0,287 1 0,592 1,3 0,497 3,397 
Costante -4,049 0,572 50,182 1 0 0,017 
    
 
 
112 
 
 
BELGIUM, WAVE 2, POPULATION AGED BETWEEN 50 AND 65 YEARS 
 
       
95% CI per EXP(B) 
  B E.S. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) Inferiore Superiore 
ricod_cond_lav 
    
150,024 18 0 
      
ricod_cond_lav(1) 1,512 0,397 14,508 1 0 4,534 2,083 9,868 
ricod_cond_lav(2) 0,112 0,339 0,109 1 0,741 1,119 0,575 2,175 
ricod_cond_lav(3) 1,535 0,42 13,331 1 0 4,642 2,036 10,583 
ricod_cond_lav(4) 0,944 0,539 3,069 1 0,08 2,571 0,894 7,392 
ricod_cond_lav(5) 0,641 0,33 3,768 1 0,052 1,898 0,994 3,626 
ricod_cond_lav(6) 1,357 0,328 17,057 1 0 3,883 2,04 7,392 
ricod_cond_lav(7) -0,149 0,416 0,128 1 0,72 0,862 0,381 1,947 
ricod_cond_lav(8) 0,373 0,407 0,842 1 0,359 1,452 0,655 3,222 
ricod_cond_lav(9) 0,772 0,37 4,342 1 0,037 2,163 1,047 4,471 
ricod_cond_lav(10) 0,897 0,274 10,732 1 0,001 2,451 1,434 4,191 
ricod_cond_lav(11) 2,312 0,533 18,831 1 0 10,099 3,554 28,701 
ricod_cond_lav(12) 0,487 0,803 0,368 1 0,544 1,628 0,337 7,861 
ricod_cond_lav(13) 4,323 0,588 54,113 1 0 75,402 23,833 238,556 
ricod_cond_lav(14) 2,612 0,384 46,313 1 0 13,627 6,422 28,913 
ricod_cond_lav(15) 2,241 0,402 31,036 1 0 9,4 4,273 20,678 
ricod_cond_lav(16) 2,661 0,504 27,826 1 0 14,307 5,323 38,449 
ricod_cond_lav(17) 0,598 0,822 0,528 1 0,467 1,818 0,363 9,111 
ricod_cond_lav(18) 2,819 0,473 35,528 1 0 16,763 6,634 42,358 
gender_w2(1) 0,163 0,149 1,2 1 0,273 1,177 0,879 1,575 
salute_gen_individ     1,997 4 0,736       
salute_gen_individ(1) 0,004 0,348 0 1 0,99 1,004 0,508 1,985 
salute_gen_individ(2) -0,103 0,236 0,19 1 0,663 0,902 0,567 1,434 
salute_gen_individ(3) -0,789 0,59 1,789 1 0,181 0,454 0,143 1,444 
salute_gen_individ(4) -0,131 0,359 0,134 1 0,715 0,877 0,433 1,774 
Q_infocare_dato     3,556 4 0,469       
Q_infocare_dato(1) -0,361 0,311 1,349 1 0,245 0,697 0,379 1,282 
Q_infocare_dato(2) 0,152 0,277 0,301 1 0,583 1,164 0,676 2,004 
Q_infocare_dato(3) -0,445 0,331 1,809 1 0,179 0,641 0,335 1,226 
Q_infocare_dato(4) -0,11 0,303 0,132 1 0,716 0,896 0,495 1,621 
n_fratelli_cl     3,712 5 0,592       
n_fratelli_cl(1) -0,289 0,239 1,468 1 0,226 0,749 0,469 1,196 
n_fratelli_cl(2) -0,129 0,239 0,293 1 0,588 0,879 0,55 1,404 
n_fratelli_cl(3) -0,395 0,273 2,093 1 0,148 0,674 0,395 1,15 
n_fratelli_cl(4) -0,084 0,235 0,127 1 0,722 0,92 0,58 1,459 
n_fratelli_cl(5) -0,408 0,354 1,33 1 0,249 0,665 0,333 1,33 
hhsize_cl     57,134 4 0       
hhsize_cl(1) 0,883 0,287 9,469 1 0,002 2,419 1,378 4,246 
hhsize_cl(2) 1,536 0,319 23,19 1 0 4,647 2,487 8,683 
hhsize_cl(3) 2,284 0,353 41,963 1 0 9,811 4,917 19,578 
hhsize_cl(4) 3,646 1,118 10,629 1 0,001 38,315 4,28 342,968 
age_clas     3,883 3 0,274       
age_clas(1) 0,171 0,331 0,268 1 0,605 1,187 0,62 2,272 
age_clas(2) 0,287 0,343 0,7 1 0,403 1,333 0,68 2,612 
age_clas(3) 0,574 0,37 2,405 1 0,121 1,775 0,86 3,667 
ft_giv_cat(1) -0,013 0,625 0 1 0,983 0,987 0,29 3,357 
ft_rec_cat(1) -0,669 0,603 1,232 1 0,267 0,512 0,157 1,669 
Costante -3,848 0,493 60,87 1 0 0,021 
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BELGIUM, WAVE 4, POPULATION AGED BETWEEN 50 AND 65 YEARS 
 
       
95% CI per EXP(B) 
  B E.S. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) Inferiore Superiore 
condlav_ricod_1     277,29 18 0       
condlav_ricod_1(1) 2,162 0,375 33,177 1 0 8,685 4,162 18,123 
condlav_ricod_1(2) 0,046 0,438 0,011 1 0,916 1,047 0,443 2,473 
condlav_ricod_1(3) 2,531 0,404 39,185 1 0 12,568 5,69 27,761 
condlav_ricod_1(4) 2,357 0,288 66,755 1 0 10,557 5,998 18,582 
condlav_ricod_1(5) 1,395 0,293 22,652 1 0 4,034 2,271 7,165 
condlav_ricod_1(6) 0,397 0,523 0,576 1 0,448 1,487 0,534 4,147 
condlav_ricod_1(7) 1,795 0,332 29,24 1 0 6,02 3,141 11,54 
condlav_ricod_1(8) 1,274 0,389 10,729 1 0,001 3,575 1,668 7,66 
condlav_ricod_1(9) 1,907 0,286 44,593 1 0 6,735 3,848 11,788 
condlav_ricod_1(10) 4,026 0,539 55,724 1 0 56,055 19,476 161,336 
condlav_ricod_1(11) 1,253 0,825 2,307 1 0,129 3,5 0,695 17,626 
condlav_ricod_1(12) 4,731 0,471 100,883 1 0 113,454 45,066 285,621 
condlav_ricod_1(13) 3,297 0,339 94,753 1 0 27,021 13,913 52,479 
condlav_ricod_1(14) 1,418 0,83 2,92 1 0,088 4,128 0,812 20,989 
condlav_ricod_1(15) 4,088 0,496 67,907 1 0 59,641 22,555 157,706 
condlav_ricod_1(16) 2,644 0,455 33,79 1 0 14,066 5,768 34,299 
condlav_ricod_1(17) 3,65 0,335 119 1 0 38,461 19,964 74,098 
condlav_ricod_1(18) 3,731 0,496 56,667 1 0 41,725 15,794 110,226 
gender_w4(1) 0,449 0,141 10,057 1 0,002 1,566 1,187 2,067 
ftgiv_w4(1) 0,166 0,662 0,063 1 0,802 1,181 0,323 4,323 
ftrec_w4(1) -0,092 0,366 0,063 1 0,801 0,912 0,445 1,868 
n_fratelli_cl_w4     1,972 5 0,853       
n_fratelli_cl_w4(1) -0,052 0,239 0,048 1 0,827 0,949 0,594 1,515 
n_fratelli_cl_w4(2) -0,002 0,237 0 1 0,993 0,998 0,628 1,586 
n_fratelli_cl_w4(3) 0,201 0,25 0,644 1 0,422 1,222 0,749 1,995 
n_fratelli_cl_w4(4) 0,11 0,234 0,22 1 0,639 1,116 0,706 1,766 
n_fratelli_cl_w4(5) 0,189 0,298 0,404 1 0,525 1,209 0,674 2,167 
infocare_dato_hh_w4 
    
10,24 4 0,037 
      
infocare_dato_hh_w4(1) -0,393 0,329 1,426 1 0,232 0,675 0,355 1,286 
infocare_dato_hh_w4(2) -0,547 0,26 4,435 1 0,035 0,578 0,348 0,963 
infocare_dato_hh_w4(3) -1,133 0,485 5,446 1 0,02 0,322 0,124 0,834 
infocare_dato_hh_w4(4) -0,225 0,376 0,358 1 0,55 0,799 0,382 1,668 
age_clas_w4 
    
1,47 3 0,689 
      
age_clas_w4(1) -0,063 0,34 0,035 1 0,853 0,939 0,482 1,828 
age_clas_w4(2) 0,123 0,35 0,124 1 0,725 1,131 0,57 2,244 
age_clas_w4(3) 0,158 0,37 0,183 1 0,669 1,171 0,568 2,417 
hh_size_ricod 
    
169,369 3 0 
      
hh_size_ricod(1) 0,639 0,24 7,119 1 0,008 1,895 1,185 3,031 
hh_size_ricod(2) 1,583 0,266 35,542 1 0 4,871 2,894 8,198 
hh_size_ricod(3) 3,08 0,283 118,213 1 0 21,752 12,485 37,897 
salute_gen_individ 
    
7,708 4 0,103 
      
salute_gen_individ(1) -0,58 0,502 1,335 1 0,248 0,56 0,209 1,498 
salute_gen_individ(2) 0,146 0,275 0,282 1 0,595 1,157 0,675 1,983 
salute_gen_individ(3) 0,877 0,489 3,221 1 0,073 2,404 0,922 6,265 
salute_gen_individ(4) -0,824 0,517 2,544 1 0,111 0,439 0,159 1,208 
Costante -5,32 0,485 120,197 1 0 0,005 
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FRANCE, WAVE 1, POPULATION OVER 65 YEARS 
 
      
Exp(B) 
95% CI per EXP(B) 
  B E.S. Wald df Sig. Inferiore Superiore 
condlav_ricod     18,31 4 0       
condlav_ricod(1) 0,219 0,35 0,404 1 0,53 1,245 0,634 2,446 
condlav_ricod(2) 1,292 0,79 2,644 1 0,1 3,639 0,767 17,269 
condlav_ricod(3) 0,845 0,29 8,559 1 0 2,327 1,322 4,099 
condlav_ricod(4) 1,135 0,43 6,839 1 0,01 3,111 1,329 7,282 
Qexpt_y_w1     9,546 4 0,05       
Qexpt_y_w1(1) -1,12 0,49 5,356 1 0,02 0,326 0,126 0,842 
Qexpt_y_w1(2) -0,58 0,35 2,681 1 0,1 0,561 0,281 1,121 
Qexpt_y_w1(3) -0,41 0,33 1,52 1 0,22 0,662 0,344 1,275 
Qexpt_y_w1(4) 0,125 0,27 0,218 1 0,64 1,133 0,671 1,912 
hh_infocare_w1     4,954 5 0,42       
hh_infocare_w1(1) 0,4 0,31 1,65 1 0,2 1,491 0,81 2,745 
hh_infocare_w1(2) 0,068 0,58 0,014 1 0,91 1,071 0,343 3,341 
hh_infocare_w1(3) 0,455 0,37 1,528 1 0,22 1,576 0,766 3,243 
hh_infocare_w1(4) -0,18 0,82 0,049 1 0,83 0,835 0,169 4,13 
hh_infocare_w1(5) 1,122 0,64 3,053 1 0,08 3,072 0,872 10,823 
hhsize_ricod     44,09 3 0       
hhsize_ricod(1) -0,12 0,37 0,113 1 0,74 0,885 0,433 1,809 
hhsize_ricod(2) 1,014 0,45 5,098 1 0,02 2,756 1,143 6,646 
hhsize_ricod(3) 2,452 0,48 25,89 1 0 11,62 4,517 29,877 
ltc_prob_w1     1,177 2 0,56       
ltc_prob_w1(1) 0,357 0,36 0,993 1 0,32 1,429 0,708 2,883 
ltc_prob_w1(2) 0,285 0,33 0,749 1 0,39 1,33 0,697 2,537 
hh_M_pub_bft_w1     0,581 2 0,75       
hh_M_pub_bft_w1(1) -0,2 0,81 0,063 1 0,8 0,817 0,167 3,997 
hh_M_pub_bft_w1(2) -0,57 0,77 0,551 1 0,46 0,565 0,125 2,553 
hh_M_hpr_w1     1,726 2 0,42       
hh_M_hpr_w1(1) 0,314 0,24 1,725 1 0,19 1,369 0,857 2,187 
hh_M_hpr_w1(2) 0,174 0,4 0,193 1 0,66 1,191 0,547 2,591 
gender_w1(1) -0,03 0,22 0,018 1 0,89 0,971 0,638 1,479 
private_ltc_service_w1(1) -0,04 0,43 0,007 1 0,93 0,964 0,417 2,229 
no_infocare_w1(1) -0,3 0,39 0,577 1 0,45 0,742 0,343 1,603 
Costante -2,86 0,42 46,23 1 0 0,057     
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FRANCE, WAVE 2, POPULATION OVER 65 YEARS 
 
      
Exp(B) 
95% CI per EXP(B) 
  B E.S. Wald df Sig. Inferiore Superiore 
gender_w2(1) 0,386 0,24 2,664 1 0,1 1,472 0,925 2,34 
age_classi_w2     1,585 3 0,66       
age_classi_w2(1) 0,329 0,29 1,252 1 0,26 1,389 0,781 2,47 
age_classi_w2(2) 0,028 0,32 0,008 1 0,93 1,029 0,553 1,915 
age_classi_w2(3) 0,107 0,31 0,116 1 0,73 1,113 0,602 2,057 
hhsize_w2     44,35 3 0       
hhsize_w2(1) -0,57 0,38 2,294 1 0,13 0,567 0,272 1,182 
hhsize_w2(2) 1,276 0,53 5,723 1 0,02 3,582 1,259 10,188 
hhsize_w2(3) 2,847 0,61 21,5 1 0 17,23 5,172 57,387 
hh_infocare_prova     5,721 5 0,33       
hh_infocare_prova(1) 0,699 0,32 4,791 1 0,03 2,012 1,076 3,763 
hh_infocare_prova(2) 0,488 0,61 0,645 1 0,42 1,629 0,495 5,358 
hh_infocare_prova(3) 0,521 0,45 1,34 1 0,25 1,683 0,697 4,063 
hh_infocare_prova(4) -0,24 1,08 0,048 1 0,83 0,789 0,095 6,557 
hh_infocare_prova(5) 0,588 0,38 2,341 1 0,13 1,8 0,848 3,822 
Mhh_pub_bft     0,165 2 0,92       
Mhh_pub_bft(1) -0,07 0,69 0,011 1 0,92 0,932 0,244 3,564 
Mhh_pub_bft(2) 0,447 1,14 0,154 1 0,7 1,563 0,168 14,585 
pr_careM_w2     0,336 2 0,85       
pr_careM_w2(1) -0,12 0,28 0,178 1 0,67 0,889 0,514 1,538 
pr_careM_w2(2) -0,21 0,43 0,246 1 0,62 0,809 0,35 1,869 
Q_spesecare_y     21,12 4 0       
Q_spesecare_y(1) -1,64 0,5 10,86 1 0 0,195 0,074 0,516 
Q_spesecare_y(2) -1,32 0,47 8,055 1 0,01 0,268 0,108 0,665 
Q_spesecare_y(3) 0,122 0,23 0,284 1 0,59 1,13 0,721 1,772 
Q_spesecare_y(4) 0,802 0,74 1,174 1 0,28 2,23 0,523 9,513 
prova_condlav     24,65 7 0       
prova_condlav(1) 0,52 0,37 2,017 1 0,16 1,682 0,821 3,445 
prova_condlav(2) -1,78 1,12 2,526 1 0,11 0,169 0,019 1,514 
prova_condlav(3) 2,901 1,21 5,768 1 0,02 18,19 1,705 194,116 
prova_condlav(4) 1,318 1,12 1,375 1 0,24 3,736 0,413 33,821 
prova_condlav(5) 0,506 0,4 1,641 1 0,2 1,659 0,765 3,6 
prova_condlav(6) 1,154 0,87 1,765 1 0,18 3,171 0,578 17,397 
prova_condlav(7) 1,598 0,47 11,62 1 0 4,941 1,972 12,382 
ltc_prob_w2     2,3 2 0,32       
ltc_prob_w2(1) -0,09 0,37 0,059 1 0,81 0,913 0,439 1,901 
ltc_prob_w2(2) -0,57 0,4 2,023 1 0,16 0,566 0,258 1,24 
private_ltc_service_w2(1) -0,24 0,62 0,149 1 0,7 0,788 0,235 2,645 
Costante -2,78 0,46 36,51 1 0 0,062     
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FRANCE, WAVE 4, POPULATION OVER 65 YEARS 
 
      
Exp(B) 
95% CI per EXP(B) 
  B E.S. Wald df Sig. Inferiore Superiore 
hhsize_cl_w4     43,471 4 0       
hhsize_cl_w4(1) 0,323 0,18 3,247 1 0,07 1,382 0,972 1,964 
hhsize_cl_w4(2) 1,324 0,27 23,309 1 0 3,757 2,195 6,43 
hhsize_cl_w4(3) 1,721 0,38 20,941 1 0 5,588 2,674 11,675 
hhsize_cl_w4(4) 2,712 1,22 4,969 1 0,03 15,07 1,388 163,594 
age_clas_over65     27,2 3 0       
age_clas_over65(1) 0,313 0,16 3,806 1 0,05 1,368 0,999 1,873 
age_clas_over65(2) 0,659 0,16 17,684 1 0 1,932 1,422 2,627 
age_clas_over65(3) 0,719 0,15 22,037 1 0 2,052 1,52 2,77 
ltc_prob_w4     3,641 2 0,16       
ltc_prob_w4(1) -0,05 0,18 0,073 1 0,79 0,952 0,668 1,358 
ltc_prob_w4(2) 0,245 0,16 2,293 1 0,13 1,277 0,93 1,753 
hh_infocare_w4     19,137 7 0,01       
hh_infocare_w4(1) -0,51 0,27 3,537 1 0,06 0,599 0,352 1,022 
hh_infocare_w4(2) 0,054 0,19 0,085 1 0,77 1,056 0,735 1,517 
hh_infocare_w4(3) 0,259 0,24 1,121 1 0,29 1,295 0,802 2,09 
hh_infocare_w4(4) 0,616 0,18 12,054 1 0 1,852 1,308 2,622 
hh_infocare_w4(5) 0,271 0,5 0,29 1 0,59 1,312 0,488 3,522 
hh_infocare_w4(6) 0,054 0,34 0,025 1 0,88 1,055 0,542 2,054 
hh_infocare_w4(7) 0,039 0,37 0,011 1 0,92 1,04 0,502 2,153 
Mhh_pub_bft_ltc_w4     2,91 2 0,23       
Mhh_pub_bft_ltc_w4(1) -0,2 0,26 0,591 1 0,44 0,818 0,49 1,366 
Mhh_pub_bft_ltc_w4(2) 0,702 0,47 2,241 1 0,13 2,019 0,805 5,064 
condlav_ricod     67,935 9 0       
condlav_ricod(1) 0,515 0,18 8,624 1 0 1,673 1,187 2,359 
condlav_ricod(2) -0,79 0,4 3,902 1 0,05 0,456 0,209 0,994 
condlav_ricod(3) -1,75 1,06 2,724 1 0,1 0,175 0,022 1,387 
condlav_ricod(4) 0,584 0,19 10,032 1 0 1,794 1,25 2,576 
condlav_ricod(5) 0,773 0,61 1,606 1 0,21 2,167 0,655 7,164 
condlav_ricod(6) 1,885 1,3 2,09 1 0,15 6,59 0,511 84,92 
condlav_ricod(7) 0,743 0,74 1,015 1 0,31 2,102 0,496 8,917 
condlav_ricod(8) 1,189 0,27 19,145 1 0 3,284 1,928 5,594 
condlav_ricod(9) 4,572 0,75 37,032 1 0 96,75 22,188 421,893 
no_infocare(1) 0,231 0,18 1,687 1 0,19 1,26 0,889 1,784 
gender_w4(1) 0,119 0,1 1,357 1 0,24 1,127 0,922 1,377 
Costante -2,52 0,24 115,01 1 0 0,08     
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FRANCE, WAVE 1, POPULATION AGED BETWEEN 50 AND 65 YEARS 
 
      
Exp(B) 
95% CI per EXP(B) 
  B E.S. Wald df Sig. Inferiore Superiore 
condlav_ricod     161,981 15 0       
condlav_ricod(1) 1,53 0,48 9,98 1 0 4,619 1,788 11,938 
condlav_ricod(2) 0,669 0,53 1,615 1 0,2 1,953 0,696 5,481 
condlav_ricod(3) 1,43 0,84 2,887 1 0,09 4,177 0,803 21,731 
condlav_ricod(4) 2,042 0,83 6,11 1 0,01 7,707 1,526 38,913 
condlav_ricod(5) 2,355 0,43 30,332 1 0 10,536 4,557 24,356 
condlav_ricod(6) 0,876 0,41 4,535 1 0,03 2,4 1,072 5,373 
condlav_ricod(7) 0,699 0,59 1,387 1 0,24 2,011 0,629 6,43 
condlav_ricod(8) 2,424 0,45 29,438 1 0 11,289 4,703 27,097 
condlav_ricod(9) 2,822 0,51 31,263 1 0 16,807 6,25 45,192 
condlav_ricod(10) 1,224 0,41 8,937 1 0 3,402 1,524 7,592 
condlav_ricod(11) 3,473 0,48 52,933 1 0 32,218 12,643 82,106 
condlav_ricod(12) 4,857 0,62 60,744 1 0 128,6 37,916 436,184 
condlav_ricod(13) 2,899 0,59 23,946 1 0 18,157 5,685 57,989 
condlav_ricod(14) 4,654 0,65 52,07 1 0 105,03 29,669 371,831 
condlav_ricod(15) 2,472 0,45 30,128 1 0 11,841 4,899 28,62 
gender_w1(1) 0,268 0,19 1,949 1 0,16 1,307 0,898 1,903 
salute_gen_individ     4,127 4 0,39       
salute_gen_individ(1) -1,99 1,05 3,553 1 0,06 0,137 0,017 1,082 
salute_gen_individ(2) 0,189 0,31 0,38 1 0,54 1,208 0,663 2,2 
salute_gen_individ(3) 0 0,39 0 1 1 1 0,468 2,139 
salute_gen_individ(4) 0,088 0,28 0,099 1 0,75 1,092 0,631 1,891 
Q_infocare_dato_w1     3,353 4 0,5       
Q_infocare_dato_w1(1) 0,227 0,43 0,277 1 0,6 1,255 0,539 2,923 
Q_infocare_dato_w1(2) -0,51 0,46 1,212 1 0,27 0,601 0,243 1,487 
Q_infocare_dato_w1(3) -0,63 0,47 1,8 1 0,18 0,531 0,21 1,339 
Q_infocare_dato_w1(4) -0,17 0,47 0,124 1 0,72 0,847 0,337 2,128 
hhsize_cl     104,959 4 0       
hhsize_cl(1) -1,41 0,34 16,899 1 0 0,244 0,124 0,478 
hhsize_cl(2) -0,5 0,37 1,809 1 0,18 0,608 0,294 1,256 
hhsize_cl(3) 1,187 0,35 11,691 1 0 3,276 1,659 6,468 
hhsize_cl(4) 2,463 0,67 13,621 1 0 11,743 3,174 43,44 
age_clas     4,229 3 0,24       
age_clas(1) -0,31 0,3 1,056 1 0,3 0,734 0,407 1,324 
age_clas(2) -0,25 0,33 0,552 1 0,46 0,782 0,409 1,495 
age_clas(3) 0,212 0,39 0,295 1 0,59 1,237 0,574 2,663 
ftgiv_w1(1) -1,95 0,61 10,366 1 0 0,142 0,043 0,466 
ftrec_w1(1) -0,74 0,66 1,268 1 0,26 0,479 0,133 1,726 
Costante -3,37 0,53 41,036 1 0 0,034     
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FRANCE, WAVE 2, POPULATION AGED BETWEEN 50 AND 65 YEARS 
 
       
95% CI per EXP(B) 
  B E.S. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) Inferiore Superiore 
ricod_cond_lav     163,23 16 0       
ricod_cond_lav(1) 2,225 0,468 22,63 1 0 9,252 3,699 23,137 
ricod_cond_lav(2) 0,528 0,475 1,235 1 0,266 1,696 0,668 4,306 
ricod_cond_lav(3) 1,582 0,812 3,8 1 0,051 4,865 0,991 23,87 
ricod_cond_lav(4) 1,922 0,738 6,781 1 0,009 6,837 1,609 29,054 
ricod_cond_lav(5) 2,507 0,378 43,874 1 0 12,264 5,841 25,748 
ricod_cond_lav(6) 1,504 0,358 17,611 1 0 4,501 2,229 9,087 
ricod_cond_lav(7) 0,914 0,531 2,956 1 0,086 2,493 0,88 7,063 
ricod_cond_lav(8) 1,516 0,469 10,438 1 0,001 4,554 1,815 11,426 
ricod_cond_lav(9) 3,132 0,416 56,673 1 0 22,912 10,138 51,78 
ricod_cond_lav(10) 2,342 0,341 47,035 1 0 10,4 5,326 20,308 
ricod_cond_lav(11) 3,262 0,641 25,921 1 0 26,111 7,437 91,676 
ricod_cond_lav(12) 4,262 0,55 60,045 1 0 70,951 24,143 208,512 
ricod_cond_lav(13) 3,635 1,091 11,109 1 0,001 37,889 4,47 321,18 
ricod_cond_lav(14) 4,168 0,691 36,402 1 0 64,611 16,681 250,259 
ricod_cond_lav(15) 3,414 0,536 40,529 1 0 30,401 10,626 86,983 
ricod_cond_lav(16) 3,249 0,522 38,818 1 0 25,77 9,273 71,619 
gender_w2(1) 0,221 0,183 1,454 1 0,228 1,247 0,871 1,784 
salute_gen_individ     5,991 4 0,2       
salute_gen_individ(1) -0,221 0,395 0,314 1 0,575 0,801 0,369 1,739 
salute_gen_individ(2) 0,237 0,261 0,822 1 0,365 1,267 0,759 2,114 
salute_gen_individ(3) -1,037 0,497 4,347 1 0,037 0,355 0,134 0,94 
salute_gen_individ(4) 0,016 0,308 0,003 1 0,959 1,016 0,556 1,857 
Q_infocare_dato     8,786 4 0,067       
Q_infocare_dato(1) -0,079 0,405 0,038 1 0,845 0,924 0,418 2,042 
Q_infocare_dato(2) -1,885 0,647 8,496 1 0,004 0,152 0,043 0,539 
Q_infocare_dato(3) -0,14 0,376 0,139 1 0,709 0,869 0,416 1,816 
Q_infocare_dato(4) -0,24 0,422 0,323 1 0,57 0,787 0,344 1,799 
n_fratelli_cl     2,185 5 0,823       
n_fratelli_cl(1) 0 0,33 0 1 0,999 1 0,524 1,909 
n_fratelli_cl(2) -0,268 0,314 0,726 1 0,394 0,765 0,413 1,416 
n_fratelli_cl(3) 0,384 0,379 1,028 1 0,311 1,468 0,699 3,083 
n_fratelli_cl(4) 0,139 0,303 0,21 1 0,647 1,149 0,634 2,081 
n_fratelli_cl(5) 0,047 0,404 0,014 1 0,907 1,048 0,475 2,312 
hhsize_cl     69,372 4 0       
hhsize_cl(1) -0,48 0,312 2,36 1 0,124 0,619 0,335 1,142 
hhsize_cl(2) 0,393 0,365 1,159 1 0,282 1,482 0,724 3,03 
hhsize_cl(3) 1,468 0,355 17,138 1 0 4,342 2,166 8,7 
hhsize_cl(4) 2,391 0,73 10,712 1 0,001 10,92 2,609 45,705 
age_clas 
    
5,258 3 0,154 
      
age_clas(1) 0,112 0,284 0,156 1 0,693 1,119 0,641 1,953 
age_clas(2) 0,015 0,317 0,002 1 0,962 1,015 0,545 1,891 
age_clas(3) -0,573 0,394 2,115 1 0,146 0,564 0,26 1,221 
ft_giv_cat(1) -0,596 0,49 1,48 1 0,224 0,551 0,211 1,439 
ft_rec_cat(1) 0,61 0,452 1,822 1 0,177 1,841 0,759 4,466 
Costante -3,75 0,506 54,992 1 0 0,024 
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FRANCE, WAVE 4, POPULATION AGED BETWEEN 50 AND 65 YEARS 
 
       
95% CI per EXP(B) 
  B E.S. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) Inferiore Superiore 
condlav_ricod_1     206,542 16 0       
condlav_ricod_1(1) 1,422 0,292 23,668 1 0 4,146 2,338 7,352 
condlav_ricod_1(2) 0,536 0,218 6,044 1 0,014 1,709 1,115 2,62 
condlav_ricod_1(3) 1,163 0,426 7,474 1 0,006 3,201 1,39 7,369 
condlav_ricod_1(4) 2,04 0,368 30,658 1 0 7,691 3,736 15,835 
condlav_ricod_1(5) 1,91 0,267 51,327 1 0 6,755 4,006 11,392 
condlav_ricod_1(6) 1,07 0,223 23,032 1 0 2,914 1,883 4,511 
condlav_ricod_1(7) 1,14 0,261 19,072 1 0 3,126 1,874 5,215 
condlav_ricod_1(8) 1,167 0,258 20,384 1 0 3,212 1,935 5,331 
condlav_ricod_1(9) 0,983 0,298 10,903 1 0,001 2,671 1,491 4,787 
condlav_ricod_1(10) 1,823 0,251 52,862 1 0 6,192 3,788 10,123 
condlav_ricod_1(11) 2,009 0,681 8,714 1 0,003 7,459 1,965 28,32 
condlav_ricod_1(12) 2,501 0,537 21,666 1 0 12,19 4,253 34,939 
condlav_ricod_1(13) 2,718 0,296 84,329 1 0 15,148 8,481 27,058 
condlav_ricod_1(14) 3,883 0,568 46,71 1 0 48,59 15,955 147,981 
condlav_ricod_1(15) 2,032 0,464 19,146 1 0 7,633 3,071 18,97 
condlav_ricod_1(16) 2,679 0,339 62,399 1 0 14,577 7,498 28,339 
gender_w4(1) 0,186 0,113 2,727 1 0,099 1,205 0,966 1,502 
ftgiv_w4(1) 0,11 0,471 0,054 1 0,816 1,116 0,443 2,809 
ftrec_w4(1) 0,373 0,318 1,378 1 0,24 1,453 0,779 2,71 
n_fratelli_cl_w4 
    
14,094 5 0,015 
      
n_fratelli_cl_w4(1) -0,047 0,186 0,064 1 0,8 0,954 0,662 1,375 
n_fratelli_cl_w4(2) 0,186 0,173 1,154 1 0,283 1,204 0,858 1,69 
n_fratelli_cl_w4(3) 0,308 0,192 2,583 1 0,108 1,361 0,935 1,981 
n_fratelli_cl_w4(4) 0,285 0,168 2,884 1 0,089 1,33 0,957 1,848 
n_fratelli_cl_w4(5) 0,665 0,21 9,973 1 0,002 1,944 1,287 2,937 
infocare_dato_hh_w4 
    
20,179 4 0 
      
infocare_dato_hh_w4(1) -0,193 0,315 0,374 1 0,541 0,825 0,445 1,529 
infocare_dato_hh_w4(2) -0,755 0,268 7,917 1 0,005 0,47 0,278 0,795 
infocare_dato_hh_w4(3) -1,657 0,47 12,421 1 0 0,191 0,076 0,479 
infocare_dato_hh_w4(4) -0,253 0,296 0,728 1 0,393 0,777 0,435 1,388 
age_clas_w4     1,856 3 0,603       
age_clas_w4(1) 0,226 0,24 0,889 1 0,346 1,254 0,784 2,006 
age_clas_w4(2) 0,096 0,244 0,155 1 0,694 1,101 0,683 1,775 
age_clas_w4(3) 0,014 0,274 0,003 1 0,959 1,014 0,593 1,734 
hhsize_cl_w4     107,415 4 0       
hhsize_cl_w4(1) -0,12 0,199 0,365 1 0,546 0,887 0,6 1,311 
hhsize_cl_w4(2) 0,789 0,222 12,596 1 0 2,201 1,424 3,402 
hhsize_cl_w4(3) 1,425 0,234 36,977 1 0 4,157 2,626 6,581 
hhsize_cl_w4(4) 3,539 0,878 16,26 1 0 34,443 6,166 192,409 
salute_gen_individ     1,722 4 0,787       
salute_gen_individ(1) -0,096 0,299 0,103 1 0,748 0,909 0,506 1,633 
salute_gen_individ(2) -0,137 0,18 0,58 1 0,446 0,872 0,612 1,241 
salute_gen_individ(3) -0,34 0,307 1,227 1 0,268 0,712 0,39 1,299 
salute_gen_individ(4) -0,052 0,19 0,074 1 0,786 0,95 0,655 1,378 
Costante -3,332 0,356 87,386 1 0 0,036 
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ITALY, WAVE 1, POPULATION OVER 65 YEARS 
 
      
Exp(B) 
95% CI per EXP(B) 
  B E.S. Wald df Sig. Inferiore Superiore 
condlav_ricod     46,6 8 0       
condlav_ricod(1) 0,701 0,26 7,327 1 0,01 2,016 1,213 3,35 
condlav_ricod(2) -0,88 1,06 0,687 1 0,41 0,416 0,052 3,314 
condlav_ricod(3) 1,698 0,74 5,274 1 0,02 5,461 1,283 23,253 
condlav_ricod(4) 1,284 0,24 29,54 1 0 3,61 2,272 5,735 
condlav_ricod(5) -0,64 1,08 0,354 1 0,55 0,526 0,063 4,368 
condlav_ricod(6) -1,39 1,16 1,432 1 0,23 0,249 0,026 2,426 
condlav_ricod(7) 0,855 1,21 0,503 1 0,48 2,352 0,221 25,011 
condlav_ricod(8) 1,359 0,3 20,07 1 0 3,893 2,148 7,056 
Qexpt_y_w1     55,38 4 0       
Qexpt_y_w1(1) -1,36 0,3 19,86 1 0 0,258 0,142 0,468 
Qexpt_y_w1(2) -0,32 0,25 1,595 1 0,21 0,728 0,445 1,192 
Qexpt_y_w1(3) -0,21 0,26 0,685 1 0,41 0,807 0,486 1,341 
Qexpt_y_w1(4) 0,79 0,26 9,293 1 0 2,204 1,326 3,663 
hh_infocare_w1     5,674 5 0,34       
hh_infocare_w1(1) -0,3 0,35 0,761 1 0,38 0,739 0,374 1,459 
hh_infocare_w1(2) 0,547 0,5 1,18 1 0,28 1,728 0,644 4,637 
hh_infocare_w1(3) -0,01 0,33 0 1 0,98 0,993 0,521 1,894 
hh_infocare_w1(4) 0,808 0,54 2,269 1 0,13 2,244 0,784 6,421 
hh_infocare_w1(5) -0,43 0,83 0,268 1 0,61 0,65 0,127 3,324 
hhsize_ricod     52,86 3 0       
hhsize_ricod(1) -1,16 0,25 22,02 1 0 0,314 0,194 0,509 
hhsize_ricod(2) -0,72 0,29 6,144 1 0,01 0,487 0,276 0,86 
hhsize_ricod(3) 0,531 0,3 3,141 1 0,08 1,701 0,945 3,061 
ltc_prob_w1     1,528 2 0,47       
ltc_prob_w1(1) 0,047 0,33 0,02 1 0,89 1,048 0,548 2,001 
ltc_prob_w1(2) -0,31 0,32 0,986 1 0,32 0,73 0,393 1,358 
hh_M_pub_bft_w1     3,356 2 0,19       
hh_M_pub_bft_w1(1) 0,193 0,35 0,298 1 0,59 1,213 0,607 2,424 
hh_M_pub_bft_w1(2) -0,62 0,37 2,852 1 0,09 0,54 0,264 1,104 
hh_hprcare_ricod(1) -0,75 0,42 3,2 1 0,07 0,475 0,21 1,074 
gender_w1(1) 0,241 0,17 1,901 1 0,17 1,272 0,904 1,79 
private_ltc_service_w1(1) -1,86 1,15 2,62 1 0,11 0,155 0,016 1,481 
no_infocare_w1(1) 0,663 0,32 4,413 1 0,04 1,94 1,045 3,6 
Costante -1,29 0,36 12,92 1 0 0,277     
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ITALY, WAVE 2, POPULATION OVER 65 YEARS 
 
      
Exp(B) 
95% CI per EXP(B) 
  B E.S. Wald df Sig. Inferiore Superiore 
age_classi_w2     5,937 3 0,12       
age_classi_w2(1) 0,158 0,17 0,902 1 0,34 1,171 0,845 1,623 
age_classi_w2(2) 0,435 0,18 5,911 1 0,02 1,545 1,088 2,194 
age_classi_w2(3) 0,226 0,21 1,191 1 0,28 1,253 0,836 1,879 
gender_w2(1) 0,085 0,14 0,391 1 0,53 1,089 0,834 1,422 
hh_infocare_w2     13,65 5 0,02       
hh_infocare_w2(1) -0,14 0,26 0,273 1 0,6 0,874 0,527 1,449 
hh_infocare_w2(2) 0,75 0,43 2,993 1 0,08 2,117 0,905 4,951 
hh_infocare_w2(3) -0,4 0,26 2,326 1 0,13 0,672 0,403 1,12 
hh_infocare_w2(4) 0,721 0,41 3,152 1 0,08 2,057 0,928 4,562 
hh_infocare_w2(5) 0,452 0,48 0,886 1 0,35 1,571 0,613 4,028 
Mhh_pub_bft_ltc     14,84 2 0       
Mhh_pub_bft_ltc(1) 0,248 0,25 0,997 1 0,32 1,282 0,788 2,085 
Mhh_pub_bft_ltc(2) -2,81 0,79 12,65 1 0 0,06 0,013 0,283 
pr_careM_w2     3,236 2 0,2       
pr_careM_w2(1) -0,5 0,29 2,922 1 0,09 0,608 0,343 1,076 
pr_careM_w2(2) -0,4 0,51 0,606 1 0,44 0,67 0,245 1,835 
hhsize_4cat     44,13 3 0       
hhsize_4cat(1) 0,35 0,26 1,819 1 0,18 1,42 0,853 2,362 
hhsize_4cat(2) 0,883 0,29 9,564 1 0 2,417 1,382 4,229 
hhsize_4cat(3) 1,625 0,31 27,16 1 0 5,078 2,756 9,357 
Q_totexpcare_y     53,06 4 0       
Q_totexpcare_y(1) -0,27 0,22 1,407 1 0,24 0,767 0,494 1,189 
Q_totexpcare_y(2) -0,18 0,22 0,654 1 0,42 0,836 0,541 1,291 
Q_totexpcare_y(3) 0,35 0,21 2,723 1 0,1 1,42 0,936 2,152 
Q_totexpcare_y(4) 0,957 0,21 21,87 1 0 2,603 1,743 3,887 
ricod_cond_lav_3     58,33 7 0       
ricod_cond_lav_3(1) 1,173 0,24 23,49 1 0 3,233 2,011 5,196 
ricod_cond_lav_3(2) -0,42 0,56 0,561 1 0,45 0,66 0,222 1,959 
ricod_cond_lav_3(3) 1,042 0,4 6,672 1 0,01 2,836 1,286 6,256 
ricod_cond_lav_3(4) 0,664 0,16 17,5 1 0 1,943 1,423 2,653 
ricod_cond_lav_3(5) 0,273 0,62 0,197 1 0,66 1,314 0,393 4,395 
ricod_cond_lav_3(6) 2,857 0,74 14,97 1 0 17,41 4,095 73,979 
ricod_cond_lav_3(7) 1,861 0,31 36,34 1 0 6,43 3,511 11,775 
ltc_prob_w2     0,468 2 0,79       
ltc_prob_w2(1) 0,148 0,28 0,288 1 0,59 1,159 0,676 1,988 
ltc_prob_w2(2) 0,167 0,26 0,4 1 0,53 1,182 0,704 1,983 
private_ltc_service_w2(1) -0,3 0,64 0,217 1 0,64 0,744 0,214 2,583 
no_infocare_w2(1) -0,63 0,29 4,783 1 0,03 0,533 0,303 0,937 
Costante -2,59 0,34 58,34 1 0 0,075     
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ITALY, WAVE 4, POPULATION OVER 65 YEARS 
 
      
Exp(B) 
95% CI per EXP(B) 
  B E.S. Wald df Sig. Inferiore Superiore 
hhsize_cl_w4     27,156 3 0       
hhsize_cl_w4(1) -0,06 0,2 0,083 1 0,77 0,945 0,644 1,388 
hhsize_cl_w4(2) 0,31 0,22 2,074 1 0,15 1,363 0,894 2,077 
hhsize_cl_w4(3) 0,945 0,26 13,262 1 0 2,572 1,547 4,276 
age_clas_over65     6,548 3 0,09       
age_clas_over65(1) -0,15 0,14 1,078 1 0,3 0,861 0,65 1,142 
age_clas_over65(2) 0,205 0,16 1,75 1 0,19 1,227 0,906 1,662 
age_clas_over65(3) 0,114 0,16 0,486 1 0,49 1,12 0,814 1,542 
ltc_prob_w4     15,976 2 0       
ltc_prob_w4(1) 0,84 0,21 15,707 1 0 2,316 1,529 3,508 
ltc_prob_w4(2) 0,398 0,18 4,769 1 0,03 1,489 1,042 2,129 
hh_infocare_w4     2,23 7 0,95       
hh_infocare_w4(1) -0,04 0,3 0,014 1 0,91 0,965 0,536 1,739 
hh_infocare_w4(2) 0,176 0,27 0,434 1 0,51 1,192 0,707 2,009 
hh_infocare_w4(3) -0,05 0,24 0,038 1 0,85 0,953 0,591 1,537 
hh_infocare_w4(4) -0,17 0,19 0,832 1 0,36 0,845 0,588 1,214 
hh_infocare_w4(5) 0,341 0,78 0,192 1 0,66 1,406 0,306 6,475 
hh_infocare_w4(6) -0,13 0,43 0,09 1 0,76 0,879 0,377 2,048 
hh_infocare_w4(7) -0,24 0,29 0,683 1 0,41 0,788 0,447 1,387 
Mhh_pub_bft_ltc_w4     10,209 2 0,01       
Mhh_pub_bft_ltc_w4(1) -0,41 0,21 3,793 1 0,05 0,661 0,436 1,003 
Mhh_pub_bft_ltc_w4(2) -0,88 0,3 8,405 1 0 0,415 0,229 0,752 
condlav_ricod     124,87 14 0       
condlav_ricod(1) 0,451 0,18 6,527 1 0,01 1,57 1,111 2,219 
condlav_ricod(2) -0,98 0,54 3,281 1 0,07 0,374 0,129 1,084 
condlav_ricod(3) 1,51 0,84 3,231 1 0,07 4,527 0,873 23,487 
condlav_ricod(4) 1,813 0,36 25,211 1 0 6,131 3,021 12,444 
condlav_ricod(5) 1,141 0,13 75,392 1 0 3,13 2,419 4,05 
condlav_ricod(6) -1,08 1,06 1,041 1 0,31 0,34 0,043 2,703 
condlav_ricod(7) 0,916 0,63 2,085 1 0,15 2,5 0,721 8,669 
condlav_ricod(8) 2,021 1,25 2,616 1 0,11 7,544 0,652 87,332 
condlav_ricod(9) 2,833 1,13 6,281 1 0,01 17 1,854 155,799 
condlav_ricod(10) 1,035 0,59 3,072 1 0,08 2,815 0,885 8,953 
condlav_ricod(11) 1,353 0,53 6,49 1 0,01 3,869 1,366 10,956 
condlav_ricod(12) 1,272 0,24 29,082 1 0 3,569 2,248 5,668 
condlav_ricod(13) 2,547 1,18 4,667 1 0,03 12,76 1,266 128,626 
condlav_ricod(14) 1,721 0,51 11,351 1 0 5,59 2,054 15,214 
no_infocare(1) -0,01 0,2 0,002 1 0,96 0,99 0,666 1,473 
gender_w4(1) -0,09 0,11 0,663 1 0,42 0,914 0,737 1,134 
Costante -1,45 0,25 35,257 1 0 0,234     
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ITALY, WAVE 1, POPULATION AGED BETWEEN 50 AND 65 YEARS 
 
      
Exp(B) 
95% CI per EXP(B) 
  B E.S. Wald df Sig. Inferiore Superiore 
condlav_ricod     161,5 11 0       
condlav_ricod(1) 1,127 0,6 3,486 1 0,06 3,087 0,945 10,08 
condlav_ricod(2) 0,52 0,7 0,554 1 0,46 1,682 0,428 6,618 
condlav_ricod(3) 1,518 0,93 2,691 1 0,1 4,564 0,744 27,996 
condlav_ricod(4) 2,958 0,55 29,43 1 0 19,27 6,616 56,102 
condlav_ricod(5) 1,428 0,58 6,139 1 0,01 4,172 1,348 12,915 
condlav_ricod(6) 1,719 0,59 8,614 1 0 5,581 1,77 17,592 
condlav_ricod(7) 2,757 0,55 25,13 1 0 15,75 5,36 46,297 
condlav_ricod(8) 4,598 0,63 53,37 1 0 99,27 28,915 340,841 
condlav_ricod(9) 3,547 0,9 15,5 1 0 34,7 5,937 202,796 
condlav_ricod(10) 3,307 1,03 10,32 1 0 27,3 3,629 205,32 
condlav_ricod(11) 3,293 0,56 34,56 1 0 26,93 8,982 80,72 
gender_w1(1) -0,12 0,16 0,505 1 0,48 0,89 0,645 1,228 
n_fratelli_cl     9,225 5 0,1       
n_fratelli_cl(1) -0,28 0,27 1,124 1 0,29 0,753 0,445 1,273 
n_fratelli_cl(2) 0,017 0,27 0,004 1 0,95 1,018 0,603 1,716 
n_fratelli_cl(3) -0,24 0,29 0,672 1 0,41 0,788 0,446 1,392 
n_fratelli_cl(4) 0,281 0,26 1,147 1 0,28 1,324 0,792 2,214 
n_fratelli_cl(5) 0,305 0,33 0,841 1 0,36 1,357 0,707 2,605 
salute_gen_individ     9,768 4 0,05       
salute_gen_individ(1) -0,66 0,73 0,818 1 0,37 0,516 0,123 2,163 
salute_gen_individ(2) -0,68 0,36 3,51 1 0,06 0,508 0,25 1,032 
salute_gen_individ(3) -0,81 0,52 2,412 1 0,12 0,444 0,159 1,237 
salute_gen_individ(4) -0,56 0,25 5,156 1 0,02 0,572 0,354 0,927 
Q_infocare_dato_w1     1,704 4 0,79       
Q_infocare_dato_w1(1) -0,23 0,48 0,225 1 0,64 0,796 0,31 2,042 
Q_infocare_dato_w1(2) 0,396 0,39 1,038 1 0,31 1,487 0,693 3,187 
Q_infocare_dato_w1(3) -0,12 0,43 0,075 1 0,78 0,888 0,379 2,078 
Q_infocare_dato_w1(4) -0,21 0,42 0,253 1 0,62 0,81 0,357 1,839 
hhsize_ricod     55,32 3 0       
hhsize_ricod(1) -1,44 0,31 21,21 1 0 0,237 0,129 0,438 
hhsize_ricod(2) -0,71 0,31 5,166 1 0,02 0,492 0,267 0,907 
hhsize_ricod(3) -0,01 0,31 0,001 1 0,97 0,988 0,536 1,823 
age_clas     5,747 3 0,13       
age_clas(1) -0,67 0,33 4,095 1 0,04 0,512 0,267 0,979 
age_clas(2) -0,31 0,33 0,886 1 0,35 0,736 0,39 1,392 
age_clas(3) -0,48 0,35 1,871 1 0,17 0,619 0,311 1,231 
ftgiv_w1(1) -0,26 0,59 0,199 1 0,66 0,77 0,245 2,422 
ftrec_w1(1) 0,045 0,46 0,01 1 0,92 1,046 0,429 2,552 
Costante -2,36 0,68 12,18 1 0 0,095     
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ITALY, WAVE 2, POPULATION AGED BETWEEN 50 AND 65 YEARS 
 
       
95% CI per EXP(B) 
  B E.S. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) Inferiore Superiore 
ricod_cond_lav_1     155,45 16 0       
ricod_cond_lav_1(1) 1,284 0,47 7,605 1 0,01 3,612 1,45 8,999 
ricod_cond_lav_1(2) -0,01 0,32 0,002 1 0,97 0,987 0,53 1,838 
ricod_cond_lav_1(3) 1,86 0,65 8,136 1 0 6,422 1,789 23,048 
ricod_cond_lav_1(4) 0,804 0,48 2,829 1 0,09 2,235 0,876 5,703 
ricod_cond_lav_1(5) 1,578 0,26 36,496 1 0 4,846 2,904 8,087 
ricod_cond_lav_1(6) 1,368 0,44 9,737 1 0 3,926 1,663 9,269 
ricod_cond_lav_1(7) 0,141 0,32 0,194 1 0,66 1,152 0,614 2,16 
ricod_cond_lav_1(8) 2,516 0,45 31,766 1 0 12,37 5,159 29,674 
ricod_cond_lav_1(9) 1,948 0,52 14,085 1 0 7,015 2,536 19,401 
ricod_cond_lav_1(10) 1,895 0,24 62,518 1 0 6,652 4,159 10,641 
ricod_cond_lav_1(11) 2,186 0,45 23,199 1 0 8,895 3,655 21,648 
ricod_cond_lav_1(12) 2,827 0,92 9,406 1 0 16,9 2,774 102,925 
ricod_cond_lav_1(13) 2,563 1,29 3,961 1 0,05 12,98 1,04 161,943 
ricod_cond_lav_1(14) 1,88 0,71 6,994 1 0,01 6,555 1,627 26,407 
ricod_cond_lav_1(15) 2,078 0,4 26,474 1 0 7,991 3,621 17,636 
ricod_cond_lav_1(16) 3,446 0,91 14,388 1 0 31,37 5,287 186,126 
gender_w2(1) 0,05 0,14 0,127 1 0,72 1,051 0,8 1,381 
salute_gen_individ     3,389 4 0,5       
salute_gen_individ(1) -0,37 0,39 0,875 1 0,35 0,693 0,321 1,494 
salute_gen_individ(2) 0,233 0,22 1,12 1 0,29 1,262 0,82 1,942 
salute_gen_individ(3) 0,395 0,36 1,197 1 0,27 1,485 0,731 3,016 
salute_gen_individ(4) 0,053 0,25 0,046 1 0,83 1,054 0,65 1,709 
Q_infocare_dato     2,091 4 0,72       
Q_infocare_dato(1) -0,19 0,31 0,383 1 0,54 0,827 0,453 1,509 
Q_infocare_dato(2) 0,304 0,3 1,051 1 0,31 1,355 0,758 2,423 
Q_infocare_dato(3) 0,177 0,28 0,4 1 0,53 1,193 0,69 2,062 
Q_infocare_dato(4) 0,149 0,27 0,314 1 0,58 1,16 0,69 1,95 
n_fratelli_cl     23,662 5 0       
n_fratelli_cl(1) 0,377 0,24 2,473 1 0,12 1,458 0,911 2,333 
n_fratelli_cl(2) 0,514 0,25 4,397 1 0,04 1,672 1,034 2,702 
n_fratelli_cl(3) 0,083 0,26 0,1 1 0,75 1,087 0,648 1,824 
n_fratelli_cl(4) 0,871 0,25 12,579 1 0 2,39 1,477 3,869 
n_fratelli_cl(5) 0,964 0,31 9,753 1 0 2,621 1,432 4,798 
hhsize_cl     41,046 4 0       
hhsize_cl(1) 0,339 0,38 0,788 1 0,38 1,404 0,664 2,966 
hhsize_cl(2) 0,803 0,39 4,288 1 0,04 2,232 1,044 4,772 
hhsize_cl(3) 1,386 0,4 12,341 1 0 4 1,846 8,67 
hhsize_cl(4) 1,368 1,11 1,519 1 0,22 3,928 0,446 34,608 
age_clas     0,97 3 0,81       
age_clas(1) 0,028 0,31 0,008 1 0,93 1,028 0,559 1,891 
age_clas(2) -0,05 0,32 0,02 1 0,89 0,956 0,509 1,794 
age_clas(3) 0,118 0,35 0,116 1 0,73 1,126 0,569 2,229 
ft_giv_cat(1) -0,53 0,55 0,936 1 0,33 0,588 0,2 1,724 
ft_rec_cat(1) 0,233 0,42 0,302 1 0,58 1,263 0,55 2,9 
Costante -3,46 0,55 39,659 1 0 0,031 
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ITALY, WAVE 4, POPULATION AGED BETWEEN 50 AND 65 YEARS 
 
 
       
95% CI per EXP(B) 
  B E.S. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) Inferiore Superiore 
condlav_ricod_1     198,07 16 0       
condlav_ricod_1(1) 0,667 0,39 2,887 1 0,09 1,948 0,903 4,206 
condlav_ricod_1(2) -0,39 0,3 1,656 1 0,2 0,676 0,372 1,227 
condlav_ricod_1(3) 1,246 0,5 6,33 1 0,01 3,476 1,317 9,175 
condlav_ricod_1(4) 1,73 0,24 52,622 1 0 5,639 3,534 8,999 
condlav_ricod_1(5) 0,378 0,3 1,549 1 0,21 1,459 0,805 2,646 
condlav_ricod_1(6) 0,366 0,3 1,492 1 0,22 1,441 0,802 2,592 
condlav_ricod_1(7) 2,079 0,37 31,966 1 0 7,995 3,889 16,436 
condlav_ricod_1(8) 1,617 0,2 64,837 1 0 5,037 3,399 7,467 
condlav_ricod_1(9) 1,272 0,79 2,564 1 0,11 3,567 0,752 16,911 
condlav_ricod_1(10) 1,082 1 1,178 1 0,28 2,95 0,418 20,81 
condlav_ricod_1(11) 2,934 0,44 44,612 1 0 18,8 7,947 44,455 
condlav_ricod_1(12) 1,797 0,59 9,284 1 0 6,03 1,898 19,156 
condlav_ricod_1(13) 3,216 0,83 15,046 1 0 24,93 4,908 126,588 
condlav_ricod_1(14) 2,01 0,32 38,62 1 0 7,462 3,959 14,066 
condlav_ricod_1(15) 3,532 1,14 9,65 1 0 34,2 3,683 317,664 
condlav_ricod_1(16) 2,886 0,62 21,786 1 0 17,91 5,333 60,172 
gender_w4(1) 0,217 0,14 2,484 1 0,12 1,242 0,948 1,627 
ftgiv_w4(1) 0,804 0,72 1,24 1 0,27 2,234 0,543 9,195 
ftrec_w4(1) 0,313 0,44 0,515 1 0,47 1,368 0,581 3,22 
infocare_dato_hh_w4     8,145 4 0,09       
infocare_dato_hh_w4(1) -0,06 0,24 0,063 1 0,8 0,943 0,595 1,495 
infocare_dato_hh_w4(2) -0,9 0,35 6,637 1 0,01 0,405 0,204 0,806 
infocare_dato_hh_w4(3) 0,46 0,55 0,696 1 0,4 1,583 0,538 4,66 
infocare_dato_hh_w4(4) 0,326 0,43 0,565 1 0,45 1,386 0,592 3,243 
age_clas_w4     3,032 3 0,39       
age_clas_w4(1) 0,316 0,34 0,844 1 0,36 1,372 0,699 2,694 
age_clas_w4(2) 0,513 0,34 2,265 1 0,13 1,671 0,856 3,262 
age_clas_w4(3) 0,384 0,36 1,119 1 0,29 1,469 0,721 2,994 
hhsize_cl_w4     86,387 4 0       
hhsize_cl_w4(1) 0,255 0,36 0,503 1 0,48 1,29 0,638 2,606 
hhsize_cl_w4(2) 1,255 0,36 12,35 1 0 3,508 1,742 7,064 
hhsize_cl_w4(3) 1,844 0,36 25,626 1 0 6,32 3,095 12,904 
hhsize_cl_w4(4) 1,355 0,87 2,423 1 0,12 3,879 0,704 21,372 
salute_gen_individ     6,848 4 0,14       
salute_gen_individ(1) -0,88 0,56 2,419 1 0,12 0,417 0,138 1,255 
salute_gen_individ(2) -0,29 0,24 1,41 1 0,24 0,749 0,464 1,207 
salute_gen_individ(3) 0,539 0,47 1,343 1 0,25 1,715 0,689 4,268 
salute_gen_individ(4) 0,324 0,27 1,401 1 0,24 1,383 0,808 2,367 
n_fratelli_cl_w4     27,624 5 0       
n_fratelli_cl_w4(1) 0,335 0,22 2,321 1 0,13 1,398 0,909 2,15 
n_fratelli_cl_w4(2) 0,477 0,22 4,54 1 0,03 1,611 1,039 2,498 
n_fratelli_cl_w4(3) 0,66 0,25 7,209 1 0,01 1,935 1,195 3,134 
n_fratelli_cl_w4(4) 0,905 0,23 15,247 1 0 2,472 1,569 3,892 
n_fratelli_cl_w4(5) 1,327 0,32 17,641 1 0 3,771 2,03 7,007 
Costante -3,89 0,54 51,504 1 0 0,02     
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SPAIN, WAVE 1, POPULATION OVER 65 YEARS 
 
 
      
Exp(B) 
95% CI per EXP(B) 
  B E.S. Wald df Sig. Inferiore Superiore 
condlav_ricod     57,5 8 0       
condlav_ricod(1) 0,836 0,313 7,149 1 0,01 2,307 1,25 4,257 
condlav_ricod(2) -0,723 1,075 0,452 1 0,5 0,485 0,059 3,99 
condlav_ricod(3) 0,672 0,863 0,607 1 0,44 1,958 0,361 10,616 
condlav_ricod(4) 1,092 0,475 5,288 1 0,02 2,98 1,175 7,557 
condlav_ricod(5) 1,659 0,291 32,51 1 0 5,256 2,971 9,297 
condlav_ricod(6) -0,134 0,822 0,027 1 0,87 0,874 0,175 4,376 
condlav_ricod(7) 1,517 0,542 7,842 1 0,01 4,559 1,577 13,183 
condlav_ricod(8) 1,677 0,32 27,41 1 0 5,351 2,856 10,025 
hh_infocare_w1     2,693 5 0,75       
hh_infocare_w1(1) 0,303 0,31 0,952 1 0,33 1,354 0,737 2,488 
hh_infocare_w1(2) 0,298 0,472 0,399 1 0,53 1,347 0,534 3,397 
hh_infocare_w1(3) 0,258 0,247 1,09 1 0,3 1,294 0,798 2,1 
hh_infocare_w1(4) 0,041 0,458 0,008 1 0,93 1,042 0,425 2,556 
hh_infocare_w1(5) 0,612 0,493 1,543 1 0,21 1,844 0,702 4,845 
Qexpt_y_w1     20,15 4 0       
Qexpt_y_w1(1) -1,079 0,301 12,81 1 0 0,34 0,188 0,614 
Qexpt_y_w1(2) -0,73 0,265 7,583 1 0,01 0,482 0,287 0,81 
Qexpt_y_w1(3) -0,166 0,236 0,495 1 0,48 0,847 0,534 1,345 
Qexpt_y_w1(4) 0,116 0,229 0,256 1 0,61 1,123 0,717 1,757 
ltc_prob_w1     1,053 2 0,59       
ltc_prob_w1(1) 0,237 0,269 0,779 1 0,38 1,268 0,749 2,146 
ltc_prob_w1(2) 0,003 0,249 0 1 0,99 1,003 0,616 1,635 
hhsize_ricod     19,84 3 0       
hhsize_ricod(1) 0,533 0,225 5,616 1 0,02 1,704 1,097 2,649 
hhsize_ricod(2) 0,416 0,259 2,578 1 0,11 1,516 0,912 2,519 
hhsize_ricod(3) 1,181 0,274 18,6 1 0 3,257 1,904 5,57 
hh_M_pub_bft_w1     8,881 2 0,01       
hh_M_pub_bft_w1(1) 0,51 0,258 3,906 1 0,05 1,665 1,004 2,762 
hh_M_pub_bft_w1(2) -2,225 1,05 4,489 1 0,03 0,108 0,014 0,846 
hh_M_hpr_w1     9,368 2 0,01       
hh_M_hpr_w1(1) -0,542 0,261 4,317 1 0,04 0,582 0,349 0,97 
hh_M_hpr_w1(2) -1,398 0,57 6,014 1 0,01 0,247 0,081 0,755 
gender_w1(1) -0,207 0,154 1,811 1 0,18 0,813 0,601 1,099 
private_ltc_service_w1(1) -19,75 10538,2 0 1 1 0 0 . 
no_infocare_w1(1) 0,062 0,265 0,055 1 0,82 1,064 0,633 1,788 
Costante -2,479 0,366 45,96 1 0 0,084     
 
 
SPAIN, WAVE 2, POPULATION OVER 65 YEARS 
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95% CI per EXP(B) 
  B E.S. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) Inferiore Superiore 
pr_careM_w2     0,752 2 0,69       
pr_careM_w2(1) -0,23 0,28 0,681 1 0,41 0,795 0,462 1,37 
pr_careM_w2(2) 0,043 0,34 0,016 1 0,9 1,044 0,538 2,024 
Mhh_pub_bft_ltc     9,76 2 0,01       
Mhh_pub_bft_ltc(1) 0,247 0,4 0,385 1 0,54 1,28 0,587 2,79 
Mhh_pub_bft_ltc(2) -1,59 0,52 9,208 1 0 0,204 0,073 0,57 
Qspesecare_y     22,45 4 0       
Qspesecare_y(1) -1,22 0,34 13,04 1 0 0,297 0,153 0,574 
Qspesecare_y(2) -0,66 0,29 5,311 1 0,02 0,515 0,293 0,906 
Qspesecare_y(3) -0,47 0,27 3,036 1 0,08 0,623 0,366 1,061 
Qspesecare_y(4) 0,356 0,27 1,79 1 0,18 1,427 0,848 2,404 
ltc_prob_w2     0,106 2 0,95       
ltc_prob_w2(1) 0,045 0,27 0,028 1 0,87 1,046 0,618 1,77 
ltc_prob_w2(2) -0,04 0,25 0,026 1 0,87 0,96 0,586 1,574 
gender_w2(1) 0,132 0,14 0,906 1 0,34 1,142 0,869 1,5 
hhsize_w2     39,77 3 0       
hhsize_w2(1) 0,88 0,27 10,34 1 0 2,411 1,41 4,123 
hhsize_w2(2) 1,431 0,3 22,67 1 0 4,183 2,321 7,539 
hhsize_w2(3) 1,808 0,33 30,38 1 0 6,095 3,205 11,592 
eta_3calssi     13,02 2 0       
eta_3calssi(1) 0,526 0,15 13,02 1 0 1,692 1,272 2,252 
eta_3calssi(2) 0,303 0,24 1,531 1 0,22 1,353 0,838 2,185 
hh_infocare_w2     10,07 6 0,12       
hh_infocare_w2(1) 0,514 0,32 2,658 1 0,1 1,672 0,901 3,1 
hh_infocare_w2(2) 1,089 0,5 4,657 1 0,03 2,97 1,105 7,982 
hh_infocare_w2(3) -0,03 0,24 0,019 1 0,89 0,968 0,609 1,538 
hh_infocare_w2(4) 0,575 0,4 2,043 1 0,15 1,777 0,808 3,908 
hh_infocare_w2(5) 0,504 0,58 0,767 1 0,38 1,656 0,536 5,12 
hh_infocare_w2(6) 0,036 0,26 0,02 1 0,89 1,037 0,627 1,715 
ricod_cond_lav_3     91,31 11 0       
ricod_cond_lav_3(1) 1,248 0,28 19,95 1 0 3,484 2,015 6,024 
ricod_cond_lav_3(2) 0,138 0,6 0,053 1 0,82 1,148 0,355 3,712 
ricod_cond_lav_3(3) 1,73 0,21 66,88 1 0 5,639 3,725 8,535 
ricod_cond_lav_3(4) 1,984 0,41 23,87 1 0 7,274 3,281 16,124 
ricod_cond_lav_3(5) -0,03 0,75 0,001 1 0,97 0,973 0,223 4,245 
ricod_cond_lav_3(6) 0,766 1,05 0,535 1 0,47 2,151 0,276 16,774 
ricod_cond_lav_3(7) 0,688 0,59 1,34 1 0,25 1,989 0,621 6,374 
ricod_cond_lav_3(8) 1,199 0,79 2,306 1 0,13 3,317 0,706 15,592 
ricod_cond_lav_3(9) 1,301 0,59 4,795 1 0,03 3,672 1,146 11,766 
ricod_cond_lav_3(10) 2,596 0,79 10,85 1 0 13,4 2,861 62,787 
ricod_cond_lav_3(11) 2,1 0,32 44,2 1 0 8,17 4,398 15,175 
private_ltc_service_w2(1) -0,28 0,93 0,088 1 0,77 0,758 0,121 4,731 
Costante -2,89 0,35 68,48 1 0 0,056     
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SPAIN, WAVE 4, POPULATION OVER 65 YEARS 
 
       
95% CI per EXP(B) 
  B E.S. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) Inferiore Superiore 
condlav_ricod     139,1 17 0       
condlav_ricod(1) 1,44 0,47 9,296 1 0 4,22 1,672 10,648 
condlav_ricod(2) 0,087 0,49 0,032 1 0,86 1,091 0,42 2,834 
condlav_ricod(3) 2,387 0,45 28,779 1 0 10,88 4,548 26,013 
condlav_ricod(4) 0,936 0,63 2,185 1 0,14 2,549 0,737 8,815 
condlav_ricod(5) 1,93 0,29 43,835 1 0 6,888 3,891 12,196 
condlav_ricod(6) 0,565 0,37 2,37 1 0,12 1,76 0,857 3,614 
condlav_ricod(7) 0,913 0,61 2,27 1 0,13 2,492 0,76 8,174 
condlav_ricod(8) 0,884 0,31 8,087 1 0 2,421 1,316 4,454 
condlav_ricod(9) 0,858 0,4 4,557 1 0,03 2,358 1,073 5,182 
condlav_ricod(10) 1,273 0,26 24,679 1 0 3,572 2,161 5,902 
condlav_ricod(11) 2,755 0,43 41,575 1 0 15,73 6,806 36,335 
condlav_ricod(12) 2,166 0,72 8,956 1 0 8,723 2,112 36,034 
condlav_ricod(13) 3,169 0,35 80,919 1 0 23,78 11,924 47,441 
condlav_ricod(14) 1,432 0,54 6,975 1 0,01 4,187 1,447 12,119 
condlav_ricod(15) 2,112 0,44 23,368 1 0 8,262 3,51 19,451 
condlav_ricod(16) 1,588 0,41 14,758 1 0 4,893 2,177 11,001 
condlav_ricod(17) 1,446 0,43 11,328 1 0 4,247 1,83 9,861 
gender_w4(1) 0,062 0,14 0,188 1 0,66 1,064 0,805 1,406 
ftgiv_w4(1) -0,06 0,96 0,004 1 0,95 0,94 0,143 6,189 
ftrec_w4(1) -0,64 0,86 0,557 1 0,46 0,527 0,098 2,831 
n_fratelli_cl_w4     9,983 5 0,08       
n_fratelli_cl_w4(1) 0 0,26 0 1 1 1 0,597 1,675 
n_fratelli_cl_w4(2) 0,279 0,25 1,214 1 0,27 1,322 0,804 2,174 
n_fratelli_cl_w4(3) 0,559 0,26 4,572 1 0,03 1,749 1,048 2,919 
n_fratelli_cl_w4(4) 0,345 0,25 1,939 1 0,16 1,412 0,869 2,293 
n_fratelli_cl_w4(5) 0,599 0,32 3,528 1 0,06 1,821 0,974 3,404 
infocare_dato_hh_w4     3,076 4 0,55       
infocare_dato_hh_w4(1) -0,32 0,34 0,876 1 0,35 0,73 0,377 1,412 
infocare_dato_hh_w4(2) -0,11 0,36 0,096 1 0,76 0,895 0,442 1,809 
infocare_dato_hh_w4(3) -1,55 1,08 2,037 1 0,15 0,213 0,025 1,782 
infocare_dato_hh_w4(4) -0,25 0,64 0,154 1 0,69 0,779 0,224 2,71 
age_clas_w4     2,999 3 0,39       
age_clas_w4(1) -0,49 0,35 2,007 1 0,16 0,611 0,309 1,208 
age_clas_w4(2) -0,59 0,35 2,932 1 0,09 0,554 0,282 1,089 
age_clas_w4(3) -0,5 0,36 1,923 1 0,17 0,609 0,302 1,228 
hhsize_cl_w4     37,684 4 0       
hhsize_cl_w4(1) -0,52 0,35 2,161 1 0,14 0,597 0,3 1,187 
hhsize_cl_w4(2) 0,369 0,35 1,114 1 0,29 1,446 0,729 2,87 
hhsize_cl_w4(3) 0,446 0,35 1,615 1 0,2 1,563 0,785 3,11 
hhsize_cl_w4(4) 2,032 0,98 4,349 1 0,04 7,632 1,13 51,542 
salute_gen_individ     3,273 4 0,51       
salute_gen_individ(1) -0,38 0,46 0,672 1 0,41 0,685 0,278 1,692 
salute_gen_individ(2) -0,12 0,25 0,221 1 0,64 0,888 0,54 1,46 
salute_gen_individ(3) -1,24 0,81 2,347 1 0,13 0,29 0,059 1,413 
salute_gen_individ(4) 0,123 0,34 0,13 1 0,72 1,131 0,58 2,207 
Costante -2,3 0,54 18,098 1 0 0,1     
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SPAIN, WAVE 1, POPULATION AGED BETWEEN 50 AND 65 YEARS 
 
  B E.S. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) Inferiore Superiore 
condlav_ricod     69,113 18 0       
condlav_ricod(1) 1,796 0,67 7,304 1 0,01 6,029 1,638 22,183 
condlav_ricod(2) 0,486 0,75 0,416 1 0,52 1,626 0,371 7,117 
condlav_ricod(3) 0,425 1,14 0,139 1 0,71 1,529 0,164 14,228 
condlav_ricod(4) 2,527 0,66 14,691 1 0 12,51 3,437 45,551 
condlav_ricod(5) 1,495 0,5 9,07 1 0 4,458 1,685 11,79 
condlav_ricod(6) 0,993 0,48 4,205 1 0,04 2,7 1,045 6,976 
condlav_ricod(7) 1,394 0,53 6,891 1 0,01 4,03 1,423 11,409 
condlav_ricod(8) 0,836 0,88 0,909 1 0,34 2,307 0,414 12,868 
condlav_ricod(9) 1,63 0,65 6,265 1 0,01 5,106 1,424 18,302 
condlav_ricod(10) 1,582 0,48 10,854 1 0 4,866 1,898 12,474 
condlav_ricod(11) 4,162 1,19 12,146 1 0 64,17 6,179 666,42 
condlav_ricod(12) 4,067 0,99 16,966 1 0 58,41 8,432 404,577 
condlav_ricod(13) 2,888 0,7 16,973 1 0 17,96 4,546 70,978 
condlav_ricod(14) 3,063 0,6 25,994 1 0 21,39 6,589 69,436 
condlav_ricod(15) 2,246 0,66 11,443 1 0 9,453 2,572 34,738 
condlav_ricod(16) 1,641 0,48 11,48 1 0 5,158 1,997 13,324 
condlav_ricod(17) 3,096 0,81 14,784 1 0 22,1 4,562 107,103 
condlav_ricod(18) 2,159 0,56 14,761 1 0 8,663 2,88 26,061 
gender_w1(1) -0,02 0,19 0,012 1 0,91 0,98 0,683 1,408 
n_fratelli_cl     2,837 5 0,73       
n_fratelli_cl(1) -0,12 0,33 0,127 1 0,72 0,889 0,465 1,699 
n_fratelli_cl(2) 0,03 0,32 0,009 1 0,93 1,031 0,551 1,929 
n_fratelli_cl(3) 0,242 0,33 0,529 1 0,47 1,274 0,663 2,449 
n_fratelli_cl(4) 0,178 0,31 0,329 1 0,57 1,195 0,65 2,195 
n_fratelli_cl(5) 0,306 0,39 0,623 1 0,43 1,358 0,635 2,903 
salute_gen_individ     1,368 4 0,85       
salute_gen_individ(1) -0,37 0,65 0,318 1 0,57 0,693 0,193 2,48 
salute_gen_individ(2) 0,12 0,29 0,169 1 0,68 1,128 0,636 2 
salute_gen_individ(3) -0,21 0,49 0,178 1 0,67 0,812 0,309 2,135 
salute_gen_individ(4) -0,23 0,29 0,636 1 0,43 0,793 0,449 1,402 
Q_infocare_dato_w1     7,711 4 0,1       
Q_infocare_dato_w1(1) -1,43 0,77 3,478 1 0,06 0,239 0,053 1,076 
Q_infocare_dato_w1(2) -0,45 0,55 0,664 1 0,42 0,64 0,219 1,872 
Q_infocare_dato_w1(3) -1,8 1,06 2,89 1 0,09 0,165 0,021 1,317 
Q_infocare_dato_w1(4) -0,57 0,57 1,006 1 0,32 0,563 0,184 1,729 
hhsize_ricod     35,203 3 0       
hhsize_ricod(1) 0,253 0,43 0,356 1 0,55 1,288 0,561 2,961 
hhsize_ricod(2) 0,523 0,42 1,549 1 0,21 1,686 0,74 3,841 
hhsize_ricod(3) 1,389 0,42 11,141 1 0 4,009 1,774 9,06 
age_clas     11,341 3 0,01       
age_clas(1) -0,15 0,34 0,208 1 0,65 0,858 0,444 1,659 
age_clas(2) 0,315 0,33 0,897 1 0,34 1,37 0,714 2,627 
age_clas(3) 0,645 0,35 3,38 1 0,07 1,905 0,958 3,788 
ftgiv_w1(1) -0,05 0,49 0,009 1 0,92 0,953 0,363 2,503 
ftrec_w1(1) 0,679 0,48 1,968 1 0,16 1,972 0,764 5,094 
Costante -4 0,7 32,594 1 0 0,018     
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SPAIN, WAVE 2, POPULATION AGED BETWEEN 50 AND 65 YEARS 
 
       
95% CI per EXP(B) 
  B E.S. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) Inferiore Superiore 
condlav_ricod     139,1 17 0       
condlav_ricod(1) 1,44 0,47 9,296 1 0 4,22 1,672 10,648 
condlav_ricod(2) 0,087 0,49 0,032 1 0,86 1,091 0,42 2,834 
condlav_ricod(3) 2,387 0,45 28,779 1 0 10,88 4,548 26,013 
condlav_ricod(4) 0,936 0,63 2,185 1 0,14 2,549 0,737 8,815 
condlav_ricod(5) 1,93 0,29 43,835 1 0 6,888 3,891 12,196 
condlav_ricod(6) 0,565 0,37 2,37 1 0,12 1,76 0,857 3,614 
condlav_ricod(7) 0,913 0,61 2,27 1 0,13 2,492 0,76 8,174 
condlav_ricod(8) 0,884 0,31 8,087 1 0 2,421 1,316 4,454 
condlav_ricod(9) 0,858 0,4 4,557 1 0,03 2,358 1,073 5,182 
condlav_ricod(10) 1,273 0,26 24,679 1 0 3,572 2,161 5,902 
condlav_ricod(11) 2,755 0,43 41,575 1 0 15,73 6,806 36,335 
condlav_ricod(12) 2,166 0,72 8,956 1 0 8,723 2,112 36,034 
condlav_ricod(13) 3,169 0,35 80,919 1 0 23,78 11,924 47,441 
condlav_ricod(14) 1,432 0,54 6,975 1 0,01 4,187 1,447 12,119 
condlav_ricod(15) 2,112 0,44 23,368 1 0 8,262 3,51 19,451 
condlav_ricod(16) 1,588 0,41 14,758 1 0 4,893 2,177 11,001 
condlav_ricod(17) 1,446 0,43 11,328 1 0 4,247 1,83 9,861 
gender_w4(1) 0,062 0,14 0,188 1 0,66 1,064 0,805 1,406 
ftgiv_w4(1) -0,06 0,96 0,004 1 0,95 0,94 0,143 6,189 
ftrec_w4(1) -0,64 0,86 0,557 1 0,46 0,527 0,098 2,831 
n_fratelli_cl_w4     9,983 5 0,08       
n_fratelli_cl_w4(1) 0 0,26 0 1 1 1 0,597 1,675 
n_fratelli_cl_w4(2) 0,279 0,25 1,214 1 0,27 1,322 0,804 2,174 
n_fratelli_cl_w4(3) 0,559 0,26 4,572 1 0,03 1,749 1,048 2,919 
n_fratelli_cl_w4(4) 0,345 0,25 1,939 1 0,16 1,412 0,869 2,293 
n_fratelli_cl_w4(5) 0,599 0,32 3,528 1 0,06 1,821 0,974 3,404 
infocare_dato_hh_w4     3,076 4 0,55       
infocare_dato_hh_w4(1) -0,32 0,34 0,876 1 0,35 0,73 0,377 1,412 
infocare_dato_hh_w4(2) -0,11 0,36 0,096 1 0,76 0,895 0,442 1,809 
infocare_dato_hh_w4(3) -1,55 1,08 2,037 1 0,15 0,213 0,025 1,782 
infocare_dato_hh_w4(4) -0,25 0,64 0,154 1 0,69 0,779 0,224 2,71 
age_clas_w4     2,999 3 0,39       
age_clas_w4(1) -0,49 0,35 2,007 1 0,16 0,611 0,309 1,208 
age_clas_w4(2) -0,59 0,35 2,932 1 0,09 0,554 0,282 1,089 
age_clas_w4(3) -0,5 0,36 1,923 1 0,17 0,609 0,302 1,228 
hhsize_cl_w4     37,684 4 0       
hhsize_cl_w4(1) -0,52 0,35 2,161 1 0,14 0,597 0,3 1,187 
hhsize_cl_w4(2) 0,369 0,35 1,114 1 0,29 1,446 0,729 2,87 
hhsize_cl_w4(3) 0,446 0,35 1,615 1 0,2 1,563 0,785 3,11 
hhsize_cl_w4(4) 2,032 0,98 4,349 1 0,04 7,632 1,13 51,542 
salute_gen_individ     3,273 4 0,51       
salute_gen_individ(1) -0,38 0,46 0,672 1 0,41 0,685 0,278 1,692 
salute_gen_individ(2) -0,12 0,25 0,221 1 0,64 0,888 0,54 1,46 
salute_gen_individ(3) -1,24 0,81 2,347 1 0,13 0,29 0,059 1,413 
salute_gen_individ(4) 0,123 0,34 0,13 1 0,72 1,131 0,58 2,207 
Costante -2,3 0,54 18,098 1 0 0,1     
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SPAIN, WAVE 4, POPULATION AGED BETWEEN 50 AND 65 YEARS 
 
       
95% CI per EXP(B) 
  B E.S. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) Inferiore Superiore 
condlav_ricod     139,1 17 0       
condlav_ricod(1) 1,44 0,47 9,296 1 0 4,22 1,672 10,648 
condlav_ricod(2) 0,087 0,49 0,032 1 0,86 1,091 0,42 2,834 
condlav_ricod(3) 2,387 0,45 28,779 1 0 10,88 4,548 26,013 
condlav_ricod(4) 0,936 0,63 2,185 1 0,14 2,549 0,737 8,815 
condlav_ricod(5) 1,93 0,29 43,835 1 0 6,888 3,891 12,196 
condlav_ricod(6) 0,565 0,37 2,37 1 0,12 1,76 0,857 3,614 
condlav_ricod(7) 0,913 0,61 2,27 1 0,13 2,492 0,76 8,174 
condlav_ricod(8) 0,884 0,31 8,087 1 0 2,421 1,316 4,454 
condlav_ricod(9) 0,858 0,4 4,557 1 0,03 2,358 1,073 5,182 
condlav_ricod(10) 1,273 0,26 24,679 1 0 3,572 2,161 5,902 
condlav_ricod(11) 2,755 0,43 41,575 1 0 15,73 6,806 36,335 
condlav_ricod(12) 2,166 0,72 8,956 1 0 8,723 2,112 36,034 
condlav_ricod(13) 3,169 0,35 80,919 1 0 23,78 11,924 47,441 
condlav_ricod(14) 1,432 0,54 6,975 1 0,01 4,187 1,447 12,119 
condlav_ricod(15) 2,112 0,44 23,368 1 0 8,262 3,51 19,451 
condlav_ricod(16) 1,588 0,41 14,758 1 0 4,893 2,177 11,001 
condlav_ricod(17) 1,446 0,43 11,328 1 0 4,247 1,83 9,861 
gender_w4(1) 0,062 0,14 0,188 1 0,66 1,064 0,805 1,406 
ftgiv_w4(1) -0,06 0,96 0,004 1 0,95 0,94 0,143 6,189 
ftrec_w4(1) -0,64 0,86 0,557 1 0,46 0,527 0,098 2,831 
n_fratelli_cl_w4     9,983 5 0,08       
n_fratelli_cl_w4(1) 0 0,26 0 1 1 1 0,597 1,675 
n_fratelli_cl_w4(2) 0,279 0,25 1,214 1 0,27 1,322 0,804 2,174 
n_fratelli_cl_w4(3) 0,559 0,26 4,572 1 0,03 1,749 1,048 2,919 
n_fratelli_cl_w4(4) 0,345 0,25 1,939 1 0,16 1,412 0,869 2,293 
n_fratelli_cl_w4(5) 0,599 0,32 3,528 1 0,06 1,821 0,974 3,404 
infocare_dato_hh_w4     3,076 4 0,55       
infocare_dato_hh_w4(1) -0,32 0,34 0,876 1 0,35 0,73 0,377 1,412 
infocare_dato_hh_w4(2) -0,11 0,36 0,096 1 0,76 0,895 0,442 1,809 
infocare_dato_hh_w4(3) -1,55 1,08 2,037 1 0,15 0,213 0,025 1,782 
infocare_dato_hh_w4(4) -0,25 0,64 0,154 1 0,69 0,779 0,224 2,71 
age_clas_w4     2,999 3 0,39       
age_clas_w4(1) -0,49 0,35 2,007 1 0,16 0,611 0,309 1,208 
age_clas_w4(2) -0,59 0,35 2,932 1 0,09 0,554 0,282 1,089 
age_clas_w4(3) -0,5 0,36 1,923 1 0,17 0,609 0,302 1,228 
hhsize_cl_w4     37,684 4 0       
hhsize_cl_w4(1) -0,52 0,35 2,161 1 0,14 0,597 0,3 1,187 
hhsize_cl_w4(2) 0,369 0,35 1,114 1 0,29 1,446 0,729 2,87 
hhsize_cl_w4(3) 0,446 0,35 1,615 1 0,2 1,563 0,785 3,11 
hhsize_cl_w4(4) 2,032 0,98 4,349 1 0,04 7,632 1,13 51,542 
salute_gen_individ     3,273 4 0,51       
salute_gen_individ(1) -0,38 0,46 0,672 1 0,41 0,685 0,278 1,692 
salute_gen_individ(2) -0,12 0,25 0,221 1 0,64 0,888 0,54 1,46 
salute_gen_individ(3) -1,24 0,81 2,347 1 0,13 0,29 0,059 1,413 
salute_gen_individ(4) 0,123 0,34 0,13 1 0,72 1,131 0,58 2,207 
Costante -2,3 0,54 18,098 1 0 0,1     
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SWEDEN WAVE 1, POPULATION OVER 65 YEARS 
 
      
Exp(B) 
95% CI per EXP(B) 
  B E.S. Wald df Sig. Inferiore Superiore 
condlav_ricod     46,6 8 0       
condlav_ricod(1) 0,701 0,26 7,327 1 0,01 2,016 1,213 3,35 
condlav_ricod(2) -0,88 1,06 0,687 1 0,41 0,416 0,052 3,314 
condlav_ricod(3) 1,698 0,74 5,274 1 0,02 5,461 1,283 23,253 
condlav_ricod(4) 1,284 0,24 29,54 1 0 3,61 2,272 5,735 
condlav_ricod(5) -0,64 1,08 0,354 1 0,55 0,526 0,063 4,368 
condlav_ricod(6) -1,39 1,16 1,432 1 0,23 0,249 0,026 2,426 
condlav_ricod(7) 0,855 1,21 0,503 1 0,48 2,352 0,221 25,011 
condlav_ricod(8) 1,359 0,3 20,07 1 0 3,893 2,148 7,056 
Qexpt_y_w1     55,38 4 0       
Qexpt_y_w1(1) -1,36 0,3 19,86 1 0 0,258 0,142 0,468 
Qexpt_y_w1(2) -0,32 0,25 1,595 1 0,21 0,728 0,445 1,192 
Qexpt_y_w1(3) -0,21 0,26 0,685 1 0,41 0,807 0,486 1,341 
Qexpt_y_w1(4) 0,79 0,26 9,293 1 0 2,204 1,326 3,663 
hh_infocare_w1     5,674 5 0,34       
hh_infocare_w1(1) -0,3 0,35 0,761 1 0,38 0,739 0,374 1,459 
hh_infocare_w1(2) 0,547 0,5 1,18 1 0,28 1,728 0,644 4,637 
hh_infocare_w1(3) -0,01 0,33 0 1 0,98 0,993 0,521 1,894 
hh_infocare_w1(4) 0,808 0,54 2,269 1 0,13 2,244 0,784 6,421 
hh_infocare_w1(5) -0,43 0,83 0,268 1 0,61 0,65 0,127 3,324 
hhsize_ricod     52,86 3 0       
hhsize_ricod(1) -1,16 0,25 22,02 1 0 0,314 0,194 0,509 
hhsize_ricod(2) -0,72 0,29 6,144 1 0,01 0,487 0,276 0,86 
hhsize_ricod(3) 0,531 0,3 3,141 1 0,08 1,701 0,945 3,061 
ltc_prob_w1     1,528 2 0,47       
ltc_prob_w1(1) 0,047 0,33 0,02 1 0,89 1,048 0,548 2,001 
ltc_prob_w1(2) -0,31 0,32 0,986 1 0,32 0,73 0,393 1,358 
hh_M_pub_bft_w1     3,356 2 0,19       
hh_M_pub_bft_w1(1) 0,193 0,35 0,298 1 0,59 1,213 0,607 2,424 
hh_M_pub_bft_w1(2) -0,62 0,37 2,852 1 0,09 0,54 0,264 1,104 
hh_hprcare_ricod(1) -0,75 0,42 3,2 1 0,07 0,475 0,21 1,074 
gender_w1(1) 0,241 0,17 1,901 1 0,17 1,272 0,904 1,79 
private_ltc_service_w1(1) -1,86 1,15 2,62 1 0,11 0,155 0,016 1,481 
no_infocare_w1(1) 0,663 0,32 4,413 1 0,04 1,94 1,045 3,6 
Costante -1,29 0,36 12,92 1 0 0,277     
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SWEDEN WAVE 2, POPULATION OVER 65 YEARS 
 
      
Exp(B) 
95% CI per EXP(B) 
  B E.S. Wald df Sig. Inferiore Superiore 
cond_lav_ricod     13,47 3 0       
cond_lav_ricod(1) 1,948 0,55 12,63 1 0 7,014 2,396 20,533 
cond_lav_ricod(2) 0,73 0,57 1,615 1 0,2 2,075 0,673 6,395 
cond_lav_ricod(3) 0,555 0,9 0,383 1 0,54 1,742 0,3 10,106 
Q_totexpcare_y     42,3 4 0       
Q_totexpcare_y(1) -3,47 0,82 17,8 1 0 0,031 0,006 0,156 
Q_totexpcare_y(2) -2,49 0,61 16,68 1 0 0,083 0,025 0,273 
Q_totexpcare_y(3) -1,61 0,49 10,88 1 0 0,2 0,077 0,52 
Q_totexpcare_y(4) -0,34 0,43 0,601 1 0,44 0,715 0,306 1,671 
hh_infocare_3cat     9,734 4 0,05       
hh_infocare_3cat(1) -0,16 0,41 0,149 1 0,7 0,855 0,387 1,892 
hh_infocare_3cat(2) -0,14 0,62 0,048 1 0,83 0,873 0,26 2,93 
hh_infocare_3cat(3) -2,27 1,11 4,147 1 0,04 0,104 0,012 0,918 
hh_infocare_3cat(4) -1,27 0,57 4,936 1 0,03 0,281 0,092 0,861 
hhsize_3cat     5,377 2 0,07       
hhsize_3cat(1) 0,506 0,56 0,812 1 0,37 1,659 0,552 4,985 
hhsize_3cat(2) 1,946 0,86 5,101 1 0,02 7 1,293 37,886 
ltc_prob_w2     10,99 2 0       
ltc_prob_w2(1) 1,285 0,53 5,863 1 0,02 3,614 1,277 10,226 
ltc_prob_w2(2) 1,682 0,51 10,74 1 0 5,378 1,967 14,709 
Mhh_pub_bft_ltc     1,517 2 0,47       
Mhh_pub_bft_ltc(1) 0,792 0,64 1,517 1 0,22 2,207 0,626 7,779 
Mhh_pub_bft_ltc(2) 0,159 0,82 0,038 1 0,85 1,172 0,237 5,798 
pr_careM_w2     5,862 2 0,05       
pr_careM_w2(1) -1,2 0,51 5,662 1 0,02 0,301 0,112 0,809 
pr_careM_w2(2) -0,74 0,89 0,704 1 0,4 0,476 0,084 2,699 
gender_w2(1) 0,423 0,29 2,078 1 0,15 1,526 0,859 2,712 
private_ltc_service_w2(1) -0,38 1,22 0,095 1 0,76 0,686 0,062 7,546 
Costante -3,2 0,64 25,28 1 0 0,041     
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SWEDEN WAVE 4, POPULATION OVER 65 YEARS 
 
      
Exp(B) 
95% CI per EXP(B) 
  B E.S. Wald df Sig. Inferiore Superiore 
hhsize_cl_w4     35,77 3 0       
hhsize_cl_w4(1) -1,57 0,29 29,39 1 0 0,209 0,118 0,368 
hhsize_cl_w4(2) 0,016 0,59 0,001 1 0,98 1,016 0,321 3,211 
hhsize_cl_w4(3) 0,078 1,18 0,004 1 0,95 1,081 0,106 10,996 
age_clas_over65     11,87 3 0,01       
age_clas_over65(1) 0,336 0,27 1,547 1 0,21 1,399 0,824 2,374 
age_clas_over65(2) 0,64 0,27 5,512 1 0,02 1,897 1,112 3,238 
age_clas_over65(3) 0,818 0,26 10,22 1 0 2,266 1,372 3,742 
ltc_prob_w4     4,127 2 0,13       
ltc_prob_w4(1) 0,398 0,31 1,64 1 0,2 1,488 0,81 2,735 
ltc_prob_w4(2) 0,558 0,28 4,075 1 0,04 1,747 1,016 3,002 
hh_infocare_w4     9,643 7 0,21       
hh_infocare_w4(1) -0,01 0,29 0,001 1 0,97 0,99 0,563 1,741 
hh_infocare_w4(2) -0,08 0,35 0,051 1 0,82 0,923 0,462 1,845 
hh_infocare_w4(3) 0,231 0,51 0,202 1 0,65 1,26 0,46 3,452 
hh_infocare_w4(4) 0,221 0,38 0,334 1 0,56 1,247 0,59 2,638 
hh_infocare_w4(5) 0,733 0,74 0,972 1 0,32 2,081 0,485 8,93 
hh_infocare_w4(6) 1,745 0,61 8,225 1 0 5,728 1,738 18,878 
hh_infocare_w4(7) 0,339 0,88 0,149 1 0,7 1,403 0,251 7,849 
riceve_transfert_w4(1) 0,509 0,36 1,973 1 0,16 1,663 0,818 3,381 
condlav_ricod     9,806 3 0,02       
condlav_ricod(1) -0,21 0,29 0,529 1 0,47 0,813 0,465 1,421 
condlav_ricod(2) -2,69 1,03 6,835 1 0,01 0,068 0,009 0,51 
condlav_ricod(3) 1,151 0,73 2,508 1 0,11 3,16 0,761 13,129 
no_infocare(1) 0,21 0,31 0,465 1 0,5 1,234 0,675 2,255 
gender_w4(1) 0,332 0,17 3,996 1 0,05 1,394 1,007 1,93 
Costante -1,53 0,38 16,15 1 0 0,217     
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SWEDEN, WAVE 1, POPULATION AGED BETWEEN 50 AND 65 YEARS 
 
      
Exp(B) 
95% CI per EXP(B) 
  B E.S. Wald df Sig. Inferiore Superiore 
RICOD_CONDLAV_1     10,67 6 0,1       
RICOD_CONDLAV_1(1) 1,722 1,055 2,661 1 0,1 5,594 0,707 44,276 
RICOD_CONDLAV_1(2) 1,449 0,806 3,23 1 0,07 4,261 0,877 20,699 
RICOD_CONDLAV_1(3) 0,063 0,841 0,006 1 0,94 1,065 0,205 5,535 
RICOD_CONDLAV_1(4) 1,359 0,96 2,003 1 0,16 3,894 0,593 25,582 
RICOD_CONDLAV_1(5) 2,076 0,969 4,593 1 0,03 7,975 1,194 53,258 
RICOD_CONDLAV_1(6) 0,671 1,274 0,278 1 0,6 1,957 0,161 23,786 
gender_w1(1) 0,446 0,439 1,035 1 0,31 1,562 0,661 3,691 
n_fratelli_cl     2,891 5 0,72       
n_fratelli_cl(1) -0,885 0,669 1,749 1 0,19 0,413 0,111 1,532 
n_fratelli_cl(2) -0,461 0,656 0,494 1 0,48 0,631 0,174 2,281 
n_fratelli_cl(3) -0,251 0,658 0,145 1 0,7 0,778 0,214 2,828 
n_fratelli_cl(4) -0,956 0,765 1,565 1 0,21 0,384 0,086 1,719 
n_fratelli_cl(5) -0,095 0,89 0,011 1 0,92 0,909 0,159 5,205 
salute_gen_individ     2,543 4 0,64       
salute_gen_individ(1) 1,694 1,227 1,905 1 0,17 5,44 0,491 60,275 
salute_gen_individ(2) 0,254 0,818 0,096 1 0,76 1,289 0,26 6,403 
salute_gen_individ(3) -0,003 1,131 0 1 1 0,997 0,109 9,15 
salute_gen_individ(4) 0,596 0,588 1,027 1 0,31 1,815 0,573 5,745 
Q_infocare_dato_w1     0,331 4 0,99       
Q_infocare_dato_w1(1) -17,08 3050,55 0 1 1 0 0 . 
Q_infocare_dato_w1(2) -17,17 2683,93 0 1 1 0 0 . 
Q_infocare_dato_w1(3) -0,619 1,076 0,33 1 0,57 0,539 0,065 4,44 
Q_infocare_dato_w1(4) -0,024 0,681 0,001 1 0,97 0,976 0,257 3,708 
hhsize_ricod     18,15 3 0       
hhsize_ricod(1) -2,412 0,581 17,26 1 0 0,09 0,029 0,28 
hhsize_ricod(2) -1,411 0,698 4,084 1 0,04 0,244 0,062 0,958 
hhsize_ricod(3) -0,663 0,836 0,628 1 0,43 0,515 0,1 2,654 
age_clas     4,919 3 0,18       
age_clas(1) -1,545 0,753 4,214 1 0,04 0,213 0,049 0,933 
age_clas(2) -0,627 0,722 0,755 1 0,39 0,534 0,13 2,198 
age_clas(3) -1,122 0,817 1,885 1 0,17 0,326 0,066 1,616 
ftgiv_w1(1) 1,007 1,124 0,802 1 0,37 2,737 0,302 24,78 
ftrec_w1(1) 0,8 0,828 0,934 1 0,33 2,225 0,439 11,269 
Costante -2,494 1,142 4,775 1 0,03 0,083     
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SWEDEN, WAVE 2, POPULATION AGED BETWEEN 50 AND 65 YEARS 
 
       
95% CI per EXP(B) 
  B E.S. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) Inferiore Superiore 
ricod_cond_lav     39,93 12 0       
ricod_cond_lav(1) 2,056 0,63 10,712 1 0 7,814 2,281 26,763 
ricod_cond_lav(2) 1,063 0,44 5,979 1 0,01 2,896 1,235 6,789 
ricod_cond_lav(3) 1,684 1,12 2,264 1 0,13 5,388 0,601 48,325 
ricod_cond_lav(4) 1,672 0,82 4,187 1 0,04 5,321 1,073 26,381 
ricod_cond_lav(5) 3,157 0,91 11,928 1 0 23,51 3,918 141,027 
ricod_cond_lav(6) 1,69 0,5 11,545 1 0 5,42 2,045 14,369 
ricod_cond_lav(7) 1,327 0,51 6,824 1 0,01 3,77 1,393 10,205 
ricod_cond_lav(8) 2,273 0,61 13,687 1 0 9,712 2,912 32,384 
ricod_cond_lav(9) 0,946 0,68 1,944 1 0,16 2,576 0,681 9,742 
ricod_cond_lav(10) 2,175 0,67 10,591 1 0 8,806 2,376 32,639 
ricod_cond_lav(11) 3,338 0,8 17,495 1 0 28,16 5,893 134,527 
ricod_cond_lav(12) 2,657 0,93 8,224 1 0 14,26 2,319 87,663 
gender_w2(1) 0,194 0,26 0,557 1 0,46 1,214 0,729 2,022 
salute_gen_individ     3,545 4 0,47       
salute_gen_individ(1) -1,23 1,07 1,311 1 0,25 0,292 0,036 2,4 
salute_gen_individ(2) 0,478 0,36 1,729 1 0,19 1,613 0,791 3,288 
salute_gen_individ(3) -0,02 0,67 0,001 1 0,97 0,979 0,262 3,661 
salute_gen_individ(4) 0,285 0,45 0,404 1 0,53 1,33 0,552 3,201 
Q_infocare_dato     2,954 4 0,57       
Q_infocare_dato(1) -0,36 0,48 0,571 1 0,45 0,696 0,272 1,782 
Q_infocare_dato(2) 0,242 0,42 0,339 1 0,56 1,274 0,564 2,875 
Q_infocare_dato(3) -0,45 0,64 0,494 1 0,48 0,637 0,181 2,243 
Q_infocare_dato(4) -0,71 0,57 1,534 1 0,22 0,493 0,161 1,51 
n_fratelli_cl     4,519 5 0,48       
n_fratelli_cl(1) 0,208 0,45 0,21 1 0,65 1,231 0,506 2,993 
n_fratelli_cl(2) 0,398 0,46 0,754 1 0,39 1,489 0,606 3,659 
n_fratelli_cl(3) 0,644 0,47 1,842 1 0,18 1,904 0,751 4,824 
n_fratelli_cl(4) 0,789 0,47 2,834 1 0,09 2,202 0,878 5,519 
n_fratelli_cl(5) 0,121 0,84 0,021 1 0,89 1,128 0,218 5,843 
hhsize_cl     25,505 3 0       
hhsize_cl(1) -0,17 0,47 0,132 1 0,72 0,844 0,339 2,104 
hhsize_cl(2) 1,059 0,57 3,486 1 0,06 2,883 0,949 8,762 
hhsize_cl(3) 1,825 0,58 9,886 1 0 6,205 1,989 19,358 
age_clas     3,42 3 0,33       
age_clas(1) 0,289 0,81 0,126 1 0,72 1,335 0,271 6,571 
age_clas(2) 0,852 0,81 1,108 1 0,29 2,345 0,48 11,466 
age_clas(3) 0,89 0,83 1,148 1 0,28 2,436 0,478 12,422 
ricod_ft_giv(1) -0,12 1,07 0,013 1 0,91 0,886 0,108 7,241 
ricod_ft_rec(1) -0,63 0,59 1,149 1 0,28 0,532 0,168 1,686 
Costante -5,41 1,06 26,166 1 0 0,004     
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SWEDEN, WAVE 4, POPULATION AGED BETWEEN 50 AND 65 YEARS 
 
      
Exp(B) 
95% CI per EXP(B) 
  B E.S. Wald df Sig. Inferiore Superiore 
condlav_ricod_2     43,89 7 0       
condlav_ricod_2(1) 2,335 0,771 9,17 1 0 10,33 2,279 46,826 
condlav_ricod_2(2) 4,281 0,941 20,71 1 0 72,316 11,442 457,055 
condlav_ricod_2(3) 0,174 0,695 0,063 1 0,8 1,19 0,305 4,646 
condlav_ricod_2(4) 2,908 0,849 11,74 1 0 18,317 3,47 96,692 
condlav_ricod_2(5) 1,482 0,83 3,191 1 0,07 4,403 0,866 22,395 
condlav_ricod_2(6) 3,041 0,878 11,99 1 0 20,936 3,743 117,113 
condlav_ricod_2(7) 3,796 0,878 18,72 1 0 44,537 7,976 248,701 
gender_w4(1) 0,615 0,465 1,75 1 0,19 1,849 0,744 4,599 
ftgiv_w4(1) 0,77 1,497 0,264 1 0,61 2,159 0,115 40,639 
ftrec_w4(1) 0,483 1,261 0,147 1 0,7 1,62 0,137 19,167 
n_fratelli_cl_w4     6,016 5 0,31       
n_fratelli_cl_w4(1) -0,142 0,687 0,042 1 0,84 0,868 0,226 3,337 
n_fratelli_cl_w4(2) 0,55 0,697 0,623 1 0,43 1,734 0,442 6,802 
n_fratelli_cl_w4(3) -0,816 0,838 0,949 1 0,33 0,442 0,086 2,283 
n_fratelli_cl_w4(4) 0,708 0,736 0,925 1 0,34 2,03 0,48 8,594 
n_fratelli_cl_w4(5) 1,042 1,144 0,83 1 0,36 2,834 0,301 26,659 
infocare_dato_hh_w4     0,594 4 0,96       
infocare_dato_hh_w4(1) -19,41 15520,85 0 1 1 0 0 . 
infocare_dato_hh_w4(2) -18,31 4393,802 0 1 1 0 0 . 
infocare_dato_hh_w4(3) -0,797 1,113 0,512 1 0,47 0,451 0,051 3,996 
infocare_dato_hh_w4(4) -0,404 1,177 0,118 1 0,73 0,668 0,067 6,702 
age_clas_w4     0,687 2 0,71       
age_clas_w4(1) 0,518 1,186 0,191 1 0,66 1,679 0,164 17,146 
age_clas_w4(2) 0,158 1,197 0,017 1 0,9 1,171 0,112 12,224 
hhsize_cl_w4     14,25 3 0       
hhsize_cl_w4(1) -0,792 0,62 1,633 1 0,2 0,453 0,134 1,526 
hhsize_cl_w4(2) 1,22 0,692 3,109 1 0,08 3,388 0,873 13,155 
hhsize_cl_w4(3) 1,665 0,925 3,242 1 0,07 5,286 0,863 32,383 
salute_gen_individ     3,206 4 0,52       
salute_gen_individ(1) 0,45 1,303 0,119 1 0,73 1,568 0,122 20,138 
salute_gen_individ(2) -0,795 0,891 0,795 1 0,37 0,452 0,079 2,592 
salute_gen_individ(3) 0,746 1,316 0,322 1 0,57 2,109 0,16 27,814 
salute_gen_individ(4) -1,517 1,107 1,877 1 0,17 0,219 0,025 1,921 
Costante -4,477 1,493 8,994 1 0 0,011     
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POLAND, WAVE 2, POPULATION OVER 65 YEARS 
 
      
Exp(B) 
95% CI per EXP(B) 
  B E.S. Wald df Sig. Inferiore Superiore 
hh_size4cat     214,31 3 0       
hh_size4cat(1) 2,035 0,42 23,291 1 0 7,656 3,35 17,498 
hh_size4cat(2) 2,831 0,47 36,434 1 0 16,957 6,763 42,513 
hh_size4cat(3) 6,053 0,49 152,15 1 0 425,36 162,576 1112,876 
Qtotcareexp_y     87,142 4 0       
Qtotcareexp_y(1) -2,55 0,45 32,169 1 0 0,078 0,032 0,188 
Qtotcareexp_y(2) -1,53 0,43 12,461 1 0 0,217 0,093 0,506 
Qtotcareexp_y(3) -1,14 0,41 7,869 1 0,01 0,32 0,144 0,709 
Qtotcareexp_y(4) 0,869 0,37 5,416 1 0,02 2,384 1,147 4,955 
hh_infocare_prova     12,62 5 0,03       
hh_infocare_prova(1) 0,722 0,42 2,896 1 0,09 2,059 0,896 4,731 
hh_infocare_prova(2) 1,432 0,59 5,916 1 0,02 4,188 1,321 13,283 
hh_infocare_prova(3) -0,12 0,44 0,072 1 0,79 0,89 0,379 2,089 
hh_infocare_prova(4) -0,52 0,54 0,944 1 0,33 0,595 0,209 1,696 
hh_infocare_prova(5) 0,22 0,39 0,322 1 0,57 1,246 0,583 2,665 
ltc_prob_w2     0,526 2 0,77       
ltc_prob_w2(1) -0,2 0,42 0,231 1 0,63 0,817 0,358 1,865 
ltc_prob_w2(2) 0,056 0,35 0,026 1 0,87 1,058 0,537 2,085 
age_3cat     0,679 2 0,71       
age_3cat(1) 0,057 0,24 0,055 1 0,81 1,059 0,657 1,707 
age_3cat(2) 0,331 0,4 0,674 1 0,41 1,392 0,632 3,066 
hhpub_bftltc_M     2,118 2 0,35       
hhpub_bftltc_M(1) 0,916 0,65 1,974 1 0,16 2,5 0,696 8,972 
hhpub_bftltc_M(2) -0,31 1,01 0,096 1 0,76 0,732 0,102 5,266 
gender_w2(1) 0,211 0,23 0,822 1 0,37 1,235 0,782 1,949 
condlav_fam_prova     58,027 6 0       
condlav_fam_prova(1) 2,03 0,3 47,001 1 0 7,613 4,261 13,602 
condlav_fam_prova(2) 2,341 1,02 5,283 1 0,02 10,388 1,412 76,446 
condlav_fam_prova(3) -2,07 0,86 5,772 1 0,02 0,126 0,023 0,683 
condlav_fam_prova(4) 1,229 0,42 8,643 1 0 3,419 1,506 7,758 
condlav_fam_prova(5) 1,466 1,03 2,029 1 0,15 4,33 0,576 32,532 
condlav_fam_prova(6) 1,459 1,25 1,353 1 0,25 4,302 0,368 50,27 
private_ltc_service_w2(1) -1,07 1,38 0,605 1 0,44 0,343 0,023 5,098 
Costante -4,9 0,57 74,639 1 0 0,007     
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POLAND, WAVE 4, POPULATION OVER 65 YEARS 
 
      
Exp(B) 
95% CI per EXP(B) 
  B E.S. Wald df Sig. Inferiore Superiore 
hhsize_cl_w4     58,81 4 0       
hhsize_cl_w4(1) -0,56 0,28 3,942 1 0,05 0,573 0,331 0,993 
hhsize_cl_w4(2) -0,26 0,32 0,683 1 0,41 0,768 0,411 1,436 
hhsize_cl_w4(3) 0,624 0,27 5,167 1 0,02 1,866 1,09 3,195 
hhsize_cl_w4(4) 1,348 0,4 11,58 1 0 3,851 1,771 8,372 
age_clas_over65     2,248 3 0,52       
age_clas_over65(1) 0,114 0,23 0,252 1 0,62 1,12 0,719 1,746 
age_clas_over65(2) 0,322 0,23 2,011 1 0,16 1,38 0,884 2,154 
age_clas_over65(3) 0,237 0,23 1,067 1 0,3 1,267 0,809 1,985 
ltc_prob_w4     0,109 2 0,95       
ltc_prob_w4(1) 0,037 0,33 0,013 1 0,91 1,038 0,547 1,968 
ltc_prob_w4(2) 0,083 0,26 0,106 1 0,75 1,086 0,659 1,791 
hh_infocare_w4     3,322 7 0,85       
hh_infocare_w4(1) 0,608 0,46 1,768 1 0,18 1,836 0,75 4,497 
hh_infocare_w4(2) -0,19 0,49 0,15 1 0,7 0,826 0,315 2,17 
hh_infocare_w4(3) -0,15 0,35 0,172 1 0,68 0,864 0,434 1,721 
hh_infocare_w4(4) 0,216 0,3 0,509 1 0,48 1,241 0,686 2,247 
hh_infocare_w4(5) 0,299 0,77 0,149 1 0,7 1,348 0,296 6,144 
hh_infocare_w4(6) 0,266 0,68 0,154 1 0,7 1,304 0,346 4,921 
hh_infocare_w4(7) 0,117 0,46 0,066 1 0,8 1,124 0,46 2,747 
Mhh_pub_bft_ltc_w4     0,473 2 0,79       
Mhh_pub_bft_ltc_w4(1) -0,2 0,52 0,154 1 0,7 0,815 0,294 2,263 
Mhh_pub_bft_ltc_w4(2) 0,415 0,81 0,26 1 0,61 1,514 0,307 7,464 
condlav_ricod     2,792 6 0,83       
condlav_ricod(1) 0,151 0,22 0,474 1 0,49 1,163 0,756 1,789 
condlav_ricod(2) 0,677 0,67 1,01 1 0,32 1,969 0,525 7,38 
condlav_ricod(3) 0,219 0,55 0,16 1 0,69 1,245 0,425 3,646 
condlav_ricod(4) -0,15 0,38 0,153 1 0,7 0,86 0,406 1,825 
condlav_ricod(5) 0,767 0,68 1,283 1 0,26 2,154 0,571 8,125 
condlav_ricod(6) 0,189 0,55 0,117 1 0,73 1,208 0,409 3,572 
no_infocare(1) -0,47 0,28 2,863 1 0,09 0,627 0,365 1,077 
gender_w4(1) 0,201 0,16 1,613 1 0,2 1,223 0,896 1,669 
Costante -1,05 0,32 10,63 1 0 0,35     
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POLAND, WAVE 2, POPULATION AGED BETWEEN 50 AND 65 YEARS 
 
       
95% CI per EXP(B) 
  B E.S. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) Inferiore Superiore 
ricod_cond_lav     164,44 17 0       
ricod_cond_lav(1) 1,978 0,39 25,945 1 0 7,231 3,378 15,483 
ricod_cond_lav(2) 0,362 0,44 0,686 1 0,41 1,436 0,61 3,377 
ricod_cond_lav(3) 0,98 0,57 2,964 1 0,09 2,664 0,873 8,127 
ricod_cond_lav(4) 0,738 0,4 3,456 1 0,06 2,092 0,961 4,555 
ricod_cond_lav(5) 1,804 0,41 19,694 1 0 6,077 2,739 13,483 
ricod_cond_lav(6) 1,797 0,42 18,728 1 0 6,029 2,672 13,603 
ricod_cond_lav(7) 0,147 0,39 0,139 1 0,71 1,158 0,535 2,507 
ricod_cond_lav(8) 1,778 0,45 15,808 1 0 5,92 2,464 14,226 
ricod_cond_lav(9) -0,09 0,45 0,041 1 0,84 0,913 0,379 2,199 
ricod_cond_lav(10) 0,925 0,48 3,653 1 0,06 2,521 0,977 6,505 
ricod_cond_lav(11) 2,468 0,64 14,85 1 0 11,8 3,363 41,423 
ricod_cond_lav(12) 2,79 0,48 34,318 1 0 16,29 6,403 41,425 
ricod_cond_lav(13) 3,053 0,46 44,984 1 0 21,19 8,68 51,703 
ricod_cond_lav(14) 2,02 0,44 21,512 1 0 7,539 3,211 17,705 
ricod_cond_lav(15) 3,855 0,69 31,265 1 0 47,21 12,225 182,327 
ricod_cond_lav(16) 1,654 0,94 3,112 1 0,08 5,228 0,832 32,846 
ricod_cond_lav(17) 3,746 0,48 61,006 1 0 42,36 16,547 108,457 
gender_w2(1) 0,114 0,17 0,472 1 0,49 1,121 0,81 1,551 
salute_gen_individ     5,205 4 0,27       
salute_gen_individ(1) -0,2 0,58 0,112 1 0,74 0,823 0,263 2,579 
salute_gen_individ(2) -0,21 0,27 0,628 1 0,43 0,81 0,481 1,364 
salute_gen_individ(3) -1,79 0,85 4,409 1 0,04 0,168 0,032 0,888 
salute_gen_individ(4) -0,19 0,27 0,521 1 0,47 0,825 0,49 1,391 
Q_infocare_dato     13,013 4 0,01       
Q_infocare_dato(1) -2,34 0,87 7,216 1 0,01 0,096 0,018 0,531 
Q_infocare_dato(2) -0,55 0,53 1,079 1 0,3 0,577 0,205 1,628 
Q_infocare_dato(3) -0,47 0,52 0,823 1 0,36 0,626 0,227 1,723 
Q_infocare_dato(4) -1,32 0,62 4,6 1 0,03 0,267 0,08 0,892 
n_fratelli_cl     8,132 5 0,15       
n_fratelli_cl(1) 0,35 0,33 1,123 1 0,29 1,419 0,743 2,713 
n_fratelli_cl(2) 0,367 0,33 1,267 1 0,26 1,443 0,762 2,735 
n_fratelli_cl(3) 0,351 0,34 1,071 1 0,3 1,42 0,731 2,761 
n_fratelli_cl(4) 0,466 0,33 2,001 1 0,16 1,593 0,836 3,038 
n_fratelli_cl(5) 1,283 0,47 7,578 1 0,01 3,609 1,447 9 
hhsize_cl     118,54 4 0       
hhsize_cl(1) 0,226 0,34 0,445 1 0,51 1,254 0,645 2,438 
hhsize_cl(2) 1,068 0,35 9,195 1 0 2,91 1,459 5,804 
hhsize_cl(3) 2,111 0,34 38,042 1 0 8,257 4,222 16,149 
hhsize_cl(4) 3,014 0,43 49,937 1 0 20,36 8,827 46,968 
age_clas     4,599 3 0,2       
age_clas(1) -0,57 0,35 2,634 1 0,11 0,567 0,285 1,125 
age_clas(2) -0,51 0,37 1,895 1 0,17 0,601 0,291 1,241 
age_clas(3) -0,22 0,41 0,296 1 0,59 0,8 0,358 1,787 
ft_giv_cat(1) -0,31 0,67 0,214 1 0,64 0,733 0,197 2,73 
ft_rec_cat(1) 0,276 0,61 0,206 1 0,65 1,318 0,4 4,341 
Costante -3,73 0,6 39,21 1 0 0,024     
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POLAND, WAVE 4, POPULATION AGED BETWEEN 50 AND 65 YEARS 
 
       
95% CI per EXP(B) 
  B E.S. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) Inferiore Superiore 
condlav_ricod_1     63,293 16 0       
condlav_ricod_1(1) 1,961 0,54 13,244 1 0 7,106 2,472 20,43 
condlav_ricod_1(2) 0,463 0,61 0,582 1 0,45 1,589 0,483 5,22 
condlav_ricod_1(3) 1,402 0,68 4,226 1 0,04 4,065 1,068 15,479 
condlav_ricod_1(4) 1,888 0,54 12,428 1 0 6,606 2,312 18,869 
condlav_ricod_1(5) 1,694 0,74 5,28 1 0,02 5,441 1,283 23,076 
condlav_ricod_1(6) 0,913 0,59 2,386 1 0,12 2,492 0,782 7,941 
condlav_ricod_1(7) 1,432 0,51 7,934 1 0,01 4,189 1,546 11,35 
condlav_ricod_1(8) 1,907 0,61 9,651 1 0 6,732 2,022 22,419 
condlav_ricod_1(9) 1,741 0,53 10,795 1 0 5,703 2,019 16,112 
condlav_ricod_1(10) 1,48 0,72 4,24 1 0,04 4,393 1,074 17,974 
condlav_ricod_1(11) 3,347 0,63 28,144 1 0 28,42 8,252 97,875 
condlav_ricod_1(12) 2,571 0,71 13,08 1 0 13,08 3,247 52,713 
condlav_ricod_1(13) 3,911 0,77 25,547 1 0 49,96 10,963 227,64 
condlav_ricod_1(14) 2,442 1,05 5,401 1 0,02 11,49 1,466 90,093 
condlav_ricod_1(15) 2,8 0,64 19,051 1 0 16,44 4,677 57,817 
condlav_ricod_1(16) 1,77 0,73 5,924 1 0,02 5,871 1,412 24,421 
gender_w4(1) -0,06 0,21 0,084 1 0,77 0,94 0,62 1,425 
ftgiv_w4(1) -0,48 1,16 0,171 1 0,68 0,62 0,064 5,97 
ftrec_w4(1) -0,16 0,82 0,036 1 0,85 0,856 0,172 4,249 
n_fratelli_cl_w4     6,959 5 0,22       
n_fratelli_cl_w4(1) 0,227 0,3 0,573 1 0,45 1,254 0,698 2,255 
n_fratelli_cl_w4(2) 0,233 0,3 0,598 1 0,44 1,262 0,7 2,277 
n_fratelli_cl_w4(3) -0,26 0,34 0,583 1 0,45 0,774 0,4 1,495 
n_fratelli_cl_w4(4) 0,509 0,34 2,278 1 0,13 1,663 0,859 3,219 
n_fratelli_cl_w4(5) -0,93 0,86 1,167 1 0,28 0,395 0,073 2,132 
infocare_dato_hh_w4     7,547 4 0,11       
infocare_dato_hh_w4(1) 0,125 0,53 0,057 1 0,81 1,134 0,405 3,174 
infocare_dato_hh_w4(2) -1,51 0,84 3,192 1 0,07 0,222 0,043 1,157 
infocare_dato_hh_w4(3) -1,35 0,97 1,963 1 0,16 0,258 0,039 1,716 
infocare_dato_hh_w4(4) 1,469 0,99 2,217 1 0,14 4,343 0,628 30,018 
age_clas_w4     2,431 3 0,49       
age_clas_w4(1) -0,32 1,24 0,066 1 0,8 0,726 0,064 8,286 
age_clas_w4(2) -1,15 1,04 1,221 1 0,27 0,316 0,041 2,438 
age_clas_w4(3) -1,1 1,05 1,085 1 0,3 0,334 0,042 2,629 
hhsize_cl_w4     35,793 4 0       
hhsize_cl_w4(1) -0,19 0,43 0,202 1 0,65 0,824 0,354 1,917 
hhsize_cl_w4(2) 1,032 0,44 5,479 1 0,02 2,807 1,183 6,662 
hhsize_cl_w4(3) 1,154 0,43 7,074 1 0,01 3,172 1,355 7,424 
hhsize_cl_w4(4) 1,398 0,63 5,008 1 0,03 4,049 1,19 13,781 
salute_gen_individ     10,441 4 0,03       
salute_gen_individ(1) -1,05 1,08 0,943 1 0,33 0,351 0,042 2,905 
salute_gen_individ(2) -0,22 0,35 0,383 1 0,54 0,807 0,409 1,592 
salute_gen_individ(3) -2,06 1,13 3,334 1 0,07 0,128 0,014 1,163 
salute_gen_individ(4) 0,724 0,32 5,01 1 0,03 2,062 1,094 3,887 
Costante -2,2 1,22 3,262 1 0,07 0,111     
 
